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Foreword
On behalf of members of the Subcommittee on Models of Court Administration, I am pleased to
present the final report Alternative Models of Court Administration. The report was prepared by the
consultants employed by the Subcommittee to assist it in carrying out its work.
The Canadian Judicial Council has long been aware of the inefficiencies of the executive model 
of Court administration as well as the challenge it presents to the independence of the judiciary.
Prior to 2003, Council had already sponsored 2 major studies and dedicated a Chiefs’ seminar to
issues and concerns surrounding court administration.
In a 2003 Judge’s Day speech in Montreal, the Council’s chair, Chief Justice McLachlin, pointed out
that through these, and other, previous studies dealing with administrative efficiency and judicial
independence, a great deal of wisdom had been amassed. She then went on to say:“It is now time
to build on this wisdom and seek to formulate concrete suggestions to this lingering challenge to
judicial independence.”
The Chief Justice was referring to the fact that earlier that year the Subcommittee on Alternative
Models of Court Administration had been established and tasked by the Administration of Justice
Committee and the Executive Committee of the Council to: (1) identify the standards of administrative
control Courts should exercise in order to ensure the required standard of judicial independence;
and to (2) come up with alternatives to the executive model of Court administration designed 
to better preserve judicial independence; better preserve the judiciary as a separate branch of
government; enhance public confidence in the judicial system; and improve the quality and
delivery of judicial services.
I am satisfied that this Report fulfils the mandate contained in the terms of reference and
formulates the concrete suggestions referred to by Chief Justice McLachlin. The Subcommittee
believes the alternative the Report calls the “Limited Autonomy and Commission Model” will best
achieve the goals set out in the terms of reference and what the Supreme Court of Canada refers 
to in the Remuneration Reference as the constitutional imperative of depoliticizing, to the extent
possible, relations between the judiciary and other branches of government. However, realizing
that, for a variety of reasons, one size may not fit all, the Report also identifies several other
alternatives. Any of these would be more appropriate for the administration of the Courts of a
modern constitutional democracy like Canada than the existing executive model that presently
prevails in all the provinces and territories of the country.
As Chair, I thank my colleagues on the Subcommittee Chief Justice Catherine Fraser, Chief Justice
David Smith, Chief Justice Michel Robert, Associate Chief Justice Robert Pidgeon, Associate Chief
Justice Douglas Cunningham, Mr. Justice Kenneth Hanssen and Mr. Justice Robert Edwards for
their dedication, hard work, cooperation and support these past two years. I also wish to thank 
our Provincial Court advisors, Chief Justice Brian Lennox and Madam Justice Kathleen McGowan,
for their participation and advice. Thanks to Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and her executive
advisor Nancy Brooks for their help and support. Thanks to all who contributed to the success of
this Report by participating in interviews and seminars, including all the members of the Council
and numerous Deputy Ministers and other administrative officers of Courts across Canada.
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I also thank the two teams of talented and dedicated consultants, the authors of the Report,
Professors Karim Benyekhlef and Fabien Gélinas from Montreal and Robert Hann, Professor 
Lorne Sossin and Professor Carl Baar from Toronto, who worked so diligently and collegially 
on this Project. Some of their work on the project was contributed pro bono. I thank them for 
that demonstration of good citizenship.
Thanks to the staff at the Canadian Judicial Council office for the secretariat services and 
advice they provided. Finally, I thank the Administration of Justice Committee for giving me 
the opportunity to chair the Subcommittee and to work with such wonderful people on such 
an interesting and important Project. It was a great experience and I learned much more than 
I contributed.
The Honourable Gerard Mitchell
Chair
Subcommittee on Alternative Models of Court Administration
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Executive Summary
1.1 The Background for the Report
This report examines and evaluates different “Models of Court Administration”. Models refer 
to organizational frameworks which prescribe the way in which decisions would be made that
determine court administration policies and operational practices. More specifically, the report
analyzes the role of the judiciary in decision-making within such models.
The report is the work of a project begun in 2003 by the Canadian Judicial Council and overseen 
by a subcommittee of its Administration of Justice Committee. That subcommittee recognized the
emergence of a number of critical issues affecting judicial-executive relations. Those issues cross
provincial and territorial boundaries and affect all Court levels. As set out in the Committee’s
request for proposals:
These issues include how best to avoid inappropriate negotiations between the
executive and judicial branches of government, ensure the provision of appropriate
support services and Court facilities for the third branch of government and enhance
accountability for the use of public monies while safeguarding judicial independence.
The purpose of this project is to serve as a catalyst for real change and reform. Following the
direction of the subcommittee, this report 
• identifies the standards of administrative control that Courts should exercise in order to ensure
the required standard of judicial independence, and 
• explores, develops and identifies models of court administration that are alternatives to the
existing “executive”1 model, in order:
a) to better preserve judicial independence and the status of the judiciary as a separate
branch of government;
b) to enhance public confidence in the judicial system; and 
c) to improve the quality and delivery of judicial services.
The models examined in this report address two kinds of relationships:
1. the relationship between the judiciary and the government—that is, the relationship that
defines the accountabilities and responsibilities of the judiciary or “Court” 2 with respect to
court administration policy and operations vis-à-vis the government or the Legislature, the
Attorney General and/or the CEO of an independent body; and
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1 The “executive”model is one in which—although there are many variations—policy and operational decision-making for
court administration is the responsibility of an executive department headed by a cabinet minister, usually the Attorney
General or Minister of Justice.
2 In the current document, we use the term “Court”to refer both to the Chief Justice per se, and to a judge or group of judges
to whom the Chief Justice has delegated responsibility and authority for court administration.
2. the relationship between the judiciary and the management of the courts—that is, the
relationship between whoever is seen as accountable and responsible for court administration
policy and operations (whether that be the “Court”, the Attorney General or the CEO of an
independent body) on one hand, and the head of a court administrative unit (the Court
Executive Officer 3) on the other.
The structure of this first key relationship will in large part determine the nature of the second.
Twenty years ago, following the Deschenes Report,4 countries such as Australia looked to Canadian
studies for new models of court administration.5 Now, Australian jurisdictions feature different
models of self-governing Courts with impressive records of improved effectiveness and efficiency.
Canada, by contrast, now ranks as one of the last common law jurisdictions in which court admin-
istration continues to be controlled by the executive branch of government. In every Canadian
province, notwithstanding a trend toward greater judicial involvement in court administration,
Courts are operated as a division of the Attorney General’s ministry, rather than as a separate
branch or even a separate department of government. Increasingly, voices from both the judiciary
and the executive are asking: is there a better way forward for court administration in Canada?
In order to determine and elaborate a preferred model for court administration in Canada, this
project has focused on collecting information from five sources:
1. detailed review of related constitutional considerations,
2. two rounds of over 60 interviews and consultations (each) with Chief Justices and Deputy
Ministers and other key participants in court administration from most jurisdictions in Canada,
with the first round focusing on the models currently existing in Canada, and the second
round of interviews focusing on a range of alternative models,
3. two full day seminars held with the Canadian Judicial Council following each round of
interviews at which the issues raised during the consultations were discussed,
4. a review of the range of models used in Courts in other jurisdictions internationally, and 
5. a review of the more general body of knowledge on models of administrative decision-
making in Courts and in other organizations.
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3 In the current document, we use the term “Court Executive Officer”to describe the person who is operational head of the
Court administration unit.That person may in different jurisdictions have a different title, such as Director of Court Services,
ADM for Courts, Chief Court Administrator, Registrar, or Clerk of Court.
4 Jules DESCH NES, Maître chez eux/Masters in Their Own House: A Study on the Independent Judicial Administration of the Courts
(Montreal: Canadian Judicial Council, Sept. 1981).
5 See Thomas W. CHURCH and Peter A. SALLMAN, Governing Australia’s Courts (Carleton South,Victoria: Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration, 1991).
1.2 Key Overall Conclusions 
Based on the evidence collected and analysis undertaken, this report has come to the following
conclusions:
1. Canada has fallen behind peer jurisdictions such as Australia in innovations in court
administration. Although the trend in most Canadian provinces is toward an enhanced
judicial role within the executive model, the deficiencies of the executive model continue 
to impair the ability of courts to fulfill court administration goals and objectives.
2. The analysis of the evidence indicates that there is a compelling constitutional rationale
for changing the executive model of court administration in Canada to a model or models
which feature a greater degree of judicial autonomy.
3. This change ensures judicial independence.
4. This change also enhances the accountability of the judiciary in court administration, as well
as achieving improved effectiveness and efficiency in court administration.
5. Although there are legitimate variations in viewpoints and the strengths of those positions 
on the issue, concerns about the shortcomings of the executive model of court administration
are widely held among the judiciary and this view is shared by some executive officials.
6. There is significant support for a model of court administration based on limited autonomy
for the judiciary within an overall budget for court administration set by the appropriate
legislative authority. Support extends further to linking this limited autonomy to the use of an
independent commission for the prevention and resolution of disputes related to the overall
size of the budget allocated to the judiciary.
7. There is also a need for a professional court administration with a chief executive officer
responsible to the Chief Justice.The existence of a CEO to handle day-to-day operations will
be important in ensuring that the judiciary is not preoccupied with those matters and can
focus on overall strategic direction of court administration.
8. This report concludes that an optimal model of court administration would be one which
provides the judiciary with autonomy to manage the core areas of court administration while
ensuring (by the carefully considered use of an independent commission) that the authority
of the political branches over resource allocation is not used arbitrarily.
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1.3 Format of the Report
This project assesses the strengths and weaknesses of specific alternative models from a number 
of perspectives. Not surprisingly, we found that different people and different types of analyses
bring sometimes dramatically different assumptions, definitions and approaches to discussions
about the judicial role in court administration. Capturing the important lessons to be learned from
this rich diversity is of course critical to any discussion of the issue. However, from that diversity 
it was possible to identify—from each perspective—directions which preserve and promote an
independent judiciary and which are most capable of effectively and efficiently meeting court
administration needs.
The analysis of the evidence leading to the key overall conclusions is presented in seven chapters.
Chapter 2:Where We are Now:Variations on The Executive Model
Chapter 2 describes the executive model of court administration and analyzes the results of
preliminary consultations conducted for this study on the issues, concerns and priorities relating 
to this model of court administration.
Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 2)
Based on the analysis in Chapter 2, it is apparent that the executive model is deficient in several
key respects:
1. Courts lack stable funding and discretion over expenditures, creating obstacles to strategic
and long-term planning.
2. Court administrators often have divided loyalties to executive and judicial offices which can
undermine the effectiveness of court administration.
3. The Attorneys Generals’ willingness and capacity to represent the Courts’ interests in
Government decision-making is eroding.
4. The mutual trust between judicial and executive leadership is jeopardized by the present
climate of disputes over court administration budgets and the implementation of judicial
compensation commission recommendations.
Chapter 3: How Did We Get Where We Are Now? Implications for the Future
Chapter 3 provides an important historical overview for considering the prospect of moving from
the current (and arguably anomalous) executive model of court administration decision-making 
to the alternative models outlined in Chapter 8. The Chapter both traces the development of the
current model in Canada and other countries, and provides examples of how other countries have
moved beyond the type of administrative structures currently in place in Canada.
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Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 3)
The analysis of Chapter 3 provides considerable historical evidence supporting the possibility
and feasibility of Canada moving from the current executive model to an alternative model.
In particular, these findings support the following:
1. Current models were not designed to run the Courts as they are now.
2. Current models have not been around as long or as universally as most might assume.
3. Not only is the impetus for change understandable, but positive change is also possible 
and desirable.
Chapter 4: Constitutional Foundations for Change
Chapter 4 examines the critical constitutional dimension of court administration. First, it summarizes
key recent and emerging trends in Canadian constitutional law. In particular it argues that one
cannot assume that the end of the process of defining the constitutional requirements of judicial
independence has been reached. That process is essential to understanding the dynamic normative
context in which models of court administration must be analyzed. The discussion pays particular
attention to the changing role of the judiciary and the recognition of the “constitutional imperative
of depoliticization”. The second part of the discussion looks at possible institutional obstacles to
change in the area of administrative autonomy, namely the federal and parliamentary structures 
of Canada in the context of the separation of powers. The discussion then turns to the broader
normative context defined over the past quarter century in international declarations, official
statements and other soft law instruments—a context that recognizes the importance of
administrative autonomy in fleshing out the general principle of judicial independence.
Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 4)
Seven conclusions may be drawn from the constitutional analysis in Chapter 4, conclusions
which can serve as guiding principles for considering alternative models of court administration:
1. The constitutional position can only be analysed in the dynamic context of the evolution 
of the role of the judiciary under the Canadian constitution. Over the last 25 years, there has
been a formidable increase in judicial responsibilities and an ever-growing involvement of
Courts in the resolution of socio-economic questions. Institutional arrangements in matters 
of court administration have not followed suit.
2. The inherent jurisdiction of Courts of law should not be expected to form the basis of
fundamental changes in institutional arrangements. However, inherent jurisdiction is based
on the rationale that Courts must have all the powers necessary for the exercise of their
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can therefore be expected to evolve with judicial responsibilities,
along with the constitutional requirements of judicial independence.
3. There are no constitutional impediments to the adoption of models of court administration
that involve a high degree of judicial autonomy.The federal distribution of powers, the
institutional arrangements peculiar to the parliamentary tradition and the conventions of
responsible government create no obstacle to the adoption of such models.
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4. Even though constitutional requirements do have a harmonizing effect at the level of
principles, federalism allows for a measure of provincial autonomy in the design of models 
of court administration.
5. The constitutional imperative of depoliticization of the relations between the political
branches and the judicial branch very likely calls for a greater measure of administrative
independence than is afforded by the models currently in place.
6. A brief comparative review of the usual reference jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Australia, shows a clear trend toward governments granting greater
administrative autonomy to the Courts.
7. Finally, statements of principle from the last 25 years of international “soft law”instruments
have recognized the importance of administrative autonomy in promoting and preserving
judicial independence and clearly support a move in Canada toward a limited judicial
autonomy model of court administration.
Chapter 5:What Criteria Should Be Used for Assessing Alternative Models?
Leaving aside any evolving constitutional requirements concerning judicial independence, an
agreement to implement changes to the current model would be more likely if it were accompanied
by evidence that the new model will improve the impacts of Court activity on society (Court
outcomes or effectiveness) and the way Courts carry out their function (court processes and
efficiency). More specifically, comparisons of one court administration model to another—or
descriptions of the failings or advantages of particular existing or potential models—must 
be made in terms of the degree to which the alternative furthers the achievement of specific
institutional objectives of the Courts.
At the same time, monitoring and reporting court administrative performance in terms of a clearly
defined set of goals and objectives is essential for all models if they are to effectively focus and
manage court resources—and to be accountable to others for that management.
Chapter 5 therefore presents a number of specific “outcome” and “process” objectives of the
Courts—and consequently, of court administration.
Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 5)
Three conclusions follow closely on the discussion in Chapter 5:
1. First, increased use of court performance goals and objectives would enhance court
administrative efficiency and effectiveness under any of the models.
2. Second, setting clear administrative goals and objectives—and regularly monitoring and
openly reporting performance in terms of those goals and objectives—would provide an
effective process for ensuring accountability under any of the alternative models.
3. In particular, by providing an effective accountability mechanism, administrative goals and
objectives would provide the strong mechanism needed for ensuring effective accountability
to a broad range of communities under judicially-led models of decision-making.
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Chapter 6:What is the Scope of Court Administration?
In much of the past quarter-century’s debates, the term “court administration” has been defined in
an overly simplistic manner. For instance, much of the discussion has treated court administration
as a monolithic whole. The right decision-making model for one part therefore has to apply to 
all parts. Furthermore, when the discussion does focus on only one or two administrative areas 
(for instance, setting the overall budget of the Court, or the physical layout of the courtroom),
other equally important areas (such as setting court objectives, or ensuring adequate working
conditions for staff and access for the public) are often given insufficient attention.
Chapter 6 brings much needed clarity to what is meant by “court administration”, by addressing 
two of its important sub-dimensions. Section 6.1 begins by identifying 5 broad areas of activities
(leadership and direction, organization and partnerships, strategies and tactics, resources, and
support systems) that together are essential to effective and efficient court administration.
The section also identifies specific types of decision-making activities within each broad area,
and then analyzes the relative advantages and disadvantages (in terms of advancing specific
institutional court objectives) of applying each of these models to these different types of
administrative activities.
Section 6.2 then introduces a second dimension by noting that the design and operation of each
type of administrative activity (e.g. information systems, budgeting) can be broken down into a
number of specific developmental stages of administrative decision-making. As an example, the
specific area,“budgeting”, is broken down into 11 distinct stages: starting from “developing the
whole budget process”; proceeding through a number of stages such as “modifying and deciding
on the size and composition of the budget” and “bookkeeping”; and finishing with “monitoring
actual and budgeted financial performance”.
One of the important results of disaggregating “court administration” into these separate areas
and stages is that one then can see the possibility that one type of court administrative decision-
making model could be appropriate for a particular type of decision (e.g. the identification of the
information required to support case/caseflow management), while another significantly different
decision-making model could be appropriate for other types of decisions (e.g. the day-to-day
operation of the system that would provide that information).
Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 6)
The analysis of Chapter 6 had a critical influence on determining the preferred model.
In particular:
1. Different types of court administrative decision-making might be best made under different
“pure”models.The possibility was therefore opened to having the optimal model for the
totality of court administration decisions to be a combination of different “pure”models.
2. More specifically, if a model with increased judicial control were the most appropriate for
many areas or stages of court administrative decision-making, it would be unlikely to be most
appropriate for all.That being the case, the most likely option would be a “limited”judicial
autonomy model (i.e. one in which other models of decision-making would apply to court
administration decisions outside certain limits).
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3. The existence of different stages of court administration decision-making also opened up the
possibility of improving the optimal model (or set of models) by incorporating yet another
type of alternative model for certain stages of decision-making. As will be seen later, our
recommended solution does just that, by adding a “commission”model to handle certain
disputes between the judiciary and budget authorities.
4. Finally, given the wide variation in the nature and complexity of court administrative activities
from one jurisdiction to another, different Court jurisdictions may find it appropriate to adopt
variations of the model(s) felt most appropriate in other jurisdictions.
Chapter 7:What Roles do Other Groups Have in Courts Administration?
Chapter 7 then clarifies another important dimension of the analysis. The Chapter argues that 
it is no longer appropriate to conduct the discussion of models of court administration within 
a framework that focuses almost exclusively on the roles of the Chief Justice and the Attorney
General. Today, such discussions must consider the increasingly important roles played by other
groups—especially governmental authorities that do not reside within the Department or 
Ministry of the Attorney General, including central agencies such as management boards, cabinet
committees, facility construction agencies, computer and information systems agencies, and
human resource/public service agencies.
Key Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 7)
The analysis in Chapter 7 is important to any consideration of the executive model and its
alternatives. In particular:
1. Given the increased role of other government departments and agencies in court
administration decision-making, it is inappropriate to assume that the Attorney General
exerts as strong a role in court administration decisions as before.This has implications 
for the degree to which the executive model (with the Attorney General representing the
executive) should be seen as continuing to be the most appropriate.
2. Thus, given the increasing influences of other groups, the ability of the Attorney General 
to act as a protector of the Courts is reduced.
Chapter 8: Different Models: Different Levels of Control over Decisions
The literature and practice are replete with different types of models of court administration that
could be considered. However, to facilitate discussion of the main issues, we identify seven distinct
groups of models that capture and emphasize key relevant differences in approach:
1. Executive Model
2. Independent Commission Model
3. Partnership Model
4. Executive/ Guardian Model
5. Limited Autonomy Model
6. Limited Autonomy & Commission Model
7. Judicial Model
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Chapter 8 elaborates on each of these models (and their many variants) and explores which 
model is most appropriate for different areas and stages of court administration decision-making.
Chapter 8 also summarizes the views and opinions gathered about each model from the two
rounds of consultations and the two workshops.
Key Model-Specific Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 8)
Highlights of the discussions of individual models include:
1. The executive model is one in which—although there are many variations—policy and
operational decision-making is the responsibility of an executive department headed by a
cabinet minister, usually the Attorney General or Minister of Justice. Notwithstanding the
significant successes and accomplishments of Canadian court administration, it is apparent
that the executive model is deficient in key aspects. Further, the success of the executive
model has often in the past depended on the level of trust and communications that exist
among specific persons occupying key decision-making positions—and their dedication and
willingness to make modifications to the pure executive model. It is a very positive sign that
these modifications—most if not all toward greater (but limited) judicial autonomy—have
generated significant improvements and have earned support from both the Court and the
executive. However, the independence of the judiciary, the effectiveness and efficiency of the
courts, and public confidence in the justice system requires an improved and robust model
that ensures that jurisdictions take full advantage of more of the types of improvements that
have already proven to be advantageous.
2. The independent commission model contemplates a range of decision-making in court
administration being undertaken by an independent commission which, by definition, would
be beyond both executive and judicial control.The independent commission model offers
some advantages; most notably it provides a “level playing field”. However, it does so by
reducing the influence of the executive (and others) to a level similar to that of the judiciary
currently.The model therefore fails to resolve one of the key concerns with the executive
model, since it fails to enhance the judicial role in court administration decision-making.
3. The partnership model involves different decision-making mechanisms through which the
judiciary and executive would collaborate in setting the direction for court administration.
Neither the judiciary nor the executive under this model could impose a decision on the
other.This model has some appeal—and it may be appropriate in smaller jurisdictions where
such models are used routinely in decision-making in other areas of government and civil
society. However, for most jurisdictions, it fails to resolve the key concerns with the executive
model in a number of dimensions; for instance, the absence of a clearly defined decision
maker and the dependence on the particular characteristics of the different partners. In fact,
in many circumstances this model could exacerbate many of the undesirable features of the
executive model.
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4. The executive guardian model involves a lead executive role in court administration
decision-making but allows for judicial intervention in certain circumstances.This model
partially resolves the key concerns with the executive model, by giving the Court power to
order either that certain court administration activities take place or that certain activities be
stopped. However, this model also has some deficiencies. In particular, it does not incorporate
any ongoing mechanisms to facilitate effective Court involvement in larger strategic decisions
that will have fundamental impacts on judicial independence and the effectiveness and
efficiency of court administration.The judiciary could veto decisions, but not initiate them.
5. The limited autonomy model provides for judicial control and autonomy over certain areas
of court administration decision-making. Under this model, the executive continues to control
the setting of overall court administration budgets but the Court is self-governing within 
that global budget.This model resolves many of the key concerns with the executive model.
While consistent with a Westminster system of Parliamentary supremacy, and while maintaining
democratic accountability over resource allocations, this model is based on judicial control
and autonomy over core areas of court administration. However, this model does not address
dispute avoidance or dispute resolution between the judiciary and executive over court
budgets.
6. The limited autonomy and commission model incorporates the features of the limited
autonomy model but joins that model with the use of an independent commission on issues
surrounding the global budget, which falls outside the scope of limited autonomy, and in this
way provides self-governing Courts and the executive with a mechanism for avoidance and
resolution of budget disputes.
7. The judicial model establishes judicial control over virtually all court administration decisions,
including the setting of the global budget. It resolves some of the key concerns with the
executive model, but gives rise to a different parallel set of legitimacy and accountability
concerns over the role of the judiciary in self-governing Courts.
Key General Findings and Conclusions (Chapter 8)
Although implicit in some of the foregoing, a number of more general findings and conclusions
are evident from the analysis of Chapter 8:
1. Change is already a fact of court administration in Canada.
2. Virtually all the recent changes in Canadian court administration have been in the direction 
of greater judicial control and autonomy.
3. There are legitimate variations in positions and the strengths of those positions on certain
issues related to most of the models.
4. However, concerns over the executive model of court administration are widely held among
the judiciary and by a few executive officials.
5. There is significant support for a model of court administration based on the combination of
limited autonomy for the judiciary in many areas of court administration and an independent
commission for the avoidance and resolution of court administration disputes.
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Chapter 9:The Recommended Model: Limited Autonomy and Commission 
The purpose of this report has been to determine which model of court administration would
better preserve judicial independence and the institutional integrity of the judiciary, better
enhance public trust and confidence in the judicial system, better improve the quality and delivery
of judicial services and better develop a culture of continuous improvement in the administration
of Canadian courts.
Based on our analysis, it is apparent that a greater degree of judicial autonomy in court
administration is likely to advance all of these goals.
More specifically, we conclude that a model of limited autonomy with an independent
commission for prevention and resolution of disputes regarding the global budget for court
administration represents the most flexible, coherent and constructive framework within which 
to realize these goals.
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CHAPTER 2
Where We are Now: 
Variations on the Executive Model
2.1 Description of the Executive Model
In the executive model, court administration is controlled by the executive, which in turn reports
to the Legislature. The “first” representative of the “executive” will usually be the Attorney General
or Minister of Justice. However, since responsibility for certain court administration decisions in
most jurisdictions has been assumed by other parts of the government, court administration
cannotbe seen as a separate unit and in fact, the “executive” is more correctly seen as represented
by a number of government ministries. A chief justice has no defined relationship to the minister
(or ministers); whether advice is sought or not is purely a matter of executive discretion.
Furthermore, the judiciary has no direct formal relationship, advisory or otherwise, to court
administration. However keen a court staff member is to serve a chief judge or chief justice, that
staff member can do so only when authorized by the executive. Finally, by far the majority of
jurisdictions have not established a clear and measurable set of goals and objectives by which
court administrative performance should be assessed, and in virtually none of the jurisdictions 
has the judiciary (and other key stakeholders) had a meaningful role in setting the expectations 
by which those who run the Court can be held accountable.
While the executive model has been justified by the principles of ministerial responsibility and
legislative supremacy, many provincial governments, in consultation with the judiciary, have
recognized the significant shortcomings of that model and have modified it in recent years by way
of informal understandings, formal rules, or more elaborately drafted Memoranda of Understanding.
The result has been a multitude of variations on the basic model. Indeed, variations have become
the rule rather than the exception.
Some of these variations have or could be made to mitigate aspects of the executive model that
limit judicial input into court administrative decisions. They therefore reflect the view that the
ability of the executive branch to manage effectively is impaired unless the judiciary can be
mobilized in designing and implementing improvements and reforms. For instance:
• The executive could formally delegate to a chief justice the authority and accountability to 
work toward a specific objective and ensure that court administrators and various stakeholder
groups (e.g. the bar) work together toward the same objectives in specific areas, for example
implementation of court delay reduction programs.
• The executive could enter into agreements with the chief justice of a Court in order to delegate
authority over a certain area of court administration decision-making, for instance, control of
expenditures within a specific portion of the court administration budget or supervision of
certain court staff.6 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Attorney General
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6 B.C. was the first province to take this step (in the mid-1970s); Ontario and Alberta among others have followed. It was 
B.C. Chief Justice Nathan Nemetz’s intention to expand the scope of the “judicial administration”budget to approximate 
a Limited Autonomy Model, as elaborated below in Chapter 8.5.
of Ontario and the Ontario Court of Justice is an example of such an initiative. This MOU, in
operation since 1993, provides the Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice with a significant
degree of control over the budget of the Office of the Chief Justice. This control does not extend,
however, to the operational budget of the Court. The MOU also sets out that the Executive
Coordinator, a government official, exercises financial and administrative responsibilities in 
and for the Office of the Chief Justice, and takes direction from the Chief Justice. The Executive
Coordinator consults with Attorney General representatives and prepares the operating budget
for the Chief Justice’s Office to be included in Attorney General estimates.
The Attorney General and Provincial Court of British Columbia have an agreement which
delegates even greater budgetary control to the Chief Judge of that Court. This initiative has
now led to a formal set of protocols, signed in 2002, which sets out in writing the roles and
responsibility of the Attorney General and the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court in several
areas, including budgetary matters. The Chief Judge has significant discretion in allocating the
budget once it is set by the government. The protocols also mandate when consultations are
required on certain kinds of administrative decision-making and contemplate regular meetings
between judicial and executive leaders. The protocols, like the Ontario MOU, are not intended 
to serve as an enforceable agreement between the Court and the government but rather set
out in a more formal fashion the existing mutual expectations and responsibilities.
• The executive could make it a matter of policy and practice that the Chief Justice’s input be
sought and considered as an integral part of decision-making processes, especially earlier in
those processes. In particular, the chief justice could be consulted in a systematic, routinized
and effective way—rather than by way of an occasional courtesy call. The Manitoba Court
Executive Board is an example of such a framework. This long running administrative initiative
provides a venue for judicial and executive leaders (i.e. the three Chief Justices, the Deputy
Minister, and the Director of Court Administration) to meet regularly, develop collaborative
approaches to shared problems and engage in high-level exchanges of information. While 
the Board is seen as a collaborative body designed to facilitate the smooth functioning of 
the executive-judicial relationship, it does not engage in decision-making on budgetary or
significant administrative matters. A similar initiative has been launched in Newfoundland
which places the Minister on the executive board as well.
• The executive could formally delegate to a chief judge and a court administrator the authority
to make binding decisions in relation to court administration. An example of such a formal
delegation is the legislative restructuring of the Federal Court, enacted in 2002 and effective in
2003, that creates the office of the Chief Administrator as the head of a new Court Administration
Service. The Chief Administrator is appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice
following consultation with the four Chief Justices of the Federal Courts. Distinctive features of
this model include the power of Chief Justices to issue binding written direction to the Chief
Administrator and the responsibility of the Chief Administrator to report annually to Parliament.
This restructuring shifts the focus of the executive model for the Federal Court away from a
direct relationship between Chief Justices and the Deputy Minister of Justice or Minister of
Justice toward a direct relationship between the Chief Justices and the Chief Administrator.7
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7 This variation moves the executive model a considerable distance toward the “Executive Guardian”model described later in
chapter 8.4.
• The executive could permit the judiciary to enhance its policy and planning capacities so 
it could play a more meaningful role in court administration. The creation of the Executive 
Office of the Nova Scotia Judiciary is an example of this initiative. This office was established 
to coordinate joint administrative policies and provide policy and media services to the 
Nova Scotia Courts. It was funded by reallocating existing resources and is seen as a first step
toward building the capacities of the Court to undertake a greater role in court administration.
While this office has a small budget and no formal decision-making role in the budgetary or
administrative process, it was designed to overcome the tendency for Superior Courts and
Provincial Courts to maintain entirely separate relationships with the executive.
• The executive could, through legislation or practice, permit judicial involvement in court
administration decision-making that amounts to de facto autonomy. One example of such 
a practice in Canada is the role undertaken by the Registrar of the Supreme Court. Through 
a combination of statutory and administrative measures, the Registrar of the Supreme Court,
by statute, functions as a “CEO” of the Supreme Court, under the direction of the Chief Justice,
and exercises significant control over the budgetary and administrative processes of the Court.
Other appellate Courts, including the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Quebec Court of Appeal,
have been granted levels of administrative autonomy.
It should, however, also be noted that despite many of the modifications that have been introduced
to the executive model, new developments in governance have strengthened executive control
and created new limitations on the judicial role in court administration.
• In particular, as Chapter 7 makes clear, the unified ministry-focused version of the executive
model (with the Attorney General representing “the executive”) has given way to an increasingly
centralized multiple service-agency version. Thus, not only does the judiciary have to influence—
through the largely informal means to which it is limited—the Attorney General, it has to
influence the much wider range of government departments, committees and agencies involved
in court administration decision-making (including but certainly not limited to Premier’s Offices,
Treasury Boards and other central agencies throughout the provinces that have taken on
additional key roles in labor-management negotiations, budget cutback processes, information
systems design and facilities management). And yet, the judiciary possesses no means to do 
so short of lobbying or negotiating with these bodies.
• Equally revealing is the involvement of other parts of the justice system in key administrative
initiatives. The development of court management information systems only within the context
of an integrated justice system is a prime example. Such approaches may make sense purely
from an efficiency point of view. However, they certainly may not make sense in terms of
principles of justice that assume a clear division between the judiciary and court administration
on the one hand, and those that argue their cases before an independent Court on the other.
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2.2 Three Conclusions on the Limits of the Executive Model
Three conclusions can be drawn about the executive model in every provincial and territorial
jurisdiction:
1. The Courts still have no authority to develop or administer independently of government 
a significant part of the court administration budget, nor to direct the carrying out of other
court administrative activities considered to have significant impact on judicial services.
Neither chief justices nor their Courts’ administrators have the kind of fiscal and operational
authority that allows them to function apart from ministerial or broader governmental
directives. Concerns have been expressed in many quarters that this represents a significant
threat to the independence of our judiciary.
2. Second, consensus has not been developed amongst key stakeholders on the appropriate
goals and objectives that should be achieved by court administration. One of the key reasons
for this lack is the fact that the Courts are missing the appropriate level of infrastructure 
to undertake the data collection, research, consultation and analysis needed to adequately
address the questions that must be asked in order to develop the goals and objectives.8
A key prerequisite to any mechanism for ensuring accountability—accountability of both 
the Court and the executive to each other—and more importantly of both groups to the
public is thus absent.
3. Finally, despite this lack of consensus on precise measures to be used, there is in many 
quarters a belief that the effectiveness and efficiency of court administration could be
improved through adoption of different management models.
In short, and notwithstanding the many variations on the executive model noted above, it remains
characterized by executive control. To the extent the judiciary has a role in court administration
outside the constitutionally mandated adjudicative sphere, it is one expressly delegated by the
executive. The result is that the executive model is largely dependent on relationships of trust 
and goodwill between the executive and the judiciary to function. Such relationships may change
with each new minister, deputy minister or chief justice and the vicissitudes of the political climate.
As the consultations discussed below indicate, this represents a fragile and unsatisfactory basis for
court administration.
2.3 First Stage of Consultations
As indicated above, the consultations in support of this project were undertaken in two stages.
The first stage focused on respondents’ experience with the executive model of court administration,
including various innovations within that model which have facilitated a range of roles for judges
in court administration decision-making. The second stage, discussed subsequently in Chapter 8,
focused on respondents’ views of the executive model in relation to the other six alternative
models identified in this report.
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8 Questions such as:“Where are we going as a Court?”“What strategic initiatives and changes in policies and procedures are
needed?”“What judicial complement and other resources are required?”
The preliminary consultations included discussions with a range of approximately 60 key participants
in court administration, including present and former Chief Justices at all levels of Courts and in 
all jurisdictions in Canada, puisne judges, former and current Attorneys General, political advisors,
Deputy Ministers of Justice, Court Services Directors and Assistant Deputy Ministers, Attorney
General staff, court staff including registrars and executive legal officers, political science and legal
academics, members of the bar and other court observers. The consultations also have included
discussions with the subcommittee of the Canadian Judicial Council overseeing this research
project. These discussions built on a number of earlier, important studies investigating alternative
models of court administration,9 as well as the parallel constitutional and administrative
investigations conducted as part of this project.
The results of this preliminary consultation are presented below. A number of sections begin with
quotations taken from the interviews.
2.3.1 The Impact of Governmental Structures on Court Administration
“Courts are viewed as a branch of the Ministry, not as a branch of government.”
In most provincial jurisdictions, judicial participants in the preliminary consultations echoed 
the refrain that the Courts, as a budgetary and administrative unit, are viewed and treated by 
the executive as a branch of the Attorney General’s ministry rather than as a separate branch of
government. This view was not shared at the federal level, where since the 1970s there has been 
a gradual separation between the Federal Court and Supreme Court on the one hand and the
Department of Justice on the other.
The impression that the Courts are treated as a branch of the ministry manifests itself in myriad
ways. Most importantly, placing the budget for court administration within the overall ministry
budget reflects this mindset. Courts have almost no ability to set priorities for court expenditures.
This is not surprising as in the vast majority of the jurisdictions, the federal level being a notable
exception, Courts have little, if any, input into court budgets, much less meaningful control over
how it is spent.
Having court staff and government managers together report to the same Assistant Deputy
Minister or Deputy Minister is another characteristic of the ministry umbrella extended over the
court administration sector. Sometimes, however, what appears minor or trivial may be nonetheless
perceived as emblematic of this dynamic. In one jurisdiction, for example, a memo was sent to the
registrar of a court addressed to all “divisions” in the Ministry requiring certain budgetary targets 
to be met. In other jurisdictions, having the same email address as ministry staff or having ministry
staff (e.g. Crown prosecutors) share resources with court staff (i.e. photocopy and fax machines)
was highlighted as symptomatic of this mindset. In less populous provincial and territorial
jurisdictions and in rural areas more generally, it is not uncommon for courthouses to be located
directly in government buildings which also house ministry staff.
16 Chapter 2
9 These include Chief Justice DESCHÊNES’ 1981 Report entitled Masters in their Own House, the 1995 study by 
Charles TREMBLAY for the Conseil de la magistrature du Québec, Rapport préliminaire sur la faisabilité de l’indépendence
administrative de la magistrature, the Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry by Mr. Justice ZUBER in 1987, and Professor 
Martin FRIEDLAND’s 1995 Canadian Judicial Council landmark study A Place Apart.
All these features, large and small, contribute to the impression that the Courts and the ministry 
are not separate or distinct governmental institutions. More substantively, the fact that court
expenditures on office furniture, library acquisitions, staff, security and information technology
often require direct approval by a ministry manager reinforces the absence of any functional
separation between Courts and the executive branch as does the absence of any Court control
over funding priorities.
2.3.2 The Impact of Litigation on the Executive-Judicial Relationship
“The mutual trust is eroding.”
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in the Remuneration Reference10 in 1997, provinces
established independent compensation commissions to set salaries, pensions and benefits for
provincially appointed judges and Justices of the Peace. By 2004, the majority of provinces in
Canada experienced significant litigation in their Superior Courts between governments and
judges’ associations challenging either the commissions’ recommendations or the rejections 
of those recommendations by governments. The result has been an unprecedented degree of
adversarial contact between provincial governments and provincial judiciaries. The Supreme
Court’s most recent decision in Remuneration Commissions Decision11 is expressly intended to
address this adversarial context. In this decision, discussed below in Chapter 4, the Supreme Court
clarifies the basis on which a government may reject the recommendation of a remuneration
commission. It remains to be seen whether this latest judgment will have an effect on the trend 
to turn to litigation to resolve executive-judicial disputes over compensation.
Several participants in the consultations cited this litigation as a contributing factor to the erosion
of mutual trust between the government and judiciary on matters of court administration. The
compensation litigation has affected this relationship in two ways. First, it has led to adversarial
rancor, as most litigation does, which may spill over into other settings; and second, because
budgets for salaries and benefits are viewed by the executive as, to some extent,“taken away”
from government, the pressure increases on court administration budgets to meet the demands 
of ever more fiscally constrained governments. This assumes of course that any increases to salaries
and benefits recommended by compensation commissions are to be funded out of existing court
administration envelopes, an assumption which itself raises obvious constitutional issues.
Other participants pointed to the role of Charter and aboriginal rights litigation and well-publicized
attacks on “judicial activism” as a source of tension in executive-judicial relations. This tension 
is exacerbated in constitutional cases where judicial decisions are seen as having a significant
impact on the allocation of public resources or the ability of the government to pursue its policy
preferences.
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10 Reference regarding the Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1977] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Remuneration
Reference]
11 Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario
(Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), 2005 SCC 44.
2.3.3 The Impact of Limits on Judicial Input in Executive Decision-making 
on Court Administration 
“Sometimes we are asked, but mostly we are told.”
A survey of “court management relationships” conducted for the Canadian Judicial Council in 
2000 and updated in 2002 revealed that in about one-third of Canadian jurisdictions, Chief
Justices reported having no role in the budgetary process. In the other two-thirds of Canadian
jurisdictions, Chief Justices reported a limited and largely ineffective role, which consisted in some
cases of reviewing budgetary submissions, submitting business plans, outlining budgetary needs
or meeting with the Registrar or Director of Court Administration to discuss budgetary issues. In a
small number of Appellate Courts, Chief Justices indicated that they exercise a significant degree
of control over the allocation of budgets but a limited role in the budgetary process.
Our consultations revealed a widely shared sense that judges are increasingly consulted on
matters of day to day administration, including security, technology and facility concerns, but 
that the depth and frequency of budgetary consultations varies widely (from being told what
government has already decided to meaningful input) and depends as much on personality and
predisposition of the Chief Justice, Deputy Minister, ADM and Attorney General involved as on
what formal processes are available (e.g. joint judicial-executive committees).
2.3.4 The Impact of Divided Loyalties on the Part of Court Staff
“They are put in an impossible position serving two masters.”
One of the enduring dilemmas of the executive-judicial relationship in matters of court
administration is the status of court staff. Most court staff formally report up a managerial chain 
of authority within courts to the registrar who in turn reports to an executive manager or assistant
deputy minister. Functionally, however, some court staff operate under the direction of the Chief
Justice. In several jurisdictions, a concern was raised with respect to senior court staff “serving 
two masters.” In some of those jurisdictions, disputes over job classifications and recruitment and
retention of court staff have become significant sources of tension between judicial and executive
leaders. On occasion, registrars reported having felt obliged to refuse direction from executive
authorities where those directions contradicted the direction received from a Chief Justice.
This issue highlights the problems which arise when a Court is intent on moving in one direction,
for example, on an issue affecting court reform, and the government is not. It also underscores 
the real problem: who is working to support the courts? And at a more fundamental level, who is
running the courts? Without clear lines of authority, accountability of administrative and clerical
support staff is difficult to achieve. Strikingly, in some jurisdictions, Court control over even the
most basic support staff services is so limited that the judges have no say even on the secretarial
staff hired to work for them.
As former Ontario Chief Justice Frank Callaghan wrote over a decade ago, change in court
administration is needed because “co-management” has proven to be a failure. He added “It has
failed because it inevitably gives rise to divided accountability on the part of those who provide
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basic assistance to judges engaged in the process of adjudication. The court administrators are
answerable to their superiors in the civil service, not the judges and hence are in a position of
inherent conflict.”12
2.3.5 Resources
By far the most often cited concern of the judiciary regarding the state of the executive-judicial
relationship related to the perception of insufficient funding for court administration. While in
some jurisdictions this concern centres on significant capital initiatives such as a new courthouse,
or renovating and retrofitting aging facilities, in other parts of the country, human resource issues
dominate the agenda. Increasingly across the country, court staff vacancies are taking longer to be
filled; and when they are filled, full-time experienced staff are often being replaced with part-time
inexperienced staff with little training and high rates of turnover. The amounts of money involved
in particular decisions may be significant or modest but the sense of being required to do more
with less appears to be a widely shared impression across the country. It is also fair to say that the
sense of having little or no control over allocation of resources is acutely felt in many courts across
this country. Whether it is denying requests for media liaison staff, canceling subscriptions to case
reporters, reducing the number of law clerks or failing to provide adequate funds for security or
information technology, there are few jurisdictions which appear not to report significant unmet
needs. The following issues approach the question of resources from distinct but interrelated
perspectives bearing on the executive-judicial relationship.
a) “The model of the Attorney General as the ‘champion’ of the Courts’ budget at the cabinet
table is eroding.”
Many participants suggest there was once a time when Attorneys General were viewed—and
viewed themselves—as advocates for Courts in terms of resources. This was in fact part of the
theory underlying the executive model of court administration. The rationale for the Attorney
General as advocate for the Courts was twofold. First, unlike University presidents or Crown
Corporation executives, judges cannot openly lobby for resources or be seen to be negotiating
for budgets without compromising judicial independence. Second, courts do not garner 
the kind of community or public support in the political process that hospitals and schools
routinely do. In short, support for courts does not attract votes. Therefore the Attorney
General, as Chief Law Officer and member of cabinet, is in a unique position to represent 
fairly and fully the special place courts occupy in our legal and political system.13 In many
jurisdictions in Canada, this fundamental underpinning of the executive model has been
eroded to the point it no longer resonates.14
Where We are Now: Variations on the Executive Model 19
12 F. CALLAGHAN,“The Financing and Administration of the Courts: A Threat to Justice” Advocates’ Society Journal,
March 1992. Note that prior to his appointment to the bench, Callaghan was Deputy Attorney General of Ontario.
13 See J. LL. J. EDWARDS, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984).
14 In fact, the notion of an historically-rooted special role for provincial Attorneys General has enough notable exceptions to
question its validity. During the 1930s and 1940s, three premiers simultaneously held the position of Attorney General,
including Maurice Duplessis of Quebec and two westerners who were not even lawyers: E. C. Manning of Alberta and Duff
Patullo of British Columbia, who compensated for his lack of legal background by having the provincial cabinet designate
him a King’s Counsel. See C. BAAR,“Patterns and Strategies of Court Administration in Canada and the United States,”20
Canadian Public Administration 242-74 (Summer 1977). Reprinted in 11 Law Society Gazette 79-110 (June 1977).
More than ever before, Attorneys General in several jurisdictions either are themselves openly
critical of the courts or are supportive of courts but are encountering increasingly critical
cabinets. Not only are courts seen as “no different” than hospitals, schools or even roads and
highways when it comes to allocating scarce public resources, but they are also more than
ever before expected to absorb cuts and where possible, generate revenue (for example,
through court fees for civil proceedings or commercial operations on court premises). In some
provinces, this trend has also manifested itself in decisions to close courthouses in areas of less
demand. The effect of such cuts is all the more significant in jurisdictions where the court
administration sector has already failedto keep pace with previous increases in government
expenditures.
b) “Too often I feel like the ‘Chief Beggar’ rather than the Chief Justice.”
The office of Chief Justice is increasingly coming to embody a contradiction. The Chief Justice
must act to meet the courts’ resource needs but must not engage in political negotiations 
with the government of the day. And yet government makes this unavoidable when it raises 
as a defence to funding courts the claimed priorities of other government departments.
Chief Justices must then do what they can to try to secure the resources their courts require 
or simply to maintain the status quo and avoid further cuts in spending for court services.
In smaller jurisdictions and smaller Courts (mostly Appellate Courts), it is still sometimes the
case that a quiet phone call between a Chief Justice and Attorney General or Deputy Minister
can smooth over resource concerns, providing government is willing to do so, but increasingly
Chief Justices are turning to formal letters, public pronouncements and in extreme cases,
threats of litigation, in their struggle to ensure the public has adequate access to justice
services of high quality.
c) The salaries and benefits of judges often distort perception of the level of support for the
administrative resources of courts.
In several jurisdictions, judges are perceived to enjoy high salaries and benefits. Judicial salaries
are not set directly by government in the wake of the Provincial Judges Reference but rather 
are set by independent compensation commissions (one national commission dealing with
salaries of federally appointed judges and provincial/territorial commissions dealing with
provincially/territorially appointed judges). While not connected to budgets for court staff,
facilities or court administration, there nonetheless appears to be a perception that the
salaries of judges are indicative of generous funding for the courts more broadly.
2.3.6 Autonomy
Resources are not the only concern expressed regarding the executive-judicial relationship.
Another widely cited concern involves the discretion and authority of Courts (and, in particular,
Chief Justices) over the allocation of court administration budgets once the level of funding has
been established. Most Chief Justices expressed the view that they wished to have fewer “line-
items” over which executive approval must be sought, and more leeway to allocate budgets to
meet the Court’s needs. The concern over autonomy was expressed when some participants
contrasted the position of Courts with that of other independent public bodies. Two comparisons
are elaborated below.
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a) Chief Justices have less independence than Parliamentary officers such as Auditors General,
Information and Privacy Commissioners, or even boards and tribunals supervised by the Courts.
A number of participants expressed puzzlement that Courts appear to enjoy less independence
than Parliamentary offices such as Auditors General and Privacy Commissioners. These
participants observe that while Courts must provide the ultimate check on executive
authority, they remain vulnerable to the executive with respect to their administrative
resources. Parliamentary offices typically prepare their own budgetary estimates for legislative
authorization. Those budgets must then be administered in accordance with rules set out in
the applicable Financial Administration Act. The Auditor General or Commissioner is responsible
for developing and implementing personnel policies, staffing models, policy planning and 
so forth, and is required to submit annual reports to Parliament detailing administrative and
financial practices. By contrast, Chief Justices typically have no formal role in the preparation
of budget estimates, nor do they control human resources decision-making or other funding
priorities within their courts.
In addition, a lengthy array of boards and tribunals enjoy a degree of administrative and
operational independence routinely denied to Courts. That includes almost all the labour
boards, utility and energy boards, and securities commissions, among others, in the provinces.
b) Courts lack stable funding and discretion over expenditures within a global budget.
Other participants pointed to the comparative lack of autonomy of Chief Justices as
compared with Chairs of major administrative boards and tribunals. Those Chairs typically
would receive stable multi-year funding envelopes which could be allocated to a variety of
administrative needs as the Chair deemed appropriate. Courts, by contrast, rarely receive
multi-year funding envelopes and often have little flexibility, if any, with respect to budgetary
line-items, not to mention an absence of effective control over the limited funding available.
2.3.7 Accountability
Among executive participants in the consultations, by far the most frequent priority in terms 
of court administration is “accountability”. Interestingly, no consensus appears to exist among
governments as to the scope or nature of accountability applicable to court administration 
or the proper instruments to measure accountability in this setting.
a) The accountability of Courts for the expenditure of public funds is often invoked 
but rarely elaborated.
Accountability for some observers means transparency—the ability to see and track precisely
where public funds are disbursed. For others, it is a measure of democratic legitimacy, and 
is reflected in the legislative committees before which executive managers must appear to
defend expenditures. Finally, still others have in mind something closer to value-for-money
audits on public expenditures to ensure they are deployed in effective and efficient ways for
public benefit. Regardless of the definition, the view shared by several executive participants
is that the executive model is necessary in order to ensure appropriate accountability over
court administration. Judicial independence, by contrast, is sometimes raised as an impediment
Where We are Now: Variations on the Executive Model 21
to accountability. This view of the Courts seems to ignore the fact that the Courts, as with
boards or the Auditor-General or Ombudsman, can report directly to the Legislature on how
funds have been spent. It also ignores the fact that the Courts can be required to comply with
spending practices and procedures applicable to the public sector.
b) The measures of quality of justice and access to justice, by which to measure value for
expenditures in court administration, are poorly articulated.
Even among those who appear clear on what they mean by accountability, there is no clear
consensus on how it ought to be evaluated. Should accountability for court administration
expenditures be measured by tangible standards relating to backlogs, volume, and judge-staff
ratios or by less tangible outcomes such as access to justice or quality justice services? Or by
reference to general aspirational goals and objectives set by the Courts similar to the goals
and objectives typically used today by many government departments? Or by another
standard often applied to boards and tribunals; i.e. accounting for public monies spent?
2.3.8 Complexity and Equity
The final dimension of the executive-judicial relationship which arose in our preliminary
consultations reflected concerns regarding complexity and equity. Together, these twin concerns
highlight the adaptability (and limits) of the executive model, and map out the terrain which 
any alternative model must be capable of traversing.
a) Court systems are becoming increasingly complex (e.g. rise of municipal Courts in some
provincial jurisdictions, development of “judicial” Justice of the Peace streams, introduction 
of case management masters).
Virtually all participants agreed with the observation that managing courts is becoming more
complex. This perspective was particularly strong among the provincially appointed judiciary
in larger provinces where Justices of the Peace and municipal Courts greatly expand the
number and variety of facilities and administrative dynamics which must be managed. Other
examples of complexity include the emergence of case management systems, technological
change such as e-filing and digitalizing court records, and new staffing needs such as media
relations specialists and increasing resources for change management.
b) Courts do not lend themselves to one-size-fits-all administrative solutions.
A majority of participants expressed the view that the executive model is not a single model 
at all but an umbrella for a wide range of models tailored to suit a wide range of court settings.
Small Courts allow for types of personal executive-judicial relationships to develop which 
are not feasible in larger Courts, and so forth. However, while the size, needs and internal
governance of Courts may differ substantially across jurisdictions and levels of Court, all
Courts appear to share similar vulnerabilities with respect to budgets, personnel and policies
which are under executive control.
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c) There are perceptions of disparities between regions within some provinces in terms of
administrative support.
One of the more revealing insights from participants is how common it is for the provincially
or federally appointed Court in a province to believe the other is more generously resourced
by the executive. In most jurisdictions, the executive does not have a separate administrative
structure in place for each Court—a regional manager, for example, will manage budgets for
both federally and provincially appointed Courts in that region. That said, the Chief Justices 
for each Court will often reach separate arrangements with the Attorney General regarding
facilities, staffing or other aspects of court administration.
In the provinces where federally appointed Courts appear to enjoy more generous funding,
the reasons cited generally reflected the view that federally appointed Courts enjoyed more
prestige. In the provinces where provincially appointed Courts appear to enjoy more generous
funding, the reasons cited generally included the view that the Attorney General had greater
“ownership” of the provincially appointed Court.
We were frequently reminded during our consultations that the executive model of court
administration in Canada is not a static or monolithic framework. Not only does it change
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on a matrix of geography, demography, history,
resources, and political and legal culture, but it also has some scope for greater judicial
autonomy and/or participation in court administration decision-making. Some of these
innovations have been briefly outlined above. These are widely seen as strengths on which
future and further alternative models should build. That said, these innovations also reflect 
the inherent limitations of judicial autonomy within an executive model.
2.4 Conclusions
Based on the above analysis, it is apparent that there is a widely held view that alternatives to 
the executive model of court administration should be explored and that the executive model 
is deficient in several key respects:
1. Courts lack stable funding and discretion over expenditures which create obstacles 
to strategic and long-term planning.
2. Court administrators often have divided loyalties to executive and judicial offices which 
can undermine the effectiveness of court administration.
3. The Attorneys Generals’ willingness and capacity to represent the Courts interests in
government decision-making is eroding.
4. The mutual trust between judicial and executive leadership is jeopardized by the present
climate of disputes over court administration budgets and the implementation of judicial
compensation commission recommendations.
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CHAPTER 3
How Did We Get Where We Are Now?
Implications for the Future
3.1 Discussion
If one traces the historical development of the current model of court administration decision-
making (i.e. the executive model), it becomes evident that the executive model was not designed
to run the Courts as they are now, and the current form of the executive model has been neither
as typical nor as long-established as most might assume. As well as providing historical information,
this Chapter illustrates how other countries have moved beyond the type of administrative
structures currently in place in Canada. This evidence supports not only the argument that
periodic change has strong roots in the history of Canadian justice, but also the argument that 
a new cycle of positive change is possible and desirable.
For most of our history, court administration was a relatively undeveloped, even simple, task that
called upon relatively inexperienced officials to provide clerical and courtroom support for judges
presiding at trials and hearing appeals.15 As a result, these tasks typically fell within the larger
administration of justice activities of provincial Attorneys General in their capacity as law officers 
of the Crown.
There were exceptions that seem ill-conceived by any standard today, however practical they
proved to be at the time. For example, in British Columbia during its first century after entering
confederation, the functions of local registrar of the Supreme Court and clerk of the County Court
were exercised by “Government Agents” in each county. These officials were part of the provincial
Ministry of Finance, and were also charged with revenue collection and the distribution of hunting
licenses. It is interesting to note that the British Columbia Attorney General did not take over that
province’s court services until 1974, and that step was controversial and contested as one of the
more radical initiatives of British Columbia’s first NDP Government.
Meanwhile, Magistrate’s Courts were typically administered by local governments even as their
functions and responsibilities grew in importance. As they were upgraded to Provincial Courts
beginning in the 1960s in Quebec and Ontario, administration was shifted to the provincial
executive (particularly the provincial Ministries of Justice/Attorney General). Funding was also
shifted fully to the province, replacing a mix of local funding and even user fees, as magistrates
were paid on a piece-work basis. In Ontario, even into the 1980s, some justices of the peace 
were paid according to the number of warrants they signed, so those looked upon with favour by
local police departments earned more income. In the first half of the twentieth century in British
Columbia, magistrates were paid per conviction, so that defence lawyers had to assure the judicial
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officer that if their client was acquitted, they would match the amount that would have been
received from the public purse.16
Whatever the historical mix of provincial or local administration of the courts, and involvement of
ministries beyond those of Justice and Attorneys General, it has only been in the past generation
that court administration has emerged as an important function requiring professional skills,
and has attracted senior officials with substantially more management experience. And it was 
not until the emergence of court administration as a key responsibility of provincial government
that the issue of judicial versus executive control emerged as a topic for debate. In fact, these 
two developments occurred side by side, and reflected the same trends.
Local administration of Magistrate’s Courts often meant in practice that locally-paid court staff had
no effective superior except the local judge, and those magistrates often managed their Court and
immediate staff in an active way. These magistrates also relied on other functionaries in the local
courthouse to assist them—police on the criminal side, social workers on the family side. Questions
about the independence of the judiciary or the separation of powers were rarely raised; courthouse
personnel perceived themselves to be part of an overall process of maintaining peace and order 
in their community; and in the process police officers might have direct access to court files, and
Provincial Court judges could obtain support services from law enforcement staff.
Superior Courts at both trial and appellate level were able to function with less likelihood of 
direct conflict with law enforcement. The judges’ immediate needs were most often met by making
requests to counsel for information and assistance. Case volume was lower, so case scheduling
could be done with less reliance on the ability of clerical staff to manipulate Court calendars. But 
as trial Courts grew in size, and judges realized that allowing counsel to schedule cases required
Courts to rely in criminal cases on the staff of Crown attorneys’ offices and police departments 
to perform sensitive and essential judicial functions, issues of management control that might
previously have appeared to be matters of convenience and comfort were now matters that struck
directly at the heart of impartial adjudication.
Once court administrative functions were consolidated under provincial Attorneys General and
Ministers of Justice, issues of principle were more clearly defined. In the most frequently cited
anomaly, management of the Courts was now the direct responsibility of the same minister 
who was responsible for prosecution of criminal cases in those Courts. More recently, the amount
of civil litigation involving the government has been increasing significantly. Furthermore, any
administrative change would henceforth be driven by the province—a recipe for conflict between
central administration and local adjudication. Thus when the Ontario Law Reform Commission
issued its Report on Court Administration in 1973, and recommended that priority be given to 
what would come to be called caseflow management, the resulting Central West pilot project 
was unsuccessful at least in part because of suspicions about its incompatibility with principles 
of judicial independence. Whatever the explanation for the demise of this project, it was quickly
followed by a 1976 White Paper that centred on a proposal by the Attorney General of Ontario 
to turn court administration over to a council in which judges would play a leading role. Thus the
difficulty of administering the Courts within a cabinet department arose virtually as soon as the
executive began to exercise central control over operational innovation.
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Had all parties involved in the administration of justice recognized the need for a full-fledged
management structure during the country’s first century, a framework in which the Courts
operated as a separate enterprise would have been a logical option: a judiciary at arms’
length from government administered within an institutional framework at arms’ length from
government. The Courts might then have been administered as a coherent entity or system 
in which independent judges, organized both hierarchically and collegially, were supported 
by appropriately trained and qualified staff. The staff in turn would have been managed, for
example, by a board or commission akin to the quasi-independent boards and commissions 
that proliferated throughout provincial governments in the 20th century.
In practice, however, the Courts of every province remained subdivisions of executive departments
responsible for a wide array of other functions performed by legal professionals—prosecuting
criminal cases, providing legal advice to the executive branch, analyzing policies related to the
delivery of legal services. This departmental framework has meant that even as court administration
has grown in complexity, the judiciary and court officials have been restricted in the options and
authority they needed to develop management structures and processes to meet the priorities 
of an effective judicial system.
In the meantime, provincial civil services grew in size, scope and professionalism in a wide range
of policy areas. Policy planning and later strategic planning became methodologies for increasing
the coherence of initiatives to improve delivery of health, education and other critical services 
to the public that fell within provincial responsibility. Building the institutional competence of
provincial governments became a means of enhancing their role in confederation. But justice
functions in general and court services in particular lagged behind the developments in other
parts of the public service. By the time these new initiatives penetrated court administration, the
era of fiscal restraint had fallen upon the provinces, and new innovations in policy, planning and
analysis of quantitative and qualitative information would too often have to be done on the
cheap, and without sufficient personnel.
It is a credit to the professionals who administer Canadian Courts that the anomalous model of
court administration that still exists in every province today has been able to operate at all. Local
courthouse staff must juggle their desire to provide over-the-counter service to the public and 
in-court support to the judiciary with the demands and strictures of a large and diverse provincial
government department. Senior managers are increasingly called upon to be part of ministry
management teams whose competing priorities—universally including effective criminal
prosecution and often extending to correctional administration—at least distract from and 
at worst conflict with the priorities of the Courts.
The fact that an anomalous model has continued is not only a reflection of the energy and dexterity
of court managers, but also a reflection of the willingness of the judiciary in many provinces to 
go along with existing management systems. Some judges are concerned that a formally rational
model for court administration would undermine some of the quiet but hard-won accommodations
of the past. Others fear that an increase in overall management responsibility would take time and
focus away from adjudication, and require management skills they may not possess. This overlooks
the fact that emerging models of judicial control have in practice enhanced the responsibility of
court administrative staff and enhanced the judiciary’s confidence not only in their competence,
but in their responsiveness and accountability.
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Efforts to spell out new and appropriate models for court management have too often in the past
been dismissed as efforts by the judiciary to enhance their power and even their personal comfort.
As a result, joint efforts by governments, judiciary and court staff to develop workable models 
that reflect the distinctive objectives and complex environment of a modern court have been too
limited in scope. Ways to organize court administration at arms length from government—and
ways to conduct court administration so that judges play a central role without spending added
hours away from their judicial tasks—remain absent throughout Canadian provinces, even after
the federal government has taken steps to enhance the administrative autonomy of the Supreme
Court of Canada and the Federal Court.
Experience in other democratic countries, including important changes brought about over the
past 20 years, suggests that court systems are moving away slowly but surely from the anomalous
models of the past. For example, the state of South Australia has established a Courts Administration
Authority made up of the Chief Justice and Chief Judges of its three levels of Courts—Supreme
Court, District Court and Magistrates Courts—that has full authority over court resources, both
human and physical. Its budget comes directly from the Legislature of the state and can be
managed with broad discretion to achieve results that are monitored from year to year against
performance objectives set by the judiciary itself.
What conditions led to the emergence and success of the South Australian CAA? First, it evolved
through two stages. In 1981, the Attorney General announced “[t]he formation of a separate
Courts Department,” amalgamating functions that had been divided between three existing
departments.17 That department was still within the executive, but its affairs were administered
through a working partnership between the judiciary and executive. When the judiciary sought
more autonomy a decade later, it was to anticipate potential problems, not to criticize existing
arrangements.18 Second, it was championed by the state chief justice, who continued to press for
an autonomous model even as he and his fellow chief justices played an active role in effectively
managing the separate executive department. Third, the state government was open to a change
that delegated greater administrative responsibility to the judiciary.19
In another well-known example, the Republic of Ireland has within the past decade established an
Irish Courts Service to handle all court support functions independent of government.20 The new
Irish Courts Service has been praised by the judiciary and the bar, and also has the strong support
of a wide range of court administrators who report that the Courts have at last been able to set
their own priorities.
Other examples where the administrative autonomy of the Court is a foundational principle
include: the Federal Court of Australia; the Family Court of Australia; all of the United States federal
court system, with its dozen circuits and over 90 districts; and a wide variety of state court systems
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within the United States (in particular, those that have achieved a higher degree of administrative
unification). Interestingly, one of the most persuasive arguments for Court administrative autonomy
in Australia was made by Stephen Skehill in 1994, when he was Deputy Secretary of the
Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department (he later became Secretary).21 He criticized the
traditional executive model, not only in terms of the lack of independence, but also in terms of
inefficient administration, the inability to provide proper support, and unacceptable financial risk.
And he cited the success of the Federal Court and the Family Court, characterizing them as “far
healthier” and more effective organizations.
Successful new models of court administration in the common law world have emerged without 
a high degree of conflict with the governments in their jurisdictions.22 In fact, those governments
have reformed their own administration in recent years to place more emphasis on managing 
by results and less emphasis on formal rules and procedures. In the process of enhancing overall
administrative effectiveness, these governments have supported similar steps by their judiciaries 
to enhance Court effectiveness by allowing more flexible, goal-oriented court management.
These developments are in no way limited to the common law world. The Netherlands has taken
important steps away from an executive model that have attracted widespread attention. Other
changes in the same direction have been noted in France, Sweden and Norway among Western
European nations, and in Bulgaria and Georgia among Eastern European nations.
Furthermore, Courts rather than governments have long possessed limited administrative
autonomy over court staffing in countries as diverse as India, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Singapore. In the past decade, even the Supreme Court in Fidel Castro’s Cuba has taken over
responsibility for court administration from that country’s Ministry of Justice.
In these contexts—historical, cross-national, and contemporary Canadian—the purpose of this
report is to facilitate the building of effective models of court administration that reflect the
distinctive needs of individual Courts and Courts in general. Courts throughout the world share 
a need for independence from government while at the same time being able to manage their
complex processes in an effective and accountable way.
3.2 Conclusions
The analysis of Chapter 3 provides considerable historical evidence supporting the possibility 
and feasibility of Canada moving forward from the current executive model to an alternative
model. In particular these findings establish the following:
1. Current models were not designed to run the Courts as they are now.
2. Current models have not been around as long or as universally as most might assume.
3. The impetus for change is not only understandable, but that positive change is possible 
and desirable.
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Constitutional principles and requirements relating to judicial independence are necessarily key
criteria in assessing alternative models of court administration. An analysis of the constitutional
position regarding administrative autonomy reveals a complex and extremely dynamic normative
context which calls for a fairly detailed review of the evolution of judicial independence both in
Canada and internationally.
4.1 The Dynamic Normative Context 
of Judicial Independence
The principle of judicial independence first took concrete form as a binding rule in the United
Kingdom in the Act of Settlement of 1701. It was the result of the ceaseless tension and struggles 
in the 17th and 18th centuries between the King and Parliament to determine which of the two
institutions would exercise sovereign legislative authority.23 The King’s judges of the time were
caught in the crossfire between the supporters of these two positions. At that time, they were
appointed durante bene placido, that is at the King’s pleasure. For the King, this method of
appointment was an important means of controlling the judiciary. Parliamentary control also
existed through the impeachment procedure. Parliament would impeach judges with whose
conduct it was not satisfied.24 Parliament, which was often referred to by the phrase “High Court 
of Parliament”, was seeking to act as a counterweight to royal power.
The 1688 Glorious Revolution guaranteed that Parliament would set the rules: its legislative
sovereignty was no longer in dispute. It took the Act of Settlement to stabilize the position of
judges by ensuring that they would henceforth be appointed during good behaviour and could
only be removed on a joint address by both Houses of Parliament. The Act of Settlement did not
come into effect until the death of Queen Anne in 1714.
The Act of Settlement did not apply outside the United Kingdom.25 Accordingly, in Canada colonial
justice remained a matter for the royal prerogative. In the 18th century, judges in Canada were
appointed and removed by the colony’s Governor, representing His Majesty. In 1834, Upper
Canada adopted a statute providing that judges were appointed during good behaviour. This
statute was not disallowed by London. Some three years following the 1840 Act of Union, this
measure was extended to Lower Canada. This statute also provided that a judge could only be
removed upon the address of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly.
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This very short historical review simply provides the chief facts regarding the emergence of the
principle of judicial independence. The sources of the principle are in fact bound up with a much
more complex history, that of the growth of the modern state. Further, this review leads one to
approach the question of the status of judges of the time with the conceptual tools of the 20th
or the 21st century; and this does not help in appreciating the evolutionary nature of the principle
of judicial independence. Why guarantee the judiciary’s independence? Today , at one level,
the answer is this: “The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure a
reasonable perception of impartiality; judicial independence is but a ‘means’ to this ‘end’”. 26 It is
important to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the Courts; but has it always been
so? And if not, how and in what institutional circumstances did this principle emerge? 
One may think that the answers to these questions are purely of historical interest. This is not so.
The answers afford a clearer understanding of the formalization of relations between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government, and thereby a grasp of the development of the
principle of the separation of powers, to which “the institutional independence of the judiciary
reflects a deeper commitment”. 27 Additionally, understanding the historical background to the
emergence of the principle of judicial independence enables one to see the ongoing evolution
which is a feature of that principle and which continues today. What does that historical review
reveal? Institutional relations in Canada change and adapt in accordance with social, economic
and political circumstances. And constitutional law must reflect those changes.28
In the Remuneration Reference, Lamer C.J. stated that “judicial independence is at root an unwritten
constitutional principle, in the sense that it is exterior to the particular sections of the Constitution
Acts”29 and that its existence is confirmed by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, which
refers to the constitution of the United Kingdom. If judicial independence is an unwritten principle
external to the text of the Constitution, the scope of the legal analysis must be broadened and the
historical circumstances in which the principle has emerged and flourished must be considered.
Since the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 articulates the “political theory which the Act
embodies,”30 one must look briefly at the political circumstances surrounding the origins of
judicial independence. It is therefore necessary to say a few words about the recognition of the
judicial “power”, as an aid in understanding the principle underlying it and clarifying its development.
The ordering of modern governmental powers, in the classical form of the executive, legislative 
and judiciary,31 is the outcome of a very lengthy process of refinement of institutions. Initially,
the sovereignty of the King took judicial form. The King was thus primarily the great dispenser of
justice. His lawyers did their utmost to place this royal authority on a firm footing, by inserting into
public discourse such maxims as “The King is the source of all justice” or “All justice comes from
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the King”, and so on. In dispensing justice, the King was assisted by his court, the Curia Regis. This
phrase has two meanings: “(i) the place where the king resided attended by the chief officials of
his court and household; and (ii) the supreme central court where the business of government 
in all its branches was transacted”. 32
The Curia Regis brought together the greatest figures in the kingdom, but increasingly it also
included royal officials, often lawyers trained in Bologna and Paris, whose function was the 
day-to-day running of the kingdom. Some of these royal officers took the name of “justices 
in the Curia Regis”. The word “justice” is thus a generic expression for such officers, since they
exercised a broad range of functions:
They were therefore much more than judges, since they took part in all the
miscellaneous functions of government which, as we shall see, were performed by 
the Curia Regis. Naturally they became prominent when the work of the Curia expanded
in the reign of Henry II. They acted either in the Curia Regis, at the Exchequer, or as
itinerant commissioners. Often they were recruited from the staff of the Exchequer; and,
as their training there gave experience of and facilities for dealing with judicial business,
they were especially useful in conducting both the judicial work of the Curia and the
business of those judicial tribunals which were beginning, at the end of Henry II’s reign,
to disengage themselves from the Curia.33
From then on, the emergence of a purely judicial body becomes apparent. However, the officers
responsible for the daily management of the kingdom’s affairs also performed tasks of a
legislative, administrative and judicial nature at their meetings. The burden of work quickly
became too large for a diffuse body such as the Curia Regis.34
Thus, in the 12th century, the Curia Regis began to break up into separate departments and distinct
courts of law.35 This process was initiated with finance and judicial affairs, two matters of critical
importance to the Norman and Angevin kings, for whom good financial management was essential
to a strong government, and control over judicial affairs the best way of avoiding internal disorder.
More formal courts were established in the Middle Ages, such as the Court of Common Pleas and,
later, the Court of King’s Bench. Of course, these courts were still not completely autonomous.
It was during the 14th and 15th centuries that the courts really took shape and became more
autonomous, constituting the common law courts. At the same time as these courts were
developing, another offshoot of the Curia Regis grew in importance: the Council in Parliament,
which also performed functions of a judicial nature. In the 14th and 15th centuries, Parliament
broke up into two separate houses: the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The splitting
up of the Curia Regis into several entities—the judges of the central courts of common law, the
House of Lords and the House of Commons—was an indication of the form modern government
would take. This process underwent a tumultuous acceleration in the 16th and 17th centuries,
which ended in the Restoration. The reign of James II saw major constitutional disputes between
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Parliament and the Monarch, which were finally resolved in Parliament’s favour and led to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1689 and, in 1701, the Act of Settlement, which dealt first with the
question of the succession to William and Mary.36
This very broad overview shows that the functions of government were at first performed in
common by the same institution, the Curia Regis, and that a process of subdividing the latter slowly
took shape in the late Middle Ages. Separate institutions emerged at that time, but their members
did not have exclusive functions. Thus, judges often performed functions of an administrative or
financial nature in the Chancery or the Exchequer. Similarly, Parliament performed functions which
might be described as judicial. Until Montesquieu and Locke, and even after, therefore, there was
significant overlapping of the executive, legislative and judicial functions.
The appearance of a modern judiciary is thus the outcome of a lengthy process of refinement and
formalization of institutions and functions: the judicial institution gradually differentiating itself
from other institutions with which it shared powers, and the judicial function gradually becoming
exclusive and retaining few areas in common with the executive and legislative powers. The Act 
of Settlement was a further stage in this differentiation process, as that Act created a previously
unknown institutional autonomy. It was then necessary to wait for a time before an organizational
principle of exclusivity was established, since until the 19th century, in Canada for example, judges
were often members of the Executive Council, and even of the House of Commons.37
The need to protect the judiciary gradually became apparent together with the latter’s primary
duty: deciding controversies according to law. Judicial independence was then an essential
element in this functional and institutional evolution:“the institutional independence of the
judiciary reflects a deeper commitment to the separation of powers between and amongst 
the legislative, executive and judicial organs of government”.38 The judicial independence of 
the 18th century, that of the Act of Settlement, was but the seed of the contemporary concept.
It has been refined over time along with concepts which are the basis for the executive and
legislative powers.
This process of institutional and functional differentiation, which is one of defining the different
branches of the State as well as the appropriate relation between those branches, has by no
means come to an end. For example, the oldest institution of the British constitutional system, the
office of the Lord Chancellor, has been redesigned in an effort to bring about a clearer separation
between the branches of the State.39 In Canada, the consequences of the “patriation” of the
Constitution and the adoption of a charter of rights that prevails over legislative enactments 
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are gradually being worked out by the Supreme Court.40 The Court takes a principled and
evolutionary approach to constitutional adjudication: the principles underlying the constitution
are said to be essential to the “ongoing process of constitutional development and evolution”. 41
It would be a mistake to assume that the end of the process of defining the constitutional
requirements of judicial independence has been reached. That process is essential to understanding
the dynamic normative context in which models of court administration must be analysed.
As government has continued to develop in the 20th century and today, the contemporary
transformations in the principle of judicial independence must now be considered.
4.2 Contemporary Evolution in Canada
Before the Charter could make its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, it was established that
Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1867 42 (“Judicature”), ss. 96 to 100, determined the limits of judicial
independence for superior courts in Canada:“The judicature sections of the Constitution Act, 1867
guarantee the independence of the superior courts; they apply to Parliament as well as to the
Provincial Legislatures”. 43 Additionally, the Privy Council had held that s. 96 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 was one of the “three principal pillars in the temple of justice . . . not to be undermined”. 44
Part VII contains the operative portions of the Act of Settlement dealing with the judiciary, namely
the appointment of judges of the superior courts during good behaviour and their removal on 
a joint address by the Houses of Parliament. Having said that, prior to adoption of the Charter,
Canadian courts had not dealt directly with the question of judicial independence. They had
simply referred to it in cases involving the interpretation of s. 96 and the assignment to the lower
courts or to administrative tribunals of powers which were within the authority of the superior
courts.45
4.2.1 The Valente Period
The situation changed fundamentally with the adoption of the Charter in 1982. In 1985 the
Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to rule on the interpretation of s. 11(d ) of the Charter,
which states that “any person charged with an offence has the right . . . (d ) to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal”. In Valente,46 the Supreme Court had to rule on the status of the Criminal
Division of the Ontario Provincial Court. The appellant Valente argued that Provincial Court judges
were not independent within the meaning of s. 11(d ) of the Charter. Le Dain J. identified the three
essential conditions of judicial independence in Canada: security of tenure, financial security and
administrative independence.
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Security of tenure is seen as the first condition of judicial independence. In Valente Le Dain J.
noted that security of tenure is the opposite of the system of appointment during pleasure.
Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure:
. . . that the judge be removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to independent
review and determination by a process at which the judge affected is afforded a full
opportunity to be heard. The essence of security of tenure for purposes of s. 11(d ) is a
tenure, whether until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative
task, that is secure against interference by the Executive or other appointing authority 
in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.47
Those are the minimal requirements for security of tenure. They reject any possibility of discretionary
removal and underpin a degree of employment security which is considerable. Le Dain J.
condemned the system of appointment during pleasure, as in the case of a provincial court judge
who has reached retirement age without having accumulated sufficient years of service to be
entitled to a pension but who may be “re-appointed” during pleasure by the Lieutenant Governor
in Council on the recommendation of the Attorney General. Le Dain J. considered that holding
office during pleasure could not “reasonably be perceived as meeting the essential requirement 
of security of tenure for purposes of s. 11(d ) of the Charter”. 48 Consequently, a judge who holds
office during pleasure cannot be an independent tribunal within the meaning of s. 11(d ).
The second condition has to do with the financial security of judges. In Valente Le Dain J. wrote,
about this second essential requirement:
The second essential condition of judicial independence for purposes of s. 11(d ) of 
the Charter is, in my opinion, what may be referred to as financial security. That means
security of salary or other remuneration, and, where appropriate, security of pension.
The essence of such security is that the right to salary and pension should be
established by law and not be subject to arbitrary interference by the Executive in a
manner that could affect judicial independence. In the case of pension, the essential
distinction is that between a right to a pension and a pension that depends on the
grace or favour of the Executive.49
The financial security aspect of the principle of judicial independence was expanded on further 
in the Remuneration Reference. For the moment, it may be noted that one year after handing down
the judgment in Valente, the Supreme Court again ruled on the question of financial security in
Beauregard.50 Mr. Beauregard was a judge of the Superior Court, and a statute required Superior
Court judges appointed after a certain date to contribute from their salaries to the pension plan
from which they would benefit. The question of reduction of salary arose incidentally. Ultimately,
therefore, the Court had to interpret s. 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867.51 The Supreme Court,
per Dickson C.J., recognized that the federal legislature had a certain latitude in determining and
paying salaries and pensions. The legislation in dispute placed judges on the same footing as
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other Canadians regarding contribution to pension plans.52 By implication, therefore, Dickson C.J.
recognized that Parliament had the right to alter the retirement plans of judges of the superior
courts. Nevertheless, he pointed out that this right to set not only pensions but salaries was not
unlimited:
The power of Parliament to fix the salaries and pensions of superior court judges is 
not unlimited. If there were any hint that a federal law dealing with these matters was
enacted for an improper or colourable purpose, or if there was discriminatory treatment
of judges vis-à-vis other citizens, then serious issues relating to judicial independence
would arise and the law might well be held to be ultra vires s. 100 of the Constitution Act,
1867. 53
Salary decisions could not be made on the basis of improper or colourable considerations that
could undermine the principle of judicial independence.
The third condition of judicial independence identified by Le Dain J., namely administrative
independence, affects the relations between the judiciary and the other constituent branches 
of government. Those relations are thus in nature what is described as institutional. In Valente,
Le Dain J. wrote regarding this third minimum requirement:
Although the increased measure of administrative autonomy or independence that is
being recommended for the courts, or some degree of it, may well be highly desirable,
it cannot in my opinion be regarded as essential for purposes of s. 11(d ) of the Charter.
The essentials of institutional independence which may be reasonably perceived as
sufficient for purposes of s. 11(d ) must, I think, be those referred to by Howland C.J.O.
They may be summed up as judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear
directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function. To the extent that the
distinction between administrative independence and adjudicative independence is
intended to reflect that limitation, I can see no objection to it.54
Le Dain J. was more explicit regarding the exact nature of this control by the courts over
administrative decisions that might have an effect on the performance of their judicial duties,
when he explained:
Judicial control over the matters referred to by Howland C.J.O.—assignment of judges,
sittings of the court, and court lists—as well as the related matters of allocation of court
rooms and direction of the administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions,
has generally been considered the essential or minimum requirement for institutional or
“collective” independence.55
In Généreux, Lamer C.J. appeared to support this approach when he wrote:
The third essential condition of judicial independence is institutional independence with
respect to matters of administration that relate directly to the exercise of the tribunal’s
judicial function. It is unacceptable that an external force be in a position to interfere in
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matters that are directly and immediately relevant to the adjudicative function, for
example, assignment of judges, sittings of the court and court lists. Although there must
of necessity be some institutional relations between the judiciary and the executive,
such relations must not interfere with the judiciary’s liberty in adjudicating individual
disputes and in upholding the law and values of the Constitution.56
These three conditions are thus the basis on which the principle of judicial independence rests.
They are its pillars. In Valente, Le Dain J. also made a fundamental distinction between individual
independence and institutional independence. That distinction was reiterated by Dickson C.J.
in Beauregard. In Valente, Le Dain J. said that “It is generally agreed that judicial independence
involves both individual and institutional relationships: the individual independence of a judge,
as reflected in such matters as security of tenure, and the institutional independence of the 
court or tribunal over which he or she presides, as reflected in its institutional or administrative
relationships to the executive and legislative branches of government”. 57
Individual independence includes what is commonly referred to as the judge’s adjudicative
independence. It is the complete autonomy which the judge must have when he or she is called
on to render a decision in a specific case. There must be no interference with this freedom of
conscience, and ideally it should function without fear or apprehension.“Historically, the generally
accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been the complete liberty of
individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them: no outsider . . . should
interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her 
case and makes his or her decision”. 58 Dickson C.J. goes on to say that this core continues to 
be central to judicial independence.59
On the institutional dimension of judicial independence, Dickson C.J. wrote:
The rationale for this two-pronged modern understanding of judicial independence 
is recognition that the courts are not charged solely with the adjudication of individual
cases. That is, of course, one role. It is also the context for a second, different and equally
important role, namely as protector of the Constitution and the fundamental values
embodied in it—rule of law, fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic
process, to name perhaps the most important. In other words, judicial independence 
is essential for fair and just dispute-resolution in individual cases. It is also the lifeblood
of constitutionalism in democratic societies.60
He continued his reasoning by saying that “on the institutional plane, judicial independence
means the preservation of the separateness and integrity of the judicial branch and a guarantee 
of its freedom from unwarranted intrusions by, or even intertwining with, the legislative and
executive branches”.61 These comments reaffirm the reasoning of Le Dain J., who said that “the
relationship between these two aspects of judicial independence is that an individual judge may
enjoy the essential conditions of judicial independence but if the court or tribunal over which he
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or she presides is not independent of the other branches of government, in what is essential to its
function, he or she cannot be said to be an independent tribunal”. 62 This fundamental distinction
between individual and institutional independence was a legacy of Valente and Beauregard, and 
is still fully relevant today.
Valente also clarified the distinction between impartiality and independence, both guaranteed 
by s. 11(d ) of the Charter. Le Dain J.’s reasons are clear in this regard:
Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues
and the parties in a particular case. The word “impartial” as Howland C.J.O. noted,
connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived. The word “independent” in s. 11(d ) reflects
or embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial independence. As such,
it connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial
functions, but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch 
of government, that rests on objective conditions or guarantees. 63
Finally, Valente suggested a test for determining whether, in a given situation, a court meets 
the three essential requirements for judicial independence pursuant to s. 11(d ) of the Charter.
Le Dain J. described this test as follows:
Although judicial independence is a status or relationship resting on objective
conditions or guarantees, as well as a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise
of judicial functions, it is sound, I think, that the test for independence for purposes 
of s. 11(d ) of the Charter should be, as for impartiality, whether the tribunal may be
reasonably perceived as independent . . . It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should
be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for independence
should include that perception. The perception must, however, as I have suggested,
be a perception of whether the tribunal enjoys the essential objective conditions or
guarantees of judicial independence, and not a perception of how it will in fact act,
regardless of whether it enjoys such conditions or guarantees.64
Généreux illustrates this recourse to the reasonable and informed person assumed by the test
suggested by Le Dain J. In that case, Lamer C.J. stated:
With respect to the case at bar, therefore, the question is not whether the General 
Court Martial actually acted in a manner that may be characterized as independent 
and impartial. The appropriate question is whether the tribunal, from the objective
standpoint of a reasonable and informed person, will be perceived as enjoying the
essential conditions of independence.65
The logic behind this reference to perception is that judicial independence serves notably as 
a means “to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice”. 66 Valente was decided 
in 1985. As already indicated, it would appear to have been the first opportunity the Supreme
Court had to rule expressly and directly on the question of judicial independence in Canada.
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Some 20 years have gone by since Valente and Beauregard. The time has now come to assess 
the changes which the principle of judicial independence has undergone in these years, when
more than ever before the judiciary has been called upon not as a transmission belt or tool for
implementing legislative policy but as an institution which is part of the government, as “the
lifeblood of constitutionalism in democratic societies”. 67
4.2.2 Post-Valente Developments
The adoption of the Charter, and with it an enhanced role for the judiciary in Canadian constitutional
democracy has made more transparent a twofold evolution: on the one hand, a focused evolution
in the general assessment of the conditions for judicial independence, and on the other, a more
diffuse evolution characterizing the conditions in which the law is produced and interpreted.
Beginning with the latter, the Charter was barely three years old when Valente was decided. The
outlines of the constitutional document and its effects had hardly begun to be felt. Twenty years
later, the role of the judiciary has changed considerably. Its role in the area of constitutional review
has certainly increased: the range of constitutional interpretation is no longer limited primarily 
to the division of powers, but now covers a very wide spectrum of questions that affect many
activities of the executive and the legislature. In particular, the courts now render constitutional
judgments which have financial effects that are far from negligible. A court may impose on various
levels of government a range of legal obligations with serious consequences for public finances.
These judgments are not chance occurrences: they are the outcome of the powers and competences
conferred on the courts not only by the Charter but also by statutes protecting rights and
freedoms. All these legislative instruments are themselves the result of political choices made 
by successive governments. This widening of court jurisdiction to the political sphere is also 
not limited to Canada.
The political arm of government here as elsewhere tends to pass on to judges responsibility 
for resolving extremely delicate social questions (abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage 
and so on). In Western societies, there is a turmoil of subjective rights, to use an expression of
Dean Carbonnier, which can only lead to increased reliance on the law. To this should be added
the almost universal tendency to treat the legal apparatus as a necessary system for controlling
not only the executive but the legislature as well. This approach has not been without consequences
for the work of the courts. In short, the last 25 years have brought a formidable increase in judicial
responsibilities and an ever-growing involvement of the courts in the resolution of socio-economic
questions. This much greater emphasis on the political role of the courts in Western societies 
has had its effect on the relations which the they may have with the legislature and executive.
Normally, one would expect such new responsibilities to give rise to new arrangements of the
relations between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
Throughout the West, one is witnessing the arrival of a society of law. The crisis in the welfare state
has certainly not resulted in a diminution of law: quite the contrary. Everywhere one is seeing a
proliferation of legislation and an explosion of litigation.68 The proliferation of legislation is itself 
a response to an ever more insistent demand for law.69 Professor Chevallier writes:
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[TRANSLATION]
This need for regulation is felt all the more acutely in contemporary societies as they
have become “risk societies”: new threats appear (contaminated blood, mad cow disease,
pollution) and scientific and technical developments are fraught with uncertainty (the
explosion of biotechnologies and of information and communication technologies); the
setting of rules is essential to re-establish “trust” . . . which has become brittle but is
indispensable to life in society.70
The explosion of litigation entails a considerable increase in the responsibilities of judges:
[TRANSLATION] 
[H]enceforward in contemporary societies judges will be responsible for resolving
conflicts of all kinds and maintaining social equilibrium: they are given responsibility 
for undoing the Gordian knots of history, of morality, of economics: it is up to the judges
to weigh the interests and define socially acceptable solutions.71
This is the broad background to the evolution in the general conditions of judicial independence
in Canada. Since Valente, this evolution has been focused and intense. The most noteworthy
development is the Remuneration Reference handed down by the Supreme Court in 1997. In that
case, the Court had to determine, with more specifics than was the case in Valente and Beauregard,
the means of implementing the essential requirement of financial security, as this had already
been identified. In three provinces, Prince Edward Island, Alberta and Manitoba, provincially-
appointed judges were faced with salary reductions enacted by law. The three cases, joined for
purposes of the reference, had this issue in common:“whether and how the guarantee of judicial
independence in s. 11(d ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms restricts the manner 
by and the extent to which provincial governments and legislatures can reduce the salaries of
provincial court judges”. 72 Without going into all the details of that very important case, it should
be noted that Lamer C.J. did not confine himself simply to considering s. 11(d ) of the Charter.
Since that section is limited in its application to accused persons,73 it was useful to reflect on 
other sources of the principle of judicial independence in the Canadian Constitution.
Lamer C.J. noted that in Beauregard, Dickson C.J. had identified several sources of the principle 
of judicial independence:
Beauregard identified a number of sources for judicial independence which are
constitutional in nature. As a result, these sources additionally ground the institutional
independence of the courts. The institutional independence of the courts emerges 
from the logic of federalism, which requires an impartial arbiter to settle jurisdictional
disputes between the federal and provincial orders of government. Institutional
independence also inheres in adjudication under the Charter, because the rights
protected by that document are rights against the state. As well, the Court pointed 
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to the preamble and judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, as additional
sources of judicial independence; I also consider those sources to ground the judiciary’s
institutional independence. Taken together, it is clear that the institutional independence
of the judiciary is “definitional to the Canadian understanding of constitutionalism” . . . 74
Lamer C.J. considered that, in addition to the sources already identified in Beauregard and s. 11(d )
of the Charter, an interpreter of the Constitution should look at the preamble to the Constitution
Act, 1867 to find a fundamental support for the principle of judicial independence. Judicial
independence “is at root an unwritten constitutional principle, in the sense that it is exterior to 
the particular sections of the Constitution Acts”. 75 This resort to the preamble can be explained in
particular by the fact that “the range of courts whose independence is protected by the written
provisions of the Constitution contains large gaps”. 76 Thus, it appears that “the express provisions
of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter are not an exhaustive written code for the protection
of judicial independence in Canada. Judicial independence is an unwritten norm, recognized 
and affirmed by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, it is in that preamble, which
serves as the grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our
commitment to this foundational principle is located”. 77
Lamer C.J. then turned his attention to the question of the individual and institutional aspects 
of judicial independence. He recalled the distinction made in Valente, but considered that the
explanation given by Le Dain J. in this regard was incomplete:
However, the core characteristics of judicial independence, and the dimensions of
judicial independence, are two very different concepts. The core characteristics of
judicial independence are distinct facets of the definition of judicial independence.
Security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence come together to
constitute judicial independence. By contrast, the dimensions of judicial independence
indicate which entity—the individual judge or the court or tribunal to which he or she
belongs—is protected by a particular core characteristic.
The conceptual distinction between the core characteristics and the dimensions of
judicial independence suggests that it may be possible for a core characteristic to have
both an individual and an institutional or collective dimension.78
Thus, in Valente the Court dealt only with the individual dimension of financial security,79
an essential characteristic identified in the judgment. Financial security also has an institutional
dimension, and it is that which the Supreme Court sought to develop and support in 
its judgment.
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There are three components to the institutional dimension of financial security:
[TRANSLATION]
• the salaries of judges of provincial courts may be reduced, but the provinces have a
constitutional obligation to establish independent, effective and objective bodies to
make recommendations in this regard which can only be disregarded on rational
grounds;
• the judiciary cannot collectively or individually engage in negotiations in this regard
with the executive or the legislature;
• the effect of such reductions cannot be to take salaries below the minimum level
required by the judge’s responsibilities.80
The Remuneration Reference is a fundamental decision in the interpretation and understanding of
the principle of judicial independence in Canada. It goes beyond Valente, since it moves forward
the nature and characteristics of financial security, an essential requirement for the independence
of the judiciary. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that the Constitution had evolved81 and with
it, of course, the principle of judicial independence.
This evolution of the principle since Valente has also had other dimensions of considerable
importance.
Firstly, the concept of institutional impartiality was developed. In Valente the Court had made an
important distinction between the concepts of impartiality and independence in interpreting 
s. 11(d ) of the Charter. In Lippé, the Supreme Court took further the analysis of the relationship
between independence and impartiality:
The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure a reasonable
perception of impartiality; judicial independence is but a “means” to this “end”. If judges
could be perceived as “impartial” without judicial “independence”, the requirement of
“independence” would be unnecessary. However, judicial independence is critical to 
the public’s perception of impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary
prerequisite, for judicial impartiality.82
Then, the Supreme Court developed the new concept of institutional impartiality:
Notwithstanding judicial independence, there may also exist a reasonable apprehension
of bias on an institutional or structural level. Although the concept of institutional
impartiality has never before been recognized by this Court, the constitutional
guarantee of an “independent and impartial tribunal” has to be broad enough to
encompass this. Just as the requirement of judicial independence has both an individual
and institutional aspect . . . so too must the requirement of judicial impartiality . . .
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The objective status of the tribunal can be as relevant for the “impartiality” requirement
as it is for “independence”. Therefore, whether or not any particular judge harboured 
pre-conceived ideas of biases, if the system is structured in such a way as to create a
reasonable apprehension of bias on an institutional level, the requirement of impartiality
is not met. 83
This new concept complements the protection offered by the principle of judicial independence.
Secondly, in Mackeigan, the Supreme Court pointed out that the essential features of judicial
independence identified by Le Dain J. in Valente were not “an exhaustive codification of the
elements necessary for judicial independence”.84 The Court went on to say that “the conditions
themselves may vary and evolve with time and circumstances”. 85 Thus, in Mackeigan, the Court
acknowledged that the principle of judicial independence included an immunity (or privilege) by
which a judge might refuse “to answer to the executive or legislative branches of government or
their appointees as to how and why the judge arrived at a particular judicial conclusion”. 86
Thirdly, until the Remuneration Reference, the judges of the lower courts, that is, essentially, the
provincially-appointed judges, received only a limited measure of protection of their judicial
independence. They were not covered by ss. 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 11(d )
only applied to courts exercising criminal and penal jurisdiction. There has thus been a marked
change, since “judicial independence [has] grown into a principle that now extends to all courts,
not just the superior courts of this country”. 87 Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile briefly to 
look at the impact of inherent jurisdiction in the context of judicial independence.
4.2.3 The Inherent Powers Doctrine
Based on experience in the United States, the inherent jurisdiction of the courts—often expressed
in terms of the inherent powers doctrine—is sometimes considered as a potential basis for claim
to, and especially the exercise of, the judiciary’s administrative independence. In Canada, one
speaks of inherent jurisdiction; in the United States, reference is to the inherent powers of courts
of law. The phrases “inherent power” and “inherent jurisdiction” will be used interchangeably.
What is the status of the inherent power of United States courts in relation to the question of
administrative autonomy? It is difficult to arrive at a precise definition of this concept in United
States law on account of the very large number of definitions suggested by case law, use of the
phrase in ways that are not always judicious and the fact that the state constitutions differ on
many points. Felix F. Stumpf, who wrote a leading text on this subject, concludes that there is no
“concrete body of inherent power law that is nationally recognized or applied”. 88 Two possible
definitions emerge, however, one drawn from legal theory and the other from case law:
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The doctrine of inherent power runs essentially as follows: the courts are a constitutionally
created branch of government whose continued effective functioning is indispensable;
performance of that constitutional function is a responsibility committed to the courts;
this responsibility implies the authority necessary to carry it out; therefore the courts
have the authority to raise money to sustain their essential functions. (Hazard, McNamara
and Sentilles,“Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting”, 81 Yale L.J. 1286, at 1287 (1972). 89
The definition suggested by a judicial decision reads as follows:
The term inherent powers has been employed in three general fashions. The first . . . use
of inherent powers, which might be termed irreducible inherent authority, encompasses
an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence
of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command
within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms ‘courts’ and
‘judicial power’ . . . The second, and most common, use of the term ‘inherent power’
encompasses those powers sometimes said to arise from the nature of the court, . . . but
more often thought to be powers implied from strict functional necessity . . . Historically,
[the Supreme Court] has viewed this particular power as ‘essential to the administration
of justice’, and ‘absolutely essential’ for the functioning of the judiciary . . . The third form
of authority subsumed under the general term inherent power implicates powers
necessary only in the practical sense of being useful . . . in the pursuit of a just result.
(Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F. 2d 557, 562-563 [3d Cir. 1985]). 90
The theoretical bases of the concept of inherent power in the United States are twofold: the
separation of powers and the very nature of courts of law. The separation of powers enables a
court to rely on its inherent powers in carrying out “its constitutionally mandated functions and 
to enable it to acquire the necessary support and resources for achieving these functions”. 91
On the second basis, Stumpf notes:
The second theoretical basis of inherent powers is that which arises from the fact of 
the court’s existence as a court . . . All courts must have, it is reasoned,“from structural
necessity” the inherent powers to do those things that are reasonable and necessary 
for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction, absent contrary
legislation or constitutional limitations.92
The concept of inherent powers has been used primarily by state courts, presumably because the
federal courts have long enjoyed administrative and operational independence and have been
relatively well-funded. The nature of such powers is quite varied. However, inherent powers may 
be grouped into two major categories: questions of procedure and judicial governance, and
administrative questions. In the first category are powers to punish for contempt of court, to draw
up rules of practice, to regulate the practice of law, including the Bar, to ensure a fair and equitable
trial, to administer cases and judicial schedules, to exclude evidence, to designate experts, to
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amend judicial records and judgments, to decide on witnesses’ costs, to ensure order and dignity
in the courtroom and so on.93 Accordingly, the concept of inherent power gives judges the power
to regulate all questions relating to the holding of a trial.
The second category of inherent powers seems more controversial, since it has to do with the
judge’s power to direct the executive to assume liability for court costs. Stumpf lists a series of
administrative matters which have been the subject of exercise of the inherent power: the hiring
and firing of employees (registrars, secretaries, stenographers, ushers, research officers and so 
on), the maintenance of adequate premises for judicial functions and their upkeep (courtrooms:
air conditioning, heating, chairs, cleanliness and so on; courthouse: construction, decoration,
improvement, soundproofing and so on), the purchase of equipment and services (telephone
system, furniture and carpets, air conditioners, tape recorders, elevators, calendars and so on).
Hazard, McNamara and Sentilles III note that “most of the reported decisions involved marginal
appropriations for ancillary personnel and facilities rather than basic fiscal underwriting”. 94 Stumpf
also notes that most disputes in which there was recourse to the inherent power involved “trial
courts and local authorities such as county or municipal fiscal agencies”. 95 The concept of inherent
powers has been relied upon chiefly by the state courts, since, as noted, federal courts enjoy a 
high degree of administrative autonomy. In order to avoid trial courts abusing the inherent powers
doctrine, state courts of appeal have imposed “a number of judicially created restrictions and
standards”. 96 Appellate courts in certain states have thus developed a test requiring trial courts 
to go through the usual channels before ordering an item of expenditure:
When . . . [established] methods fail, and the court shall determine that by observing
them the assistance necessary for the due and effective exercise of its own functions
cannot be had, or when an emergency arises which the established methods cannot or
do not instantly meet, then and not till then does the occasion arise for the exercise of
the inherent power. 97 (State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 137 P. 392, 395 (Mont. 1913))
According to the case law reported by Stumpf, this test has been applied in several more recent
cases. Similarly, state supreme courts “have promulgated administrative rules or orders that require
specific procedures that must be pursued to resolve such disputes”. Stumpf explains:
By adopting such rules, the courts of last resort seek to minimize and reduce the likelihood
that individual trial judges may use inherent powers in situations that eventually turn out
to be inflammatory and controversial. In essence, the invocation of inherent powers is put
in the larger framework of the appellate court’s overall supervision of the state’s judiciary
rather than particular judge’s assertions of authority. The rules provide a systemic approach
to controlling the sporadic use of inherent powers by individual trial judges. It also recognizes
the concern of appellate courts that the judiciary should not usurp the fiscal authority’s
legitimate role in balancing and establishing governmental priorities for public funds.98
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Additionally, for courts to rely on the concept of inherent powers, appellate courts require 
“a showing of ‘reasonable necessity’, or powers ‘reasonably necessary’, to achieve the specific
purpose for which the exercise is sought”. 99 Appellate courts may also place a very heavy burden
on trial courts seeking to use their inherent powers. One test that has been used requires “clear,
cogent and convincing evidence”. 100
It may be seen from this review of the United States concept of inherent powers that they are
used for well-defined purposes which have some connection with the holding of a trial (questions
of procedure and judicial governance) or with administrative questions that have a direct and
immediate impact on the functioning of the judicial process.
In the final analysis, the scope of this concept with regard to administrative matters seems to 
be limited to isolated actions, which may represent large sums of money but which clearly do 
not cast doubt on the constitutional division of functions. This concept cannot be relied on as 
a means of divesting the executive of all administrative duties which have judicial ramifications
and drawing up a budget for judicial affairs in its place, replacing the executive and exercising
complete control over the administrative staff assigned to the courts. Rather,“the doctrine . . . is 
of modest practical consequence, capable of dealing effectively with some small problems but
unable to solve the big ones”. 101 Given the significant limitations placed by the courts on use of
the doctrine of inherent powers, the concept seems very useful in resolving limited and defined
administrative problems. But it appears to have limited potential for wider use.
What is the situation in Canada? In a now classic article, the English writer I.H. Jacob defined the
concept of inherent jurisdiction as follows:
In this light, the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as being the reserve 
or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as
necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the
observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression,
to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.102
As in the United States, inherent jurisdiction has to do with questions of procedure and judicial
administration. Thus, inherent jurisdiction assumes that the court has the power to control access
to courthouses and give individuals access to them;103 that the court can control its procedure 
by ensuring that its hearings are public or by excluding certain persons, dismissing frivolous and
vexatious applications, correcting procedural inequities, suspending proceedings regarded as
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wrongful, adopting rules of practice,104 or determining in a case of two conflicting decisions 
of administrative courts involving the same two parties which shall take priority, and so on.105
Inherent jurisdiction, associated with the status of a court of record, also gives the court the power
to punish for contempt of court.106 The origins of inherent jurisdiction confirm the two areas of
application just identified:
It will, I think, be found that the superior courts of common law have exercised the
power which has come to be called “inherent jurisdiction” from the earliest times,
and that the exercise of such power developed along two paths, namely, by way of
punishment for contempt of court and of its process, and by way of regulating the
practice of the court and preventing the abuse of its process.107
Inherent jurisdiction in Canada has not typically been considered as including the power 
to resolve purely administrative questions that have a direct and immediate impact on the
functioning of the judicial process. Nonetheless, there is a line of authority in Quebec in which 
the courts have used their power to require of the executive the presence of an usher in
courtrooms,108 to maintain judges’ secretaries in their positions109 or to keep judges’ parking
places at the Montreal Courthouse at a set price.110 These cases contain no analysis relating 
to inherent jurisdiction, or indeed the slightest mention of the concept. This is undoubtedly
explained by the presence in Quebec of art. 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which appears 
partly to codify the concept. It reads as follows:
The courts and the judges have all the powers necessary for the exercise of their
jurisdiction. They may, in the cases brought before them, even of their own motion,
pronounce orders or reprimands, suppress writings or declare them libellous, and 
make such orders as are appropriate to cover cases where no specific remedy is
provided by law.
These judgments were rendered on the basis of this provision. Some cases have also referred to
Valente, and in particular to the administrative independence described by Le Dain J. Although
inherent jurisdiction is not the basis of these judgments, the definition of administrative
independence in Valente, though limiting, seems broad enough to cover these particular cases.
It is crucial to bear in mind that inherent powers, by definition, inhere in courts and their jurisdiction
and so cannot be analysed independently of the role the judiciary is expected to play in the
constitutional structure. The codification of the doctrine, noted above, is a good reminder of its
rationale: The courts and the judges have all the powers necessary for the exercise of their jurisdiction.
Given the very significant evolution of the past 25 years in this respect, this means that inherent
powers are now inherent in a judiciary with a significantly increased role. The fact that the Quebec
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decisions can be explained as an application of Valente can be taken as an indication that the
general constitutional principle of judicial independence is tied to the very same evolution 
in the role and functions played by the judiciary, including the attendant evolution in public
perceptions and expectations. In other words, as long as constitutional principles are in tune 
with this evolution, inherent powers cannot add much to the equation. They remain a valuable
safeguard, but one which should not be expected to form the basis of fundamental changes 
in institutional arrangements.
4.3 Administrative Independence and 
the Imperative of Depoliticization 
The third essential characteristic of the principle of judicial independence, administrative
independence, as identified by Le Dain J. in Valente, has not been the subject of further decisions
by the courts as in the case of financial security or security of tenure.111 In Valente, Le Dain J.
referred to the growing demands for administrative autonomy of the courts, as expressed, for
example, in the Deschênes report, Masters in Their Own House. He noted that “Although the
increased measure of administrative autonomy or independence that is being recommended 
for the courts, or some degree of it, may well be highly desirable, it cannot in my opinion be
regarded as essential for purposes of s. 11(d ) of the Charter”. 112 Le Dain J. also indicated that 
the case before him concerned the judge’s independence in making decisions (adjudicative
independence) as opposed to independence in matters of administration.113
Consequently, the scope of Le Dain J.’s opinion may be circumscribed with regard to this 
third characteristic of judicial independence, especially as that opinion dealt only with the
interpretation of s. 11(d ). Indeed, Le Dain J. wrote in this regard that “The essentials of institutional
independence which may be reasonably perceived as sufficient for purposes of s. 11(d ) must, I
think, be . . . judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately
on the exercise of the judicial function”.114
The principle of judicial independence derives from several sources, including the preamble 
to the Constitution Act, 1867, which gives it a much wider scope. It would thus appear that the
question of administrative independence has not yet been closely studied by Canadian courts.
Pronouncements by the Supreme Court at the level of general principle, however, may well have a
direct bearing on the issue, as would appear to be the case with the imperative of depoliticization
put forward by the Court in the Remuneration Reference. In other words, it remains to be seen 
what essential elements are included within the scope of administrative independence. Before 
the Reference, the then Chief Justice, Brian Dickson, had this to say about the requirements of
administrative independence for the courts:
Independence of the judicial power must be based on a solid foundation of judicial
control over the various components facilitative and supportive of its exercise . . .
Effectively, the financial and administrative requirements of the judiciary for the
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dispensing of justice are in the hands of the very ministers who are responsible for
defending the Crown’s interests before the courts . . . Preparation of judicial budgets and
distribution of allocated resources should be under the control of the chief justices of
the various courts, not the ministers of justice. Control over finance and administration
must be accompanied by control over the adequacy and direction of support staff.115
This should be helpful in considering how the Remuneration Reference bears upon administrative
independence.
4.3.1 Implications of the Imperative of Depoliticization
As already explained, the nature and scope of the principle of judicial independence in Canada
has evolved significantly since Valente. The Remuneration Reference is in this regard a fundamental
step in this evolution since it provides new benchmarks for assessing judicial independence. In
that case, the Court firmly asserted that relations between the judiciary on the one hand and the
legislature and executive on the other should be depoliticized:
What is at issue here is the character of the relationships between the legislature and
the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. These relationships
should be depoliticized. When I say that those relationships are depoliticized, I do 
not mean to deny that they are political in the sense that court decisions (both
constitutional and non-constitutional) often have political implications, and that the
statutes which courts adjudicate upon emerge from the political process. What I mean
instead is the legislature and executive cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political
pressure on the judiciary, and conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise
reserve in speaking out publicly on issues of general public policy that are or have the
potential to come before the courts, that are the subject of political debate, and which
do not relate to the proper administration of justice.116
To this requirement should also be added the formal prohibition issued by the Court to judges
from individually or collectively engaging in negotiations of their remuneration with the executive
or with representatives of the legislature.117 The depoliticization of relations between the judiciary
and the two other branches of government undoubtedly appears to be one of the principal
grounds of the Remuneration Reference. Negotiations between the parties should be avoided since
the principle of negotiation entails a need to engage in compromises and to barter accommodations
which may lead to a perception among the public that the judiciary is open to any compromise,
if the situation requires it. This depoliticization requires a formalization of relations between the
judiciary and the other two branches of government, and hence the use of independent and
neutral commissions.
The reasons of the Supreme Court are especially relevant when it comes to the question of the
administrative independence of the judiciary. Here too the requirement of depoliticization applies
to the ever-increasing responsibilities of the judiciary noted earlier. The ever-widening impact of
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court judgments on the government’s budget cannot fail to have an effect on the perception 
of relations between the judiciary and the executive when the time comes for the latter to 
prepare and approve the courts’ budget. Nor can there be any doubt that chief justices today 
are increasingly embroiled in ongoing negotiations with governments on court needs and
budgets. Under these circumstances, is there not a risk that the judiciary’s independence is 
being compromised in the eyes of an informed observer? Some may reasonably believe that 
the judiciary might be tempted to defer a decision or limit its scope in order to avoid seeing 
its budget or human resources shrink. There is cause for concern even if this has never happened.
For in these matters it is appearances that count, not reality.
Aside from purely financial questions, the increasing role of the courts in defining Canadian values
(and those of Western societies in general) argues for a clearer administrative separation between
the judiciary and the executive. In Canada, the question of adjudicative independence, that is, the
judge’s freedom of conscience to decide by himself or herself, without interference or constraint,
on the outcome of the case, is no longer in doubt. A Canadian judge legally enjoys individual
independence. The various judgments of the courts considered earlier have marked out the field
of individual independence.
However, administrative independence, the fundamental aspect of the institutional dimension of
judicial independence, has not yet been given more formal recognition, as if judicial independence
were to continue to be articulated around the model of the solitary, isolated judge. Adjudicative
independence is certainly essential, but ultimately it can only be an illusion if the informed public
comes to believe that the judiciary as a whole is subject to the will, even the whims or pressures,
of the executive in determining its operating budget and day-to-day administration. Since the
growing role of the courts has attracted more searching review of the judiciary’s actions, the 
time is not far distant when such relations will be subject to significant media attention and may
even arouse suspicion, as has already been the case with the judicial appointment process. In
Mackeigan, McLachlin J. noted the importance of these two aspects of independence, and the
need to avoid relations between the judiciary and the other two branches of government that
could detract from the appearance of judicial independence:
What is required, as I read Beauregard v. Canada, is avoidance of incidents and
relationships which could affect the independence of the judiciary in relation to the two
critical judicial functions—judicial impartiality in adjudication and the judiciary’s role as
arbiter and protector of the Constitution.118
Since the conditions of judicial independence can “vary and evolve with time and circumstances”, 119
one can readily discern the direction taken by the Supreme Court’s rulings, to the extent that they
follow logically from decisions already rendered.
The way in which the direction taken by the Supreme Court may be seen as logically implied 
by previous rulings can be explained as follows. In addition to security of tenure, independence
entails two essentials: financial security and administrative independence. Financial security has 
an institutional dimension which, according to the Supreme Court, has three components: the
requirement of independent commissions, a prohibition of negotiation and a minimum salary
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level. What matters in relation to administrative independence is the general rule from which
these three components are derived: they “all flow from the constitutional imperative that, to the
extent possible, the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government 
be depoliticized”. 120 The legislature and the executive “cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political
pressure on the judiciary”. 121 It is clear that administrative independence has an institutional
dimension and that the administration of the courts gives rise to relations which are just as
“politicized” between the political branches on the one hand and the judiciary on the other. It 
will be recalled that institutional independence depends on the “perception”122 of a “reasonable
and informed person”. 123 Such a person would find it difficult to understand why depoliticization
should not be required in respect of administration and resources if it is in matters of remuneration.
The Supreme Court explained the Remuneration Reference as follows:
The often spirited wage negotiations and the resulting public rhetoric had the potential
to deleteriously affect the public perception of judicial independence. However
independent judges were in fact, the danger existed that the public might think they
could be influenced either for or against the government because of issues arising 
from salary negotiations.124
It seems unquestionable that negotiations over administrative and budgetary matters have 
the same potential to affect the public perception of judicial independence.
This constitutional imperative of depoliticization needs fleshing out. In the area of financial
independence, the constitutional imperative demands that independent remuneration
commissions be established and that their recommendations normally be followed.125 In the 
area of administrative autonomy, the detailed consequences of the constitutional imperative
remain to be defined. But there can be no question that the executive model of judicial
administration raises very serious issues. In view of the institutional dimension of independence
stressed in the Remuneration Reference, it would seem logical to assume that the constitutional
imperative of depoliticization warrants the granting of a greater degree of administrative
autonomy for the judiciary. Irrespective of whether the executive and the legislature actually exert
political pressure on the judiciary (taken as an institution), they clearly appear in this regard to be
in a position to do so. For if pressure can be exerted on the judiciary through political control of
salary adjustments and other benefits, as the Remuneration Reference established, it is quite clear
that pressure can also be exerted through political control of court administration and budgets.
The implication of the Remuneration Reference should now be considered against the broader
institutional context of the Canadian constitutional system, which may be perceived as creating
potential obstacles to the recognition of a greater degree of administrative independence beyond
the federal courts.
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4.3.2 Perceived Institutional Obstacles to Administrative Independence
If the constitutional imperative of depoliticization appears to be inconsistent with an executive
model of court administration, it can also be argued that this model is an implication of Canada’s
federal and parliamentary structures, which might not accommodate the application of the separation
of powers doctrine to issues of court administration.
a) The Federal Dimension
Canada’s federal structure and the federal principle which underlies it have greatly contributed to
the shaping of the judiciary’s position under the constitution. Historically speaking, the need for a
neutral mechanism for resolving federal issues was the first institutional reason for the constitutional
role entrusted to the judiciary. The institutional independence of the courts emerged “from the
logic of federalism, which requires an impartial arbiter to settle jurisdictional disputes between 
the federal and provincial orders of government.”126 But federalism may also be said to impose
limitations on the development of a unified conception of administrative autonomy.
The first question one might raise about the impact of Canada’s federal structure is the extent to
which constitutional requirements have a harmonizing effect upon models of court administration
throughout Canada.
The first prong of the answer lies in the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 that bear upon
court administration. Section 92(14) of the Act provides as follows:
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
[ . . . ]
14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution,
Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal
Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.
It is therefore clear that legislative power over court administration generally lies with provincial
legislatures. At the same time, the judicature provisions of the Act serve as a legitimate basis for 
a measure of federal intervention in the administrative environment in which section 96 judges
perform their functions. Various allowances and continuing education programmes, for example,
may be seen as falling under section 100 of the Act. Also, section 101 clearly puts legislative power
over the administration of federal courts, including the Supreme Court, in the hands of Parliament.
Legislative power over penitentiaries (section 91(26)), though not over prisons (section 92(6)),
also lies with Parliament. These various heads of jurisdiction create points of contact with
provincial powers.
The second prong of the answer is the level of generality at which constitutional requirements 
are cast in the evolving constitutional case law. To take the example of the requirement of
independent commissions defined in the Remuneration Reference, a constitutional standard is
established (as an instantiation of the general imperative of depoliticization) which could be, and
was, met by legislatures in differing ways. This shows that constitutional requirements of judicial
independence may materialize in different ways across provincial lines. The harmonizing effect 
of constitutional requirements can be said to be taking place at the level of principles only,
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leaving space for the provinces to take account of local circumstances in the organization of 
court administration.
Another question may be raised about the impact of the Constitution Act 1867 on the evolution 
of models of court administration in Canada. Upon a cursory reading of section 92(14), it might
conceivably be thought that court administration is entrusted to provincial legislatures and
therefore not to courts. However, the short answer to this is that Part VI of the Constitution Act
1867, entitled “Distribution of Legislative Powers”, deals with precisely that, namely the distribution
of legislative powers between the only two existing possibilities: the federal legislature (Parliament)
on the one hand, and the provincial legislatures on the other. In other words, Part VI addresses 
the division of powers as between the provincial and federal orders of governance only; it says
nothing about the distribution of powers as between branches within these orders and certainly
not as between the Courts and either level of government.
The long answer involves a reminder that all legislative powers exercised under sections 91 
and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 are subject to constitutional requirements. The undoubted
provincial power over the remuneration of provincial judges, for example, does not empower
provinces to ignore the constitutional requirements of financial independence. It is true of course
that the judicature section (Part VII) of the Constitution Act 1867 is silent on the independence of
provincial judges and courts. But constitutional requirements have evolved since 1867 and the
power of provinces over the administration of justice is now subject to these requirements under
Canadian constitutional law. As the Supreme Court clearly put it,“the jurisdiction of the provinces
over ‘courts’, as that term is used in s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, contains within it an
implied limitation that the independence of those courts cannot be undermined.” 127
The issue of the distribution of powers between branches brings one to the separation of 
powers doctrine.
b) The Separation of Powers 
One would not be overly surprised to find in a Canadian constitutional law textbook a statement
to the effect that there is no general separation of powers in the Canadian Constitution,128
possibly followed by an explanation that as “between the executive and legislative branches, any
separation of powers would make little sense in a system of responsible government”129 This is
because responsible government in the British parliamentary tradition demands that members of
the executive branch generally be drawn from, and enjoy the confidence of, the elected assembly.
In turn, the rule of confidence implies a form of political control of the elected assembly by the
government which makes separation limited in the important sense that the executive controls
the agenda of the legislative branch.130 At the same time, the executive controls the agenda only
so long as it enjoys the confidence of the assembly and therefore is under the constant threat of
removal. This is not to say, however, that the separation of powers doctrine can have no place in a
system of parliamentary democracy, or in Canadian constitutional law.
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With respect to parliamentary democracy, it is helpful to recall that Montesquieu, who is the main
reference point on the separation of powers and whose writings greatly influenced the framers of
the United States constitution, saw the British constitution as the mirror of liberty. James Madison’s
interpretation of the separation of powers as expounded by Montesquieu is instructive in this
respect:
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in
saying “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or body of magistrates,” or,“if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers,” he did not mean that these departments
ought to have no partial agency in, or control over, the acts of each other. His meaning,
as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his
eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department 
is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.131 
Madison went on to show that the necessary separation between “departments” cannot in practice
be sustained unless they are “so far connected . . . as to give to each a constitutional control over
the other”, 132 and that in order for “checks and balances” to function, it is fundamental that “each
department should have a will of its own”. 133
In this light, it becomes easier to grasp how a commitment to the separation of powers can be
said to have been incorporated into the Canadian Constitution through the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867, which refers to a constitution “similar in Principle to that of the United
Kingdom”. 134 It also becomes easier to grasp how a complete separation of functions was never
part of any of the well-known constitutional designs.“In broad terms, the role of the judiciary is,
of course, to interpret and apply the law; the role of the legislature is to decide upon and
enunciate policy; the role of the executive is to administer and implement that policy”. 135 But it is
easily understood that legislative functions may be vested in the executive, that judicial functions,
including the interpretation of law, may be vested in non-judicial bodies such as administrative
tribunals,136 and that the judiciary may be vested with non-judicial functions, such as the 
advisory function.137
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Today, in Canada, the separation of powers is recognized as a fundamental constitutional
principle.138 As between the political branches, the separation of powers has been relied upon,
together with parliamentary democracy, to provide a legal basis for the hierarchical relationship
between the executive and the legislative branches. It is thus an aspect of the separation doctrine
that the executive branch is subordinate to the legislative branch in the sense that it must carry
out the latter’s intent when validly expressed in a statute.139
But it is in contexts involving the judiciary in relation to the political branches that the separation
of powers has most often been relied upon. Institutional aspects of judicial independence, for
example, are said to be “bound up with” and to “inhere” in the separation of powers.140 At the
same time, it is clear that there is more to judicial independence than what the separation of
powers may require, since judicial independence speaks to relationships not only between branches
of the state but also between judges and private parties.141 Conversely, there is clearly more to 
the separation of powers than judicial independence, even in the context of the institutional place
of judicial power. For example, the separation of powers is seen as protecting the core jurisdiction
of superior courts from legislative encroachment.142
The doctrine of the separation of powers is otherwise referred to as a reminder that no branch of
government should overstep its bounds and that each show proper deference to the legitimate
sphere of activity of the other.143 As the Supreme Court recently stated,“No one doubts that the
courts and the legislatures have different roles to play, and that our system works best when
constitutional actors respect the role and mandate of other constitutional actors”144 The role and
mandate of each constitutional actor of course remains unclear to a significant extent. From the
perspective of political branches, one might legitimately look for evidence of the “bounds” which
the judicial branch would not overstep. Courts frequently point out that the Charter “has changed
the balance of power between the legislative branch and the executive on the one hand, and the
courts on the other hand, by requiring that all laws and government action must conform to the
fundamental principles laid down in the Charter.”145
Where are the limits of judicial power in this context? The short answer is that courts would 
follow a constitutional amendment just as they are applying the Charter, and that they would
respect a section 33 derogation just as they have in the past. A longer answer would point to the
most basic—but often overlooked—check on any judicial power, which is a result of its being
procedurally passive: courts generally have no power but that of deciding issues that others put
before them. A longer answer would also point to another fundamental check on judicial power,
which is that judicial decisions largely depend on the executive branch for enforcement. These 
are some of the checks and balances that are built into the system.
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Against this backdrop, the question becomes whether an evolving principle of separation can say
anything about administrative autonomy for courts. Looking back to James Madison’s imperative
that each branch should have “a will of its own”, it is easy to see that the separation principle 
might indeed point in the direction of greater administrative autonomy. In the context of judicial
independence, the constitutional imperative of depoliticization established in the Remuneration
Reference exists to ensure that the political branches are not seen as being in a position to
influence the judiciary outside the regular channels of legislation and litigation. The possibility 
of such influence was recognized in the context of financial independence and could logically be
recognized in the context of administrative autonomy. The imperative to remove all institutional
sources of influence through depoliticization, after all, is at least partly about guaranteeing the
conditions in which it is possible for the judiciary to “have a will of its own”.
c) Responsible Government and Financial Accountability 
The third and last cluster of concepts that has sometimes been raised as an obstacle to the
evolution of administrative autonomy revolves around responsible government and financial
accountability. Responsible government has already been discussed in the context of the
separation of powers; it should now be considered in terms of the role of the political branches 
in ensuring financial accountability.
The role of the executive in the financial process today is still marked by its medieval origin, when
the King was expected to meet public expenses out of his own revenues. As public expenses grew
and the ability of the King to meet them diminished, the Crown was obliged to seek funds by
summoning a council—an early form of parliament—to discuss what aids should be given.
Under rules of parliamentary procedure, requests to the elected assembly for funds still originate
with the Crown, which now acts on the advice of cabinet. The fund is of course made up of
revenue generated through taxation measures initiated by a Minister of the Crown in the elected
assembly.146 With the evolution of responsible government, first in Great Britain and much later in
Canada,147 the role of the executive in the financial process and the rule requiring parliamentary
authorization came to be loosely associated with the convention that the government must enjoy
the confidence of the elected assembly. But, contrary to popular belief, a convention clearly linking
financial matters to confidence was never firmly established in Canada.148
The role of the executive in financial matters is at any rate entirely a matter of conventions,
parliamentary rules of procedure, and, to an extent, statute. The legislative branch is therefore at
liberty to alter this role and has done so in many jurisdictions. It has done so with a view notably
to conferring a measure of financial independence on various officers such as ethics commissioners
and auditors general. That the lines of budgetary accountability may in some cases not go
through the Crown or one of its ministers is now a well accepted fact in parliamentary systems.
It is widely considered necessary to sound governance and was never considered a threat to
principles of democratic accountability. Accountability is ensured through direct parliamentary
authorization, based on estimates put directly to the elected assembly. Hence, there is no reason
of principle for opposing similar arrangements for the judiciary.
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The rule that no money can be taken out of the consolidated revenue fund without parliamentary
authorization is more embedded in our system. It is one of the most deeply rooted principles in
the British constitutional tradition. It belatedly followed the relinquishment by the Crown of all
powers pertaining to taxation, which the parliament at Westminster can arguably be said to have
obtained towards the end of the 14th century, but which remained a matter for legal and political
controversy well into the 17th century. The constitutional pedigree of this principle lies in its being
inextricably bound up with the democratic evolution that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights
in 1689.149 It is one of the rules that most clearly embody the notion of democratic accountability
and it is legal, not merely conventional.150
Yet, there is no doubt that this principle was altered at least partially by the mandate which courts
were given in 1982 upon adoption of the Charter. As pointed out earlier, judicial decisions now
have unprecedented economic impact. It has come to be accepted that a constitutional require-
ment may result in the government being required to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in
order to implement a court decision. This involves a parliamentary authorization which may be
given based on an external imposition, thereby altering the logic behind the principle. Democratic
accountability in this context has therefore taken on a texture richer than that of majority rule 
and recognizes that “democracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of
law”.151 Democratic accountability is now understood as a broader concept which incorporates 
the constitutional constraints related notably to the protection of individual rights and freedoms
by an independent judiciary.
To be sure, the “legislature’s exclusive jurisdiction to allocate funds from the public purse”152 is 
still recognized today and parliamentary authorization is still required. But in some circumstances
its denial by the elected assembly would amount to the exercise of a last resort political power 
to censor the judiciary, and to a constitutional crisis. It is precisely with the avoidance of such
constitutional crisis in mind that a new, flexible form of judicial review was devised in the context
of the independent remuneration commissions’ recommendations.153 Governments and
legislatures are bound to follow these recommendations unless they can rationally justify a
decision to depart from them.154 The last word on rationality remains with the courts, which 
in turn remain largely powerless should a question arise as to implementation. Should the
establishment of independent commissions become a requirement in the context of court
administration, it is very likely that the same balance would be struck and that similar
arrangements would be put in place.
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4.4 Administrative Independence of Courts 
in Comparative Legal Perspective
A brief look at the question of the administrative independence of the courts in certain foreign
jurisdictions is warranted, to provide some background for the analysis of this question in Canada.
In principle, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by all systems normally used 
for comparative reference purposes by the Supreme Court in its ongoing interpretation of the
Canadian Constitution. However, when it comes to defining the consequences of the principle 
of independence in practice and in detail, one finds that evolution may be prompted by political
concern with the need for change rather than the evolution of constitutional case law.
A brief review of the usual reference jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, the United States and
Australia, will suffice to show a clear trend toward the granting of greater administrative autonomy
to the courts. In countries with a formal constitution (the United States and Australia), this is a
legislative trend which anticipates and to some extent forestalls evolution in constitutional
decisions. In the United Kingdom, reforms have been drastic given the historical importance 
of the Lord Chancellor in the constitutional structure. Even though the executive model of court
administration is still prevalent, the transfer of judicial functions from the office of the Lord
Chancellor and the relative administrative independence of the new Supreme Court evidences a
similar legislative trend. In other words, the political branches in the reference countries have all
taken cognizance of, and, to various extents, have acted upon, the imperative of depoliticization.
4.4.1 The United Kingdom
From a constitutional perspective, the United Kingdom is different from the other reference
countries because parliament could theoretically abolish all legal protections relating to judicial
independence. To be sure, this would be unconstitutional in the conventional sense at least to 
an extent. But the conventions in this area are unclear and the sanction for the violation of any
convention said to be binding on parliament remains uncertain. The protection of judicial
independence under this traditional position is therefore limited and uncertain.
The balance between the political branches and the judiciary reflected by the traditional position,
however, has changed significantly over the the past 25 years. As was noted earlier, the judiciary
has come to play an increasingly important and prominent role in society. In the United Kingdom,
part of this stems from the body of supranational jurisprudence growing out of the the country’s
entry into the European Union.
The Human Rights Act 1998, by incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights, has had
a substantial impact in this sense. By requiring judges to interpret domestic law consistently with
the Convention, the Act has given rise to court interpretations that are openly in conflict with the
government’s intentions, as far as these are apparent from a review of Hansard.155 Also, by giving
judges the power to declare that legislation is incompatible with the Convention while leaving
Constitutional Foundations for Change 57
155 Reference to Hansard in this context is governed by the rule in Pepper v. Hart ([1993] 1 All ER 42).
correctives with the polititical branches, the Act has partially altered the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, introducing a form of parallel constitutional law.156 Courts now have to judge acts of
parliament under broad human rights standards.157
It is in this context that, in 2003, the government announced sweeping plans to reform the judicial
system. Constitutional reformers had long held the post of Lord Chancellor to be anomalous in a
modern democracy and the fusion of powers it embodies unacceptable.158 The same was said
about the judicial role of the House of Lords and the political process of judicial appointments.
The Constitutional Reform Bill was published in February 2004. In July 2004, following public
consultations and committee review, the House of Lords overturned the provisions meant to
abolish the post of Lord Chancellor but accepted those elements of the Bill relating to the creation
of the Supreme Court, the appointments commission, and the termination of the judicial roles
played by the House of Lords and its speaker, the Lord Chancellor. The Constitutional Reform Act
received Royal Assent on March 24, 2005.159
As suggested above, the constitutional reforms leave intact the traditional system of court
administration which was unified in 2003 by the creation of “Her Majesty’s Courts Service” within
the Constitutional Affairs Department.160 This system, which applies to the courts of England and
Wales (to the exclusion of the new Supreme Court) basically implements a centralized executive
model of court administration. The evolution brought forth by the reform lies in the recognition
that a separation of powers should be encouraged and that the Supreme Court should enjoy a
measure of administrative autonomy. Constitutional Affairs Secretary Lord Falconer declared, upon
the publication of the reform bill:
Limiting the power of patronage and severely curtailing the ability of ministers to
appoint and discipline judges are important safeguards to judicial independence.
It is right that politicians should not seek to influence the smooth running of the judicial
system. The duty to uphold judicial independence further underlines that.
In a modern democracy, judges have no place in Parliament and politicians no place 
in the courtroom. Separating the powers of judges and politicians, while keeping the
balance between them, is the best means of maintaining clarity and confidence in our
constitution.161
The reform was thus clearly informed by both the independence of the judiciary and the
separation of powers. One of the central and much publicized concerns was with the judicial
appointments process, which was to be as far removed from the risk of political influence as
possible. Less noted but equally important in the context of both judicial independance and the
separation of powers was a concern for administrative autonomy. It is clear that for the purpose of
implemention of both principles, the new Supreme Court, which takes appellate jurisdiction over
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the whole Kingdom from the House of Lords and “devolution” jurisdiction from the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, was conceived as the fundamental embodiment of the judiciary.
The Supreme Court was thus singled out in respect of both the appointment process, which will
not be discussed here, and the introduction of administrative autonomy.
The Act makes provision for the resourcing and funding arrangements for the Supreme Court. It
creates the post of Chief Executive of the Supreme Court within a statutory framework. The Chief
Executive is made responsible for the non-judicial functions of the Court and anything delegated
to him by the President (who takes over the judicial functions and responsibilities of the Lord
Chancellor). In effect, this allows the Chief Executive to become responsible under the President
for appointing staff to the Court. The Chief Executive is answerable to the President and must
carry out his functions in accordance with the President’s directions. The Chief Executive is
responsible for ensuring that the court’s resources are used to provide an efficient and effective
system to support the Court in carrying on its business. The Minister has a corresponding duty
under the Act to provide accommodation for the Court and to provide other resources to allow
the Chief Executive to carry out his responsibilities.162
The Explanatory Note to the Act details the operation of the resourcing arrangements as follows:
• The administrative service for the Supreme Court will be headed by a Chief Executive,
a civil servant appointed by a process involving an ad hoc commission.
• The staff of the Court will be civil servants, accountable to the Chief Executive and 
not to the Lord Chancellor.
• The Chief Executive will be principally answerable to, and operating under the 
day-to-day guidance of, the President of the Court.
• The President of the Supreme Court and the Chief Executive will determine the bid 
for resources for the Court in line with Governmental spending review timescales.
• The bid will be passed to the Lord Chancellor, who will include it as a separate line 
in the overall [Department for Constitutional Affairs] bid submitted to the Treasury.
• The Lord Chancellor will be responsible for directly dealing with the Treasury 
to secure resources for the Court during the Spending Review process.
• The Treasury will scrutinise the overall [Department for Constitutional Affairs] bid 
and approve the overall financial expenditure for the [Department for Constitutional
Affairs] group in the Spending Review period including the Supreme Court.
• Following the settlement the [Department for Constitutional Affairs] will give 
a separate Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) to the UK Supreme Court.
• The Chief Executive of the Supreme Court will submit an estimate to HM Treasury
which will then be presented before the House of Commons as part of the overall
estimates.
• The House of Commons will approve the overall estimates and transfer resources
accordingly.
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• Because the Supreme Court will have its own estimate, the funds approved will be
transferred to the Court direct from the Consolidated Fund, not via the [Department
for Constitutional Affairs].
• The Chief Executive will be the Accounting Officer for the Supreme Court and so
directly accountable to the Court and to Parliament, rather than being subject to the
[Department for Constitutional Affairs] Permanent Secretary as Principal Accounting
Officer.163
As the Explanatory note points out,“[t]he Chief Executive will not be able to carry out his duties 
if the Lord Chancellor does not provide appropriate resources”.164 This is the result of the decision
to maintain the ministerial channel for budgetary purposes which, as will be seen below, is also 
a feature of the Federal Court and the High Court regimes in Australia. The new Supreme Court
regime introduces an innovative safeguard in this respect: a chief justice is given the possibility 
to lay written representations directly before Parliament.165 Overall, the new arrangements
represent a tremendous increase in administrative and budgetary autonomy, an increase which
was clearly grounded in the notions of judicial independence and the separation of powers.
4.4.2 The United States
In terms of administrative independence, the legal situation of federal courts in the United States
(Article III) is not the result of constitutional decisions by the courts. In fact, this question has not
given rise to constitutional litigation. Rather, it is the outcome of administrative arrangements
between the various players involved:
The federal judicial administrative arrangement is a product of accretion rather than
systematic design, but it is an arrangement that members of the governance and
administrative agencies have affirmed several times, most recently when the Judicial
Conference stated that “[i]n the interests of administrative efficiency, accountable
resource utilization, and effective external relations, the present distribution of
governance authority among the national, regional (circuit), and individual court levels
should be preserved”. 166
Thus, administrative autonomy does not appear to depend on constitutional foundations as such:
“Compared to the matter of decisional independence, the claim for branch independence167 has a
much more tenuous grounding in constitutional history”.168 Indeed, the framers of the United States
Constitution had absolutely no thought of the question of judicial administrative autonomy:
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The judicial power, to be sure, was a power separate from the legislative and executive
power—Hamilton referred to ‘the different departments of power’—but the concept of
a separate, independent judicial branch as an administrative entity was not present. The
first federal judicial system had no independent administrative apparatus except for the
authority of each court to appoint its own clerk.169
Until 1840, the federal judicial system was administratively responsible to the Department of the
Treasury, then to the Department of the Interior, and finally to the Department of Justice when the
latter was created in 1870.170 Additionally, Congress “made federal district judges, in effect, agents
of the executive departments. They evidently complied, in one way or another . . . with other
statutes that, in effect, made federal judges hearing examiners for non-judicial officials in the
nation’s capital”.171 So, as in Canada, federal judges in the late 18th century were required to
perform duties that were not strictly speaking judicial. This is another example of the long, gradual
and difficult progress toward differentiation in governmental functions. Even the framers of the
United States Constitution, though imbued with the writings of Montesquieu and Locke and
aware of the theory of the separation of powers, were still to some extent subject to monarchical
designs for the performance of duties and the establishment of institutions.
The principle of real administrative autonomy for the judiciary emerged in the United States in the
20th century:
The idea of a truly independent judicial branch, administratively responsible and
competent, even if not administratively autonomous, emerged only in the twentieth
century as a product of the Progressive Movement’s effort to rationalize government
and make it more efficient. To that end, wrote Roscoe Pound, Louis Brandeis, and others,
in 1914,“the court should be given control of the clerical and administrative force
through a chief clerk, appointed by and responsible to the court for the conduct of this
part of the work”. The notion of a separate administrative governance machinery for the
courts emerged gradually from those beginnings.172
In 1939, Congress withdrew administrative control of the federal courts from the Department of
Justice and assigned it to a new agency which was to perform its function under “the direction
and supervision of what is now called the Judicial Conference of the United States”. 173 The
Attorney General of that time, Homer Cummings, who had piloted this reform through Congress,
supposedly told the latter “Let the judges run the judiciary”. 174 This important reform, which will
be describe briefly below, illustrates in the United States context the inexorably changing nature
of the principle of judicial independence. Its evolution is evident in view of the fact that the
question of administrative autonomy was largely ignored until the 20th century:
That the creators of the federal judiciary fashioned the institution as they did hardly
means that those late eighteenth century elements are consistent with an independent
judiciary in the twenty-first century. It only means that we can find little guidance in the
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views of the founders for the concept and elements of administrative judicial
independence as they present themselves to us today. Rather, it might be better 
to argue that the 20th century has completed the evolution of judicial administration
protections begun with the Constitution’s tenure and salary clauses, an evolution 
that was largely dormant through the entire nineteenth century and some of the
twentieth.175
It was thus up to the principal players, Congress, the Department of Justice and the federal judges,
to understand the need to develop the judicial institution so as to adapt it to the new challenges
of the 20th century.
In 1939, therefore, Congress created, by legislation,176 the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, responsible for determining the budget for federal courts and for administering
them. This agency acts under the control and supervision of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The latter is composed exclusively of federally-appointed judges and presided over by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He performs an essentially administrative
function and is not expected to become involved in the judicial appointment process or to deal
with questions relating to the removal of judges.177 The Judicial Conference appears to be an
important agency in the general assessment of the administrative autonomy of federal judges:
The Conference’s broad authority arises mainly from the primary statute of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which directs the Administrative 
Office to exercise its responsibilities “under the supervision and direction of the Judicial
Conference”. Those responsibilities have accreted over the years into a large corpus of
functions, including developing the annual judicial branch appropriations request, fixing
the compensation of non-judicial personnel, maintaining the statistical reporting
systems, and numerous other duties, Many of the duties stem, directly or indirectly, from
the responsibility to administer the judicial branch appropriation.178
The Office prepares a budget, working closely with the appropriate Conference committees. This
budget is then reviewed and approved by the Judicial Conference and forwarded to the Office of
Management and Budget, in the Office of the President,“for inclusion, as a matter of convenience,
into the overall proposed budget that the President sends to Congress”. 179 It is worth noting that
“the President has a statutory obligation to forward the judiciary’s budget request to Congress
without change”. 180 Additionally, there is in the United States “a long tradition that executive
branch officials will not ‘comment’ to Congress on the judiciary’s request”. 181
The administrative autonomy of federal judges, therefore, is the result of an agreement between
the principal players which led to legislative recognition of the importance of giving the judiciary
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control over its administrative destiny.182 This recognition was not the result of constitutional
litigation, although arguments of a constitutional nature, such as judicial independence and the
theory of the separation of powers, were put forward to justify this new ordering of administrative
responsibilities. In particular, the re-ordering was the outcome of the significant evolution in the
duties assigned to the judiciary. Recognizing the multiplication of such duties and their relative
complexity, Congress acknowledged that judicial independence could no longer be limited to
adjudicative independence:
The argument that administrative independence is a necessary condition for the
exercise of decisional independence is a forceful one, but support for it comes from
sources other than the text of the Constitution and the history of federal judicial
administration. We have provided historical information to show that the administrative
independence of the courts from the other branches was not a feature, in theory or 
fact, of the original organization of the three branches. The progressive amount of
independence of the courts from the other branches was a response to the growing size
and complexity of court operations and to the threat to decisional independence that
many judges saw as a by-product of external administration.183
This quotation is entirely consistent with the reasoning developed earlier regarding the inevitable
evolution of the principle of judicial independence in Canada, based on the formidable expansion
of the quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of judicial duties. That expansion necessarily
means greater administrative autonomy, as it is understood in the United States and is gradually
being understood elsewhere.
4.4.3 Australia
Even a brief review of the situation in Australia requires a distinction to be made between, first, the
federal system and the system of states, and between the established constitutional guarantees
and the reality of administrative independence in the purely legislative sense.
At the federal level, the Australian constitutional system recognizes the judiciary as one of the
principal powers in government, which places the latter in a privileged position as compared to the
courts of states in the federation. The provisions dealing with the appointment of federal judges
are similar to those in the Constitution Act, 1867 in Canada, in that judges are appointed by the
Governor General in Council, their pay is determined by Parliament and they hold their tenure
“during good behaviour”, but with the difference that reduction of a judge’s remuneration is expressly
prohibited.184 The limited protection offered by the Constitution of the Commonwealth, albeit limited,
is entrenched and so cannot be altered simply by legislation.185 This includes certain constitutional
principles that may have an impact on judicial independence, such as nemo judex in causa sua (a
traditional requirement of impartiality), and certain fundamental legislative documents inherited
from the British system, such as the Act of Settlement, 1701 and the Commissions and Salaries of
Judges Act, 1760.
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These constitutional principles and fundamental documents are relevant in analyzing the
independence of the state judiciary, but with the caution that traditionally the state judiciary 
was not regarded as a “judicial power” in the broad sense resulting, at the federal level, from the
separation of powers doctrine. This is the reason why, for example, the principle stated in the
leading case Liyanage186 is regarded as not applying to relations between state legislatures 
and the state judiciary.187 The constitutions or fundamental laws of the states provide unequal
protection for various aspects of the principle of judicial independence. In some cases, this
protection is entrenched through a “manner and form” requirement which binds future legislatures.188
Judges of the state superior courts have greater protection than their colleagues in the lower
courts, whose removal is in some cases “at the pleasure” of the executive.189 In terms of formal
constitutional protection, aside from the considerable guarantees provided in certain cases by
tradition and convention, it can be said that the judicial independence of state judges in Australia
is not very great.
The trend towards an increased degree of independence is however well under way. This
movement towards reinforcing the independence of state judges has found considerable support
from a landmark judgment of the High Court, which drew certain consequences for independence
from the exercise of federal judicial functions by state courts. Following this judgment, legislatures
are no longer free to assign to state courts exercising federal jurisdiction duties that would be
inconsistent with the “judicial power” as conceived by the Constitution of the Commonwealth.190
In Kable, a majority of four out of six judges ruled that an “integrated judicial system” existed,191
an idea which might in due course result in the courts bringing the independence of state 
judges to a level comparable to that of federal courts.192 However, this move toward levelling 
the constitutional protection of judicial independence is based on the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, which refers expressly to security of tenure and financial independence.
What then is the position with respect to administrative independence? Once again, a trend
towards increased protection is noticeable. Based partly on an analogy with judicial protection 
in matters of salary, a significant number of judges have already publicly taken a position in 
favour of a measure of administrative independence for the courts.193 There is no longer any
hesitation in treating administrative independence as an essential feature of judicial independence.
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The High Court’s judgment in Kable also gave a certain conceptual impetus to the development 
of administrative independence, emphasizing the concept of “public confidence in the independence
of the judiciary or of a judge” as a reference point in analyzing duties which it would be
unconstitutional for a judge to perform (and which accordingly the legislature cannot assign).194
With the courts relying on a principle of such a general nature in their approach to the imperatives
underlying the constitutional protection of judicial independence, the analogy with financial
security becomes all the more applicable. If the remuneration of judges must be guaranteed to
preserve their independence in the view of the public, it is hard to argue that a large number of
administrative questions should be regarded in any other way.195 The need is to meet the same
imperative, which must be measured in accordance with the public’s perception. The case-by-case
definition of the consequences of this imperative by the courts is only impeded by interpretative
formalism which is rapidly diminishing. From this reference by the High Court to the “public
confidence in the independence of judges and the judiciary”, it may also be concluded that the
relevance of the institutional dimension of judicial independence has become established in
Australian constitutional law.
That being said, federal legislation has long been in advance of decisions by the courts on
administrative independence, since the federal courts are in general self-administered. Due
undoubtedly to its place in the structure of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, it is the 
High Court of Australia which first enjoyed comprehensive administrative independence.196
This independence is the result of reforms undertaken and carried out in the seventies and makes
the High Court a separate legal person which controls in its own name not only its staff but also
the real property that it uses.197 The Court is administered by an executive director and registrar,
who act on behalf of the judges.198 In the area of finance, the Court gives the Minister of Finance
its budgetary forecasts and he or she makes recommendations to Parliament.199 Forecasts which
have been approved by the Minister of Finance must be observed by the Court.200 On these last
two points, the principle of ministerial responsibility extends to the budget of the Court and the
latter has limited freedom of manoeuvre in using the monies allocated. It is worth noting again 
in this context that a British-style parliamentary setup can accommodate a system of budget
preparation and allocation of funds which would only involve Parliament, without going through
the ministerial channel.
In should be mentioned before concluding that the Federal Court and the Family Court also enjoy
comprehensive administrative independence, which will not be considered here.201
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The above review of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia has shown a trend
toward the granting of greater administrative autonomy to the courts, particularly in respect of
the courts with greater political responsibilities. The political branches in the reference countries
have all recognised through legislation the need for greater administrative autonomy based on
judicial independence and the separation of powers. In this respect, the evolution of constitutional
norms through case law was noticeable only in situations where the executive model of court
administration had been retained. The trend noted here is hardly surprising given the international
evolution of the concept of judicial independence, which is the subject of the next section.
4.5 The International Normative Context 
of Judicial Independence 
The constitutional requirements regarding judicial independence have changed significantly in
Canada since Valente, and there is no indication that these changes have come to an end. As the
Supreme Court of Canada noted in Mackeigan, the essential characteristics of judicial independence
defined in Valente are not “an exhaustive codification of the elements necessary for judicial
independence”, as “the conditions themselves may vary and evolve with time and circumstances”. 202
The Remuneration Reference puts forward a constitutional imperative that the judiciary’s relations
with the other branches of government should be depoliticized. The way in which this imperative
will work in practice has still to be defined and that definition will only come from court decisions
on constitutional matters if the political branch of government decides not to take the initiative.
Either way, for the purposes of our analysis, it is worth looking at the evolution of the norms that
have been adopted internationally on the question of judicial independence.
To begin with, it should be noted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 10, and the
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, in article 14, guarantee judicial independence.
These fundamental provisions of international treaty law, largely regarded as forming part of the
jus cogens, guarantee judicial independence beyond the particular context of criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court’s judgments in Beauregard and the Remuneration Reference, which establish
that the guarantee expressed in the Charter is only an example of a broader principle, are thus
very much in keeping with international law.
However, beyond this universally recognized general rule, international legal instruments do not
provide much guidance. In order to interpret and bring these fundamental documents to life,
therefore, it is natural to turn to what is now often called “soft law”, that is statements of principle
which are regarded by the courts as having persuasive force. These international statements 
take the form of various instruments such as declarations, directions and principles, based on
comprehensive and quasi-universal reflection on the requirements of judicial independence. There
has been a significant acceleration in the evolution of research and analysis in this area in the last
25 years. The result of this analysis is a valuable normative heritage that cannot be ignored.
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These soft law instruments have recognized the importance of court administration in fleshing 
out the general principle of judicial independence. These instruments include the Syracuse Draft
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1981 (International Association of Penal Law and
International Commission of Jurists), the Tokyo Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in 
the Lawasia Region, 1982 (LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee), the International Bar
Association Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, New Delhi 1982 (International 
Bar Association); the Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983 (World
Conference on the Independence of Justice), the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary, 1985 (General Assembly endorsement), the Beijing Statement of Principles of the
Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region, 1995 (Conference of Chief Justices of Asia 
and the Pacific Region), the Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial
Independence, 1998 (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth Magistrates’ and
Judges’ Association, Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association and Commonwealth Legal Education
Association), the European Charter on the statute for judges, 1998 (Council of Europe), the Beirut
Declaration 1999 (First Arab Justice Conference, Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary
and the Legal Profession, in cooperation with the Center for the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers) and the Cairo Declaration on Judicial Independence 2003 (Second Arab Justice Conference,
Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, in cooperation with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development
Program).
These international instruments all recognize the importance of administrative autonomy 
and consider at least some aspects thereof to be requirements of judicial independence.
Figure 4.1 provides the details of such requirements, which concern court financing, budgeting
and administration.
The persuasive force of these international documents is recognized not only by international
courts applying international law but also by Canadian courts applying domestic law, especially
constitutional law. The Supreme Court actually refers to such documents when determining the
content of the principle of judicial independence. In the Remuneration Reference, the Supreme
Court referred to the Draft United Nations Universal Declaration of the Independence of Justice.203
More recently, in Mackin, the Supreme Court referred to the Montreal Universal Declaration on the
Independence of Justice.204 The phenomenon is easily explained, since the reasons for defending
and protecting judicial independence usually transcend domestic legal systems.205
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Figure 4.1 International Soft-Law Requirements
Financing • Must be sufficient to enable the judiciary to perform its functions
(Syracuse 24, European Charter 1.6, UN Principles 7) . . . to the highest
standards (Latimer House II 2);
• It is a priority of the highest order for the state to provide adequate
resources to allow for the due administration of justice (Tokyo 13,
Montreal II ix 2.41);
• The amount allotted should be sufficient to enable each court to function
without an excessive workload (Syracuse 25, Beijing 37);
• The judiciary must have an opportunity to be heard or must participate 
in the determination of the envelope (Syracuse 25, European Charter 1.8)
• The State shall guarantee an independent budget for the judiciary 
(Beirut 2, Cairo 1)
Budgeting • The budget of the courts shall be prepared by, in collaboration with or
upon the advice of the judiciary (Beijing 37, Montreal II ix 2.42, European
Charter 1.8, Beirut 2, Cairo 1);
Administration • The main responsibility for Court administration shall vest in the judiciary
(Montreal II ix 2. 40) or in a joint body (New Delhi 9, Beijing 36);
• This includes appointment, supervision and disciplinary control of
administrative personnel and support staff (Beijing 36) and control of 
the monies allocated to the judiciary (Latimer House II 2)
In several constitutional systems, federalism has played an important part in the development of
judicial independence, simply because of the need felt by the political branch of government to
entrust litigation involving the division of powers to an independent arbiter. The concept of the
separation of powers has also played an important role in several systems, when it is necessary to
determine the relations between the courts and other branches of government. The concept of
separation of powers, which does not require a dogmatic separation of functions, relies on the
assumption that only power is able to control power. Power depends, among other things, on
independence. In all systems universally, the rule of law and the protection of human rights have
provided sufficient reasons for establishing and protecting an independent judiciary. Without 
an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, even in the most limited understanding of
the concept.
In reviewing the reasons underlying the very idea of protection for judicial independence,
(i.e.: federalism, the separation of powers, the rule of law or constitutionalism, and the protection
of human rights), one sees that these are fundamental principles of the Canadian Constitution,
to which the Supreme Court unhesitatingly attaches legal consequences.206 According to the
Supreme Court,“observance and respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing process 
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of constitutional development and evolution of our Constitution as a ‘living tree’”. 207 In the
context of judicial independence,“soft law” offers ways of giving concrete form to these general
principles. The general principles give rise to the constitutional imperative of depoliticizing the
judiciary’s relations. These normative positions offer ways of giving effect to this imperative.
The primary responsibility for deciding how the imperative will be implemented belongs to the
political branches of government. But it is the courts which ultimately have to decide whether 
a particular legislative arrangement is constitutionally acceptable.
4.6 Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis of the constitutional position, seven conclusions may be drawn which
can serve as guiding principles in the context of alternative models of court administration:
1. The constitutional position can only be analysed in the dynamic context of the evolution 
of the role of the judiciary under the Canadian constitution. Over the last 25 years, there has
been a formidable increase in judicial responsibilities and an ever-growing involvement of
courts in the resolution of socio-economic questions. Institutional arrangements in matters 
of court administration have not followed suit.
2. The inherent jurisdiction of courts of law should not be expected to form the basis of
fundamental changes in institutional arrangements. However, inherent jurisdiction is based 
on the rationale that courts must have all the powers necessary for the exercise of their
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can therefore be expected to evolve with judicial responsibilities,
along with the constitutional requirements of judicial independence.
3. There are no constitutional impediments to the adoption of models of court administration
that involve a high degree of judicial autonomy. The federal distribution of powers, the
institutional arrangements peculiar to the parliamentary tradition and the conventions of
responsible government create no obstacle to the adoption of such models.
4. Even though constitutional requirements do have a harmonizing effect at the level of
principles, federalism does allow for a measure of provincial autonomy in the design of
models of court administration.
5. The constitutional imperative of depoliticization of the relations between the political
branches and the judicial branch very likely calls for a greater measure of administrative
independence than is afforded by the models currently in place.
6. A brief comparative review of the usual reference jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Australia, shows a clear trend toward governments granting greater
administrative autonomy to the courts.
7. Finally, statements of principle from the last 25 years of international “soft law” instruments
have recognized the importance of administrative autonomy in promoting and preserving
judicial independence and clearly support a move in Canada toward a limited judicial
autonomy model of court administration.
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Chapter 5
What Criteria Should Be Used 
for Assessing Alternative Models?
The Models of Court Administration project had its genesis in three related concerns and
assumptions of members of the Canadian Judicial Council:
1. That the abilities of Canadian trial and appellate Courts to carry out their responsibilities 
and objectives in an effective and efficient manner are negatively impacted by both 
the levels of resources available for court administration and the manner in which those
resources are utilized;
2. That improvements could be made to both the levels of court resources and the manner 
in which they are utilized; and 
3. That many of the required improvements could be most effectively and efficiently achieved 
if there were a change in the role of the judiciary in decision-making related to court
administration.
An important purpose of the first round of interviews was to get a first impression of whether 
or not the interviewees considered the above assertions to be valid. It is important to note 
that—although there was considerable variation in opinions expressed in the first round of
interviews—there was considerable concern and agreement expressed regarding the above 
three premises, certainly enough to warrant further effort to improve on the current situation.
It is also important to note that much of the discussion—particularly discussion of how 
the current “executive” model negatively impacts the ability of the Courts to carry out their
responsibilities—was phrased in fairly general terms. In the second round of consultations,
which was intended to assist in developing clear and practical conclusions and recommendations,
it was necessary to delve deeper using a more specific set of questions and a more specific
framework and language for describing the specific nature of those impacts.
In particular, it was critical to clarify the actual and likely impacts of current and alternative
decision-making models in each of the areas of court responsibility and performance that are
listed in Figure 5.1.
The goals and objectives shown in Figure 5.1 have been identified through our review of the




Key Institutional Goals and Objectives
1. To better preserve judicial independence and the institutional integrity of the judiciary as a
separate branch of government
2. To enhance public trust and confidence in the judicial system
3. To improve the quality and delivery of judicial services, more specifically:
a) To make court dispute resolution more accessible (esp. re: reduced costs, more familiar and
effective process, more timely)
b) To ensure a more timely pace of litigation (all stages)
c) To enhance the quality of dispute resolution (equality, fairness and integrity—process and
outcomes)
d) To enhance court transparency
e) To enhance the environment for conducting the work of the Court (litigants, judiciary,
lawyers, mediators, other participants)
4. To develop within the Court an enhanced capability and culture of continuous improvement
and reform, more specifically, by ensuring:
a) Clear direction and leadership (including setting of objectives and measuring performance
and evaluation)
b) Clear accountabilities and strong partnerships (including partnerships with the bar and
external service providers)
c) Effective and efficient operational strategies, tools and practices (including: rules, practice
directions, procedures)
d) Sufficient well-trained personnel and adequate resources (including: judiciary, advocates,
mediators, parties, registry staff, general public)
e) Effective support systems (including: court management information systems,
communications systems, financial systems)
The first three objectives focus on the Courts as distinctive institutions serving fundamental
purposes of democratic government (objective #1) and doing justice in individual cases 
(objective #3). The second objective recognizes the need to secure and maintain public support
for the administration of justice. All three objectives relate to the Courts’ impact on society and
other aspects of their external environment. In the terminology employed by studies to evaluate
alternatives, these are typically called output measures.
What Criteria Should Be Used for Assessing Alternative Models? 71
The fourth objective—including all five of its components—relates to what are called process
measures. They identify whether and how well the Courts perform the full set of management
functions and processes that are common to all effectively operating modern organizations.
This fourth set of objectives is particularly important given the current ever-changing social,
technological, economic and political environment. Even more than before, Courts must develop
the internal capacity to quickly recognize the need for change and to respond to that need
effectively and efficiently—all the while protecting the longer term values and functions for 
which they have particular responsibility.
It is important to note that the objectives in Figure 5.1 constitute the criteria to be used within 
the project to evaluate the proposed alternative models of the judicial role in court administration
decision-making. More specifically, models will be evaluated in terms of which one best facilitates
attainment of these objectives.
In particular, the first round of interviews identified a number of concerns that the current
(executive) administrative model undermined the achievement of Objective #1 (preserving 
the independence of the judiciary). For instance:
A number of participants expressed puzzlement that Courts experience less independence
than legislative208 offices such as Auditors General and Privacy Commissioners. These
participants observe that while Courts must provide the ultimate check on executive
authority, they remain vulnerable to the executive with respect to their administrative
resources.
The round one interviews also elicited specific comments about the need for alternative models 
to better facilitate the achievement of Objective #2 (enhance public trust and confidence) and
Objective #3 (improve the quality and delivery of judicial services). For instance, many chief
justices felt that Courts need enhanced planning capacity in order to determine if they are
providing sufficient/ optimal access to communities. However, there were considerably fewer
comments made about the likely impacts of new models on the Courts’ ability to achieve
objectives #2 and #3. This result may have occurred because the questions in the interviews 
did not specifically address the distinct types of court objectives shown in Figure 5.1. It is also
possible that, because the executive model rarely provides judges with the authority or capacity 
to achieve the objectives listed in #3, comments regarding these objectives were less common.
Similarly, specific examples were forthcoming about the deficiencies of the current model in
ensuring the desired level of judicial involvement in administrative processes identified within
Objective #4 (for instance, setting clear direction and leadership, determining the size and
distribution of the court budget, designing court facilities).
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5.1 Additional Considerations Relevant for Change—
and for Choosing One Model over Another 
The key criteria for choosing one model or another, as indicated above, is whether it does a better
job of achieving the goals and objectives of court administration. That said, we have identified a
number of additional general considerations directly relevant to, first, whether a change should be
contemplated, and second, which model should be chosen over others. The most important are
listed here:
• Innovation in court administration is a function of institutional confidence and administrative
competence.
• The willingness to innovate increases with the Courts’ confidence that they can achieve
innovations and control their direction.
• As a result, innovation in the courts is more readily observed in systems as the length of time
that they have been administratively autonomous increases. Thus for example,
– The South Australian Courts have gone further in setting their own administrative
performance targets now that they have operated for several years under an autonomous
Courts Administration Authority.
– American state Courts have been more innovative when they are able to set their own
priorities (e.g. gender bias and racial bias task forces were set up within the court systems 
of many states, while this was not an option in Canada where law societies and bar
associations typically took on this work).
– The Singapore court administrative system is highly innovative (not only technologically
but in ways associated with responsiveness to clients and the public) even while its legal
system is more conservative.
• Transparency is greater when innovation is developed by an administratively autonomous
system. Since innovation does not require direct negotiation with government officials to
whom court administration is subordinate, the appearance of justice is not compromised—
but in fact enhanced—by innovation efforts.
• As a result, Courts can publicize their innovation initiatives, increasing public knowledge of
these efforts.
• Real accountability is therefore greater under more autonomous models of court administration.
The public is in a position to assess the effectiveness of court administrative activity in general
and innovation in particular, so that issues can be brought to the attention of the Legislature.
This approach to accountability is very different from the classical theory of public management
through a chain of command (Legislature to cabinet to minister to deputy minister).
• Given the complexity of court administration, and the delicate relationship between govern-
ment and judiciary derived from the principle of judicial independence, the existence of greater
accountability through a more open and autonomous model should not be surprising to
observers of modern management processes.
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• Initial adoption of new organizational or structural frameworks often emphasizes the need 
to maintain stable operations as broad reorganization occurs. Thus for example the test of
successful court administrative reorganization is whether parties and counsel are able to access
the services of counter clerks without disruption (“without noticing anything different”).
• However, if court administrative reorganization does not yield medium- or long-term changes
that enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency, participants and stakeholders will question the
value of the effort.
• Therefore, the onus is on those advocating changing models of court administration to ensure
that the effort has been worthwhile.
• At the same time, change can produce benefits regardless of the direction of change, because
openness to change is often more important than the specific changes themselves.209
• The most important benefit of a separate and independent court administration service is the
ability of the Courts to set their own priorities. This was the main message conveyed in Ireland
by career court administrators who worked under the executive model and under a Courts
Service created in the 1990s.
• This ability to set priorities enhances the willingness as well as the capacity of the Courts to
collaborate with other key actors in the justice system. Thus independent court administration
does not isolate the Courts, but enhances the confidence of the judiciary and court personnel
that external linkages can be created in ways that do not compromise the court system.
And finally,
• To minimize the uncertainty and risk associated with any restructuring initiative and thereby
encourage support for positive change, it is important that developing and implementing the
recommended model build on lessons learned from the innovation in court administration
ongoing in Canada and that has taken place around the world.
5.2 Conclusion
Three conclusions follow closely on the discussion set out above:
1. First, increased use of court performance goals would enhance court administrative efficiency
and effectiveness under any of the models.
2. Second, setting clear administrative goals and objectives—and regularly monitoring and
openly reporting performance in terms of those goals and objectives would provide an
effective process for ensuring accountability under any of the alternative models; and 
3. In particular, by providing an effective accountability mechanism, administrative goals and
objectives would provide the strong mechanism need for ensuring effective accountability 
to a broad range of communities under judicial led-models of decision-making.
While establishing the criteria for evaluating models of court administration is a necessary step 
in the analysis, such criteria take on meaning only when the various decision-making settings 
and stages of court administration are clarified. It is to that task that we now turn.
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Chapter 6
What is the Scope of Court
Administration Decision-Making?
From our earlier interviews, it was also clear that different respondents have different definitions 
of what constitutes “court administration” decision-making. At the very least, they understandably
emphasize certain key areas, such as court budgeting. However, this focus may well result in less
attention being paid to other important areas that are required for effective and efficient court
administration.
In the second round of interviews, it was important to ensure that a consistent definition of the
scope of court administration was employed. It was also important that this definition include the
full range of decision-making and activities within the area.
6.1 Decisions and Activities within Five Key Areas
For a Court to achieve the objectives stated in the previous Chapter, it must develop and maintain
effective and efficient administration activities in the five areas shown in summary fashion in
Figure 6.1 and in more detail in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.1: Five Elements of an Effective and Efficient Court Administration
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6.1.1 Leadership and Direction
Clear and strong leadership is a key to developing an effective and efficient court administration.
In particular, leadership is required to develop within all groups a commitment to working 
toward a shared vision and set of objectives. This leadership would, for instance, set the standards
the Court should achieve regarding access to justice, time limits for disposing of different types 
of cases, other case management time standards, and workplace standards for judicial and
administrative staff and the public. The leadership would also review performance, continuously
assess changes in the level and nature of caseloads and the developing alternatives for dealing
with those cases, and ensure the carrying out of the other types of change-management activities
necessary to ensure the creation of a learning environment and a culture of continuous
improvement.
6.1.2 Organization and Responsibilities
Within an effective court administration, accountabilities and responsibilities for all essential tasks
would be clearly defined and allocated to the appropriate groups. Of particular interest would be
defining the appropriate organizational structures within the Courts (e.g. a Unified Family Court)
and the creation and maintenance of partnerships with external public and private groups (e.g.
law enforcement, corrections, court workers, diversion and alternative measures, mediators, social
and health support groups, community care and supervision groups). This area would also include
defining and ensuring an appropriate role for different public groups in identifying needs and
reviewing court administration responses.
6.1.3 Effective Strategies,Tactics and Procedures
Continuous efforts would be made to facilitate and improve measures to ensure that court
administrative units combine and utilize all available resources in ways that best provide the
services required to achieve objectives. This will include ensuring that significant resources are
made available for development and implementation—at the corporate, management and
individual level—of change and re-engineering efforts to ensure a responsible and accessible
court system. These may include, for example, adoption and modification of effective case and
caseflow management practices, rules of Court, and strategies (e.g. court connected mediation,
settlement weeks), and the focusing of resources on priority court functions and case requirements.
6.1.4 Resources
Having available adequate levels and types of resources is critical to an effective court
administration. This would include developing a professional court administration staff through
appropriate hiring, training, supervision and development of systems and environments for
rewarding positive performance. Considerable attention would also be paid to developing court
facilities that support the particular judicial and administrative processes chosen and planned for
the Court. Care would also be given to ensure the availability and maintenance of the general and
special types of equipment (e.g. modern automated court management information systems)
needed to support the work of the Court.
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Of particular concern in this area would be court administrative decisions and activities at all
stages of court budgeting processes that result in the availability of sufficient resources of all
types to achieve court objectives.
6.1.5 Support Systems
Finally, the work of the court administrative units must be facilitated by efficient management and
administrative support systems, all of which are designed to best support court decision-making
processes. This will require the development and maintenance of, for instance: case and caseflow
management information systems (manual and automated); communications and media systems,
and financial accounting systems.
Effective and efficient processes in each of these areas are essential for a Court to achieve its goals
and objectives. In addition, decisions and activities in each area often have significant impacts on
the results of decisions and activities in other areas. For instance, case and caseflow management
strategies can have a significant impact on the level and types of judicial, facilities and financial
resources required by a Court. Similarly, committed leadership is recognized as an essential
foundation of caseflow management systems. At the same time, the success of any case manage-
ment system is directly dependent on the availability of timely and complete information from
automated information systems—systems which, in turn, cannot be developed without adequate
financial resources. All elements are essential to an effective court administration.210
In considering how and whether Courts might benefit from alternative models of administrative
decision-making, it is important to consider possibilities in all five areas. In particular, it is
important to go beyond the budget negotiation or budget expenditure activities that have 
often been the focus of earlier and current discussions. As shown in Figure 6.2—which lists some
of the more prominent specific processes, functions and areas of decision-making within each of
the five elements—court budgeting comprises only one of many areas of “court administration”
decision-making.
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210 It is recognized that while these five elements are necessary for the most efficient and effective organization, they are 
often missing (in whole or in part) from many organizations with which we come into contact every day, whether public or
private, charitable or profit-making. An organization may have a clear idea of its objectives but lack effective strategies and
procedures for putting them into practice. Another organization may have lost sight of its objectives amidst the pressure of
daily operations. Still others may lack the support systems to evaluate their performance, or the partnerships necessary to
achieve their objectives. For our purposes, these five elements provide a check list to evaluate not only the effectiveness of
current court administration, but also a means to assess the participation of judiciary and government in both the current
model and possible alternatives.
Figure 6.2: Processes and Functions within Each of the Five Key Elements of Effective
Court Administration: Detailed Description
1. Leadership and Direction
Including:
• developing a clear and shared vision 
• setting specific objectives and standards in all areas
• ensuring visible support from all groups on which the success of court administration
depends
• maintaining an awareness of developments in the environment that might facilitate or
hinder court administration activities 
• monitoring and evaluating progress made toward those objectives
• strategic planning
• adjusting policies and operations to ensure continuous improvement and effective change
management.
2. Organization and Responsibilities
Including development and implementation of:
• identification of which groups and individuals within and outside court administration and
judiciary can most effectively contribute to the achievement of court administration
objectives
• clear accountability and reporting structures within the court administrative units
• clear statements of responsibilities within the court administrative units and judiciary
• developing partnerships within the Court (e.g. between and among the various levels of
Court: e.g. defining role of the puisne judges in policy development)
• effective partnerships with external groups (e.g. bar, Attorney General, government IT and
HR groups, NGO’s)
• effective division of work between internal and external persons and groups based on
relative effectiveness and efficiency in achieving court administration objectives—and
building on existing and previous competencies and experience
• effective contributions from groups outside the court administration and judiciary
3. Effective Strategies, Tactics and Procedures
Including identifying, developing and implementing:
• the services that should be offered (both traditional and innovative)
• the processes and functions that must be formed to provide those services
• case and caseflow management policies and procedures
• the most effective tactics and procedures for delivering those services (including business
re-engineering, best practices, learning environments and cultures of continuous
improvement) 
• methods to focus services and resources on priority areas of need
• processes to tailor tactics and procedures to the particular needs of different types of
clients and cases
• Rules of Court and Practice Directions
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Figure 6.2: Processes and Functions within Each of the Five Key Elements of Effective
Court Administration: Detailed Description (continued)
4. Resources
Including development and maintenance of:
• Human Resource Management
– adequate staffing levels
– identifying gaps in the competencies of staff in relevant areas








• court physical security
• Budgeting Systems
– budgeting
– budget preparation processes linked to objectives
– budgets structured to reflect policies and priorities
5. Support Systems
Including development and maintenance of:
• Financial Systems
– accounting
– encumbrance accounting reports
– financial controls
• Management Information Systems
• Communications and Media Systems
– within court administration
– between court administration and judiciary
– among different Courts
– between the Court and partners inside and outside the Court
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6.2 Control of Decisions at What Stage 
of the Planning/Operations Continuum
Each of the activities shown in Figure 6.2 has a second dimension which is important to consider
when determining the appropriate role of the judiciary in decision-making regarding that activity.
That dimension relates to the different “stages” of decision-making that could be involved in each
of those activities.
Figure 6.3 presents a generic visual description of the different stages of the continuous
improvement cycle of planning/design/implementation/operations/evaluation that could apply to
most court activities.



































Life Cycle of 
Court Administration
Activities
Different court administrative areas will typically follow variations on these steps. For instance,
steps relevant to the court budgeting/expenditure area might include those listed in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4
Example Steps in the Budgeting/ Expenditure Life Cycle
1. Developing/improving the process to be used in preparing and managing a Court’s budget
(including: what should be the involvement of the judiciary, Attorney General, other
government officials and the public in decision-making at each step; what information should
be considered at each step; the timing of each step; and what types of manual and
operational systems are to be used)
2. Identifying needs for financial and other resources (including: reaching a consensus on future
developments likely to affect court caseloads and workloads, likely future changes to court
case and caseflow management practices, potential impacts of new technology, potential new
partnerships for delivering services, performance levels to be achieved)
3. Initial exploration of general budgetary approaches and options (including: whether to restrict
options to those involving limited or no growth or growth to a specified maximum
percentage; whether to explore a number of options)
4. Preparation of draft scenarios (including: the discussion of priorities and determining
preliminary options)
5. Setting of priorities and the preparation of detailed prioritized budgets
6. Final review and approval of the budget 
7. Modifying and deciding on the size and composition of the budget
8. Approving and making expenditures within the budget
9. Bookkeeping and other accounting practices to document expenditures
10. Reviewing priorities, preparing supplementary budgets and making expenditures outside the
budget (including in emergencies)
11. Monitoring actual and budgeted financial performance
The steps that are used will, of course, vary from one jurisdiction to another (and perhaps between
different court systems within the same jurisdiction). The important point to consider is, however,
what decision-making role the judiciary should properly play at each stage, including whether
different decision-making roles for the judiciary are appropriate for different steps. The appropriate
model of judicial involvement in decision-making might, for instance, vary depending on broad
criteria such as whether the stage of decision-making can be characterized as: policy vs. operations
or general design vs. detailed design. For instance, in the above budgeting example, it might be
appropriate for the judiciary to control some stages, while a more joint decision-making process
might be appropriate for other stages (being less contentious); in turn, roles for other parties 
(e.g. the Legislature or a government official or an independent commission) in the decision-
making process might be seen as appropriate at other stages.
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6.3 Conclusion
The analysis above leads to several key conclusions. In particular:
1. Different types of court administrative decision-making might be best made under different
“pure” models. The possibility was therefore opened to having the optimal model for the
totality of court administrative decisions be a combination of different “pure” models.
2. More specifically, if a model with increased judicial control were the most appropriate for
many areas or stages of court administrative decision-making, it would be unlikely to be most
appropriate for all. That being the case, the most likely option would be a “limited” judicial
autonomy model (i.e. one in which other (non judicial autonomy) models of decision-making
would apply to court administration decisions outside certain limits).
3. The existence of different stages of court administration decision-making also opened 
up the possibility of improving the optimal (set of ) models by incorporating yet another 
type of alternative model for certain stages of decision-making. As will be seen later, our
recommended solution does just that, by adding a “commission” model to handle disputes
between the judiciary and other groups.
4. Finally, given the wide variation in the levels and nature of different types of court administrative
activities from one jurisdiction to another, different court jurisdictions may find it appropriate
to adopt variations of the model(s) felt most appropriate in other jurisdictions.
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Chapter 7
What Roles Do Other Groups Have 
in Court Administration?
7.1 Discussion
Much of the attention historically has been placed on the decision-making role of the judiciary 
in court administration vis-à-vis the role of the Attorney General—with the role of the Attorney
General deriving from both his or her special role qua Attorney General with responsibility for
court administration and his or her general role as representative of the government with respect
to matters that affect all parts of government. This focus results, for instance, in discussion of
whether the Attorney General represents an effective advocate for court administration matters
either “at the cabinet table” or at the most senior government-wide committee. Discussions
therefore most often considered how to divide up control of decision-making in administrative
matters between only two groups: the judiciary and the Attorney General.
However, in the last decade or two, this dual decision-maker framework has lost much of its
relevance. Instead, changes in government organizational policies, changes in technology and
changes in the types of services offered within the court arena have resulted in many more
stakeholders demanding a role in decision-making.
First, consider the special “justice/social policy” role of the Attorney General. Clearly, whatever court
administration model is chosen, that model must respect the importance of the Attorney General’s
important policy and operational responsibilities in fulfilling the government’s social justice
agenda. However, from an administrative and functional perspective, governments and society
increasingly see benefits in treating crime prevention, private security, law enforcement, access 
to justice, prosecution, Courts, prisons and various forms of community-based treatment and
corrections as all being part of a larger criminal justice system. Similarly, civil Courts are seen 
as only one element of a broader civil justice system that includes various forms of compliance-
enforcement mechanisms and many private and court-connected ADR mechanisms. Finally, Family
Courts, especially Unified Family Courts, are seen as best fulfilling their role if they are more closely
related to the social and community services traditionally offered by other agencies. The result is
that what once were seen as solely “court” administrative decisions are now more likely to be seen
as criminal justice “system”, civil justice “system” or family justice “system” decisions.
Since many of the other groups involved in these systems do not report to the Attorney General
(or even the provincial government), the Attorney General often finds himself or herself as one of
many senior officials (e.g. Solicitor General, Correctional Services, Justice, Community Services,
Consumer and Commercial Relations) at the table in Cabinet and in senior government meetings
to discuss key policy issues and operational issues—such as what “justice system” policy objectives
should be emphasized in setting criteria for allocating the percentage of the available budget that
should go to the Courts and the percentage that should go to other components of the “system”,
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or whether it would be best to build a court management information system or an “integrated
justice” information system. Additional decision-makers are brought into the discussion when
court administrative matters affect or require changes to the local operations of groups such as
the police—for instance, when considering changes to the scheduling of criminal cases.
Second, there have been major changes with respect to the broader role of the Attorney General
as responsible for representing (to the Courts) government policies and practices that have direct
impacts on court administration. A number of governments some time ago took responsibility for
setting certain policies and operational guidelines away from Attorneys General and gave them to
central government agencies. The most prominent examples were in the areas of human resource
management (e.g. the setting of job classifications, pay scales of staff, screening appointments),
information systems (e.g. whether or not to automate, and if so, whether to build separate or
integrated justice systems), communications systems (e.g. internet access policy), facilities (e.g.
whether or not to plan and build courthouses, including possible use of public/private partnership
strategies) and budgeting processes. Although the Attorneys General were responsible for
implementing the policies and guidelines, any influence the Court might have had on what
policies and guidelines were being set would have been indirect if the Courts had interacted only
with the Attorney General. To have a more significant impact, the Courts would have had to
interact with officials from the central agencies. This is certainly relevant to the question whether
general government policies regarding overall budget restrictions should apply in equal measure,
or at all, to the Courts.
More recently, however, many governments have extended the direct influence of central agencies
on court administration matters by giving those agencies a direct role in more operational
activities. Thus, meetings to discuss operational issues related to court administration are more
and more likely to be attended—and in some cases, led—by officials from central agencies.
For instance, in some jurisdictions courthouse planning committees are chaired by a centralized
facilities/infrastructure development agency, with the Attorney General being one of many
interests at the table. Similar situations often result with information systems planning and
development committees. Of further concern is that at times the third party agency is seen as
treating groups (particularly other groups within government) other than the judiciary as the
primary client to be satisfied. In certain instances, they may even refuse to recognize that the
judiciary is in fact a client.
The increasing complexity and globalization of certain administrative functions has also to some
extent been responsible for the centralization of decision-making within governments with regard
to general policies and guidelines affecting court administration. For instance, the increased costs
and complexity of developing automated information systems requires the following of particular
best practice procedures and the incorporation of global standards in planning and developing
such systems. This has made it much more difficult for an individual Court to “go its own way” in
choosing its own computer software or hardware. However, it has also made it more critical that
Courts develop mechanisms to understand the IT development process, to be keenly aware of the
points in the development process at which influence can be directed, and to take advantage of
those opportunities. To do all of these tasks will require more direct communication with the
groups within central government agencies responsible for designing and implementing the IT
development process. Indeed, it may be necessary for Courts to take control of certain, if not all,
aspects of IT development and operations, particularly given security and confidentiality concerns.
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At a minimum, better communication would result in improvements to the process that would
ensure that judicial input is more appropriately incorporated at key points—in particular, during
the early stages of system development when key decisions are made that have a significant
impact on all future decisions. (For instance, should the e-filing component be developed before
the case management component, or the judgment enforcement tracking component?)
Finally, Courts themselves are evolving into organizations that best achieve their objectives
through mechanisms that involve groups that traditionally were seen as outside either the 
Courts or the Attorney General’s purview. Courts are increasingly seeing the advantages in certain
areas of utilizing decision-making processes that involve more co-operative and consultative
processes—for instance, with the Bar on various “operations” committees. At the same time, civil
and family Courts are increasingly incorporating mediation and other forms of ADR as new steps
in the dispute resolution process. Criminal Courts are increasingly experimenting with sentencing
processes (e.g. circle sentencing) and different types of sentences (e.g. conditional sentences and
treatment options) and different kinds of Courts (e.g. Drug Courts, Mental Health Courts, Family
Violence Courts) that require for their success direct involvement of groups that do not fall within
the ambit of the Attorney General’s department, and often are not part of government at all.
The most obvious examples are individuals and firms and associations offering mediation and
arbitration services, Aboriginal groups, and community treatment agencies.211
In conclusion, one cannot help but have concerns that the influence of the judiciary over key court
administrative policy and operational decisions made within government—as exercised through
the Attorney General—has diminished. It is also clear that changes in the technical environment
and changes in the evolving way in which Courts perform their functions require consideration of
a decision-making model that addresses the role of many public and private groups other than
the Attorney General.
Figure 7.1 presents examples of groups whose roles in interacting with the courts must be
addressed in any model.
Figure 7.1




• Central Government Agencies




• Law enforcement officials
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211 However, here it should be noted that continuing participation of such groups in consultative processes is often
contingent on continuing government funding supporting their operations.
• Victims’, children’s and other advocacy groups
• Treatment providers
• Correctional officials (for both remand and sentenced
offenders)
• Providers of ADR services (incl. mediation and
arbitration)
• The general public and specific groups within the
general public—especially with regards to identifying
needs and assessing administrative response.
7.2 Conclusions
The analysis of Chapter 7 is important to any consideration of models other than the executive
model. Based on the analysis in this Chapter, we have concluded as follows:
1. Given the increased role of other government departments and others in court administration
decision-making, it is inappropriate to assume that the Attorney General exerts as strong a
role in court administration decisions as before. This has implications for the degree to which
the executive model (with the Attorney General representing the executive) should be seen 
as continuing to be the most appropriate.
2. Similarly, given the increasing influences of other groups, the ability of the Attorney General
to argue on behalf of the courts (under the executive model) is reduced.
3. The ability of the Courts to develop direct relationships with key stakeholder groups has been
impaired by the executive model of court administration.
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Chapter 8
Alternative Models: Different Levels 
of Control over Decisions 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that, far from facing an environment in which one model has been
entrenched for a long period of time, those willing to explore improved models of administration
decision-making are dealing with a relatively new model and with a recognized need for reform.
Chapter 4 then mapped out the constitutional terrain which suggests that alternatives to the
executive model of court administration could be constitutionally permissible and in some cases
may be more consistent with some constitutional norms. After a discussion in Chapter 5 of the
criteria by which different models should be assessed, Chapter 6 then identified the potential range
of types (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) and stages (Figure 6.3) of court administration decisions over which
the judiciary could exercise different kinds and degrees of control. Chapter 7 then identified the
other stakeholder groups that are likely to lay claim to a significant role in making those decisions.
This Chapter now addresses the question: how can one improve on the current situation and,
more specifically, what changes (if any) should be made to the role the judiciary in court
administration decision-making?
In responding to that question, it is helpful to have a simplified categorization of “model” decision-
making roles for court administration. We consider a high level categorization that defines the
current executive model and six main alternatives to that model, each of which represents a
different clustering of possible roles of the branches of government, and in particular the Court,
in relation to:
• The Legislature
• The Attorney General
• The executive head of court administration
• Other governmental officials and bodies (e.g. IT standard setting groups)
• Other non-governmental groups (e.g. the bar, victim’s rights groups, mediators).
The seven models that are shown in Figure 8.1 summarize the existing model and six distinct options:
1. Executive Model
2. Independent Commission Model
3. Partnership Model
4. Executive/ Guardian Model
5. Limited Autonomy Model
6. Limited Autonomy & Commission Model
7. Judicial Model
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Figure 8.1: Alternative Models of Court Administration Decision-Making (continued)
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In each of the models summarized in Figure 8.1, the relationship between the Court and the
Legislature and/or government is different.
This Chapter provides a description and discussion for each of the seven models. The description
of each of these models attempts also to take into consideration specific variations within each
model and examples domestically and internationally where such models operate. The analyses 
of the seven models are intended to focus on the relationship between the judiciary and the
executive branch of government and how this relationship shapes, and is shaped by, the various
different models. Other key relationships play a significant role in court administration and will 
fall to the courts to address through internal mechanisms, including the relationship between
various levels of court in a jurisdiction (i.e. the relationship between trial and appellate courts 
and the relationship between courts with federally-appointed and provincially-appointed judges);
intra court relationships between the Chief Justice, Associate Chief Justices and puisne justices;
relationships between the judiciary and court staff, between the judiciary and the bar, and so
forth. While these relationships are all significant, it is apparent from our constitutional analysis,
from our analysis of administrative effectiveness and efficiency and from our consultations that
the relationship between the judiciary and the executive remains the defining framework for
discussing court administration in Canada.
The discussion and analysis of each model builds on the extensive consultations undertaken 
both with judicial and executive respondents as well as other participants in court administration
as part of this project. The consultations took place in two stages. The first stage focused on
respondents’ experience with the executive model of court administration, including various
innovations within that model which have facilitated a range of roles for judges in different stages
of court administration decision-making. The second stage was comprised of a more detailed set
of consultations focusing on respondents’ preference for a particular model or models over others.
In support of the second round of consultations, respondents were provided with a discussion
paper which included model descriptions which were substantially similar to the descriptions
provided below.
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Figure 8.1: Alternative Models of Court Administration Decision-Making (continued)















What emerged from these consultations, as discussed below, is a widespread degree of 
concern and dissatisfaction with the executive model of court administration and a widespread
consensus on moving toward a model of limited autonomy and an independent commission 
for dispute resolution.
It should be emphasized, once again, that the discussion of preferences for a particular model
takes place against the backdrop of the various key court administration functions set out in
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6. While some respondents felt a particular model was appropriate
for all court administration functions, other respondents felt different models were appropriate 
for different court administration functions. For example, one judicial respondent concluded 
that the Limited Autonomy model was appropriate for human resource decision-making but 
that an Executive Guardian model made more sense for decision-making relating to information
technology. Other respondents felt particular models were more appropriate for specific courts.
For example, some respondents indicated they would be comfortable seeing greater judicial
control over appellate courts but not trial courts.
This discussion on the consultations is not intended to provide a statistical breakdown of
responses nor will it capture all the nuance of respondents’ linkages of particular models to
particular courts or court administration functions. Rather, the aim is to describe the various
models, provide examples of where those models operate, and an overview of the responses
relating to each model arising from the second round of consultations.
Before turning to the discussion of each model, however, it should be made clear that the
alternatives to the current executive model, while they spell out quite different roles for the
judiciary and for the government, are similar to each other and different from any current
executive model in the provinces or territories in two fundamental ways.
• A Separate and Complete Court Administration Unit
First, each alternative model assumes that the courts will be administered as a separate and
self-contained organization.
In fact, this in itself is a distinct step away from the traditional operation of the executive
model in the provinces, regardless of any current formal or informal role of the judiciary in
court administration. Under current provincial practice, items that would normally be part of
the court budget have in some jurisdictions been transferred away from the Courts to another
part of the ministry or department in which court administration resides (e.g. to prosecution
or central legal services) without the approval of the chief justices of the affected courts.
Similarly, personnel policies and processes for the appointment of court administrative
officials are at times under the supervision of human resource sections separate from court
administration. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 7, Courts have been required to participate in
development of automated information systems under the direction of officials from either a
central government agency or even a separate ministry with potentially conflicting goals and
roles in the justice system. Even more troubling, in certain of these situations those officials
have not given the judiciary a meaningful opportunity to participate.
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• Clear Expectations for Court Administration
Second, it is assumed that both the judiciary and the executive—not to mention other
stakeholder groups—recognize the need for developing a clear consensus on what is
expected from court administration planning and operations. As noted in Chapter 5, a
consensus on expectations regarding court administrative performance is essential for
assessing which of the models should govern decision-making—so one can assess which
model best meets those expectations. However, equally important, no matter which decision-
making model is chosen, a consensus on how court administrative performance should be
measured—and what levels of performance are expected—will be essential for measuring
administrative performance and thereby demonstrating accountability and transparency of
administrative decision-making. This applies whether the decision-making model designates
the Court, the Attorney General, or some other body as responsible for that decision-making.
The following discussion of different models therefore assumes that Canada follows the 
lead of a number of other jurisdictions in establishing a consensus on specific expectations
regarding the key areas of court administration performance—more specifically, in those
areas of performance listed in Figure 5.1.212
8.1 The Executive Model 
8.1.1 Summary Description of Analysis of Executive Model from Chapter 2
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are significant deficiencies with the Executive Model, which now
characterizes, with some variation, the model of court administration in Canada. Based on the
analysis in Chapter 2, it is evident that alternatives to the executive model of court administration
should be explored. The executive model was found to be deficient in several key respects:
1. Courts lack stable funding and discretion over expenditures which create obstacles to
strategic and long-term planning;
2. Court administrators often have divided loyalties to executive and judicial offices which can
undermine the effectiveness of court administration;
3. The Attorneys General’s willingness and capacity to represent the courts interests in
Government decision-making is eroding; and
4. The mutual trust between judicial and executive leadership is jeopardized by the present
climate of disputes over court administration budgets and the implementation of judicial
compensation commission recommendations.
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212 The development of court administration performance goals and objectives for Canada—or for individual Courts within
Canada—will, of course, require a significant effort involving a number of key stakeholders. However, some efforts have
already begun in certain Canadian jurisdictions, and there are a number of precedents and lessons learned from other
jurisdictions that will be helpful in that exercise.These include: the five main categories addressed in the “Trial Court
Performance Standards (TCPS) and Measurement System”, developed by the National Center for State Courts in the United
States after considerable consultation with a large number of state Courts throughout the USA; and the 30 categories
addressed in the “Judicial Reform Index”developed by ABA-CEELI (Central and East European Law Initiative of the American
Bar Association).The TCPS has already been adapted for use in New South Wales, Australia.
While the analysis above focused on the executive model per se, below the executive model is
revisited in a comparative context as part of the second round of consultations, and is evaluated in
relation to the alternative models of court administration identified and developed in this Chapter.
8.1.2 Second Round of Consultations
In the second round of consultations, respondents were asked to indicate their preferred model 
of court administration after being presented with a discussion paper describing the executive
model and the six alternative models.
In this context, few judicial respondents expressed a preference for the executive model. Many
though not all representatives of the executive branch of government expressed this preference,
and associated the executive model strongly with what they characterized as the “status quo”.
In some cases, this meant a degree of support for arrangements which in fact have already
contemplated a greater role for the judiciary in court administration, as presented above. For
example, some respondents justified their support for the executive model on the basis it has
been able to accommodate greater judicial input in decision-making and greater judicial control
over court staff and court resources. Some executive respondents distinguished the executive
model as one based on “mutual respect” rather than “a fixed governance model”. Other executive
respondents acknowledged that the executive model is “imperfect” but asserted it remains
preferable to the alternatives. Rarely, though, was this accompanied by any analysis of the
alternatives. Rather, to some of the executive respondents, the search for preferred models of 
court administration suggested a solution in search of a problem.
Executive respondents tended more to view court administration from the vantage of accountability
and responsibility in a parliamentary cabinet system. While judicial independence is an obvious
and agreed augmentation to this principle, most executive officials expressed the view that
judicial independence is limited to adjudication and does not extend to administrative support 
for the courts. In the past, this attempt to draw the line between what is governed by the principle
of judicial independence and what is governed by the principle of responsible government has
led to making small exceptions to the latter principle to ensure the former (e.g. Justice Le Dain’s
carving out in Valente (discussed in Chapter 2) of case assignment as an administrative function
belonging exclusively to judges), or of allowing exceptions to the latter principle as a way of
acknowledging limited administrative competence of the judiciary (e.g. the B.C. provincial court
executive-judicial protocols).
Thus the debate has traditionally focused on either win-lose strategies or compromises that show
some give on the part of the executive but retain the established framework. What are beginning
to emerge are signs of a win-win approach, one that develops accountability mechanisms and
administrative structures that respect both the prerogatives of parliament and the independence
of the judiciary (for example, the Ontario Court of Justice MOU, discussed above).
What is missing is an acknowledgement by governments that their existing ability to manage the
courts in the public interest is severely limited. They are in a position to say no when courts make
specific requests for personnel and services, acting in the name of fiscal constraint. But they are
not in an effective position to facilitate basic choices among competing court priorities, so that the
courts can evolve effective responses to public needs.
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Some executive respondents focused more on the relative inexperience and lack of capacity 
on the part of the judiciary to take over the functions now performed by executive managers.
However, this approach risks turning the consequences of the executive model into the rationale
for that model. One respondent cited as an example an incident where an executive manager
intervened to correct a judge who had made what he considered inappropriate expenditure
requests. The respondent’s point was that, absent the professionalism of the manager, the judge
and the court could have been exposed to negative publicity and an embarrassing episode.
The emphasis of these respondents on the skills and sophistication of court administration
managers is important and constructive. But the lack of respect for the administrative capacities 
of the judiciary reflected in some of the executive respondents highlights the deficiencies of the
executive-judicial relationship in the executive model.
A number of executive respondents raised the importance of court administration having a “seat
at the cabinet table” through the Attorney General or Minister of Justice. This argument reflects a
circular logic. Executive control over court administration is justified on the basis that the judiciary
has no control over executive decisions, such as the allocation of resources for court administration,
and therefore courts will be “worse off” without an Attorney General or Minister of Justice present
to advocate on their behalf. If an alternative to the executive model were in place, however, the
vicissitudes of the cabinet table would arguably have far less impact on court administration.
Consequently, with an alternative model, for example, direct funding by the Legislature, a seat 
at the cabinet table would have considerably less significance. As indicated by the judicial
respondents to the preliminary consultations, the failure of Attorneys General to champion the
courts’ concerns and priorities is increasingly seen as a barrier to securing appropriate resources 
to achieve the goals and objectives of court administration. The minister’s advocacy and
understanding is critical. But why should this only occur when subordinate officials within the
ministry control court administration? If a minister takes seriously his/her role as “law officer of 
the crown” and source of independent legal advice to cabinet, advocacy should not depend on
the formal court management structure. Obviously, in practice it requires good communication
between the minister and the judiciary and court officials, but this is true under any model.
A small group of judicial respondents acknowledged the concerns over the executive model 
but expressed concerns over a greater role for the judiciary in court administration as well. Some
believed that judges are appointed to adjudicate and have neither the skills nor mandate to
control the administration of courts. Others from this group of respondents expressed the view
that it could be unseemly and inappropriate for a Chief Justice to engage in political negotiations
with the executive over resources.
A decisive majority of judicial respondents and some executive respondents, however, indicated
the strong view that an alternative model of court administration was preferable. They generally
viewed the present system as one requiring significant reform and it is fair to say that there is 
a widely held view that the executive model, despite its various iterations, is failing. Its evident
problems are not confined to any one Court. One Chief Judge indicated in a letter concerns over
how governments set budgets, how classification decisions are made and how consultations are
carried out. A Deputy Minister from that province, who was copied on the letter, commented that 
…if you were to survey Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers across Canada
about their issues and concerns, I suspect that the letters they would write would
express the same kind of concerns the Chief Judge raises… 
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Just as some Deputy Ministers saw the flaws in the current executive practices as not justifying the
search for alternatives, other respondents did not see concerns about alleged inexperience of the
judiciary in management and administration as a barrier to change.
Those supporting change emphasized that in the alternative models, Courts would still rely on
professional court management and managers. The one change however would be that the court
managers would no longer be placed in a conflict of interest; instead, their reporting relationships
and obligations would be to the Courts for whom they would be performing their duties. They
recognized that while some members of the bureaucracy might be concerned about the impact
of change on them personally and while those officials feared loss of control, this ought not to be
used as a justification for opposing needed changes. In their view, compelling reasons existed for
departing from the executive model even though implementing such change will be challenging.
One judicial respondent reacted to the discussion paper setting out the seven models in the
following terms:
Reading the descriptions of the various models in detail reminded me of just how
challenging it will be to move beyond executive control of court administration. It will
mean not just changing structures but also changing mindsets. Seeing the other models
also reminded me, however, that it is possible to move beyond the executive way and
also reminded me why it is necessary to do so.
Many judicial respondents to the second round of consultations echoed the concerns with 
the executive model elicited during the first round of consultations and set out above.
Continuing concerns with the “separate realities” of the judiciary and the executive characterized
these responses.
8.2 The Independent Commission Model
8.2.1 Description
Although the “independent commission” model does not enhance judicial involvement in
administration decision-making, it does take a fundamental step away from the executive model.
The independent commission model also demonstrates that there is not necessarily a direct 
trade-off between judiciary and executive: a decrease in the authority of the executive need not
lead to a concomitant increase in the authority of the judiciary.
In the Independent Commission Model, a separate body (the commission) is established with
responsibility for certain types and stages of court administration decisions. That commission,
whose size and structure would depend on its specific mandate, would be at arms length from
government, in the tradition of independent boards and agencies, Crown corporations, or bodies
such as Provincial Auditors, Ombudsmen, or Information and Privacy Commissioners. There would
still be a process of reporting to the Legislature, either directly or through a minister, but the
emphasis would be on reporting for the purposes of transparency and openness, reflecting a
modern view of accountability to the public rather than to political superiors. Thus the commis-
sion, not the minister, would be accountable for actions of the commission.
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Members appointed to the commission would not sit as representatives of those who appointed
them. Members of the Court (i.e. the judiciary) would not sit on any governing body of the
commission, and as with the executive model, the Court (i.e. the judiciary) would have no policy 
or operational control over the commission. The difference with the executive model is that the
Attorney General (and other government departments) would have a similar lack of policy or
operational control over the commission. The commission would be functionally independent of
both. To ensure that this is so, the commission would have to be named by joint agreement of the
judiciary and government.
Given this independence, and given that at least implicitly the government and the judiciary 
are delegating important powers to the commission, the appropriateness and viability of this
Independent Commission Model critically depends on the existence of a consensus on a set of
clearly defined and measurable goals and objectives of the commission—especially for reasons of
transparency and accountability. Further, under this model, the extent to which both the judiciary
and the Attorney General (or other government ministries) would have an influence on court
administration (through advisory mechanisms and other means) would depend on policies and
procedures determined when the commission was set up.
There can be a number of variations of this model, depending on the scope of the commission’s
mandate. For ease of reference, we have identified three such variations.
• Dispute Resolution Mandate
• Restricted Policy and/or Operational Mandate
• Full Administrative Services Commission
Each will be dealt with in turn.
• Dispute Resolution Mandate
First and at one end of the continuum, is a variation of the Independent Commission Model 
in which the commission’s mandate restricts it to a dispute resolution role in specific areas of
administration decisions. No matter which of the models presented later in this section were
chosen to govern decision-making in all or some of the court administration areas, disputes can
and likely will arise between the executive and the Courts/judiciary—and perhaps other
bodies. Whoever is in charge of that area of administration could have the authority to dictate
the resolution of the dispute, but doing so either:
a) produces bitterness and suspicion within the Court or executive that will disrupt the kind
of day-to-day working relations necessary for the effective administration of justice, and/or
b) leads to a tentative and hesitant response by the executive or Court that avoids bitterness
but undermines needed innovation.
One way to address this difficulty would be through a dispute resolution mechanism
independent of both Courts and government. Legislation could spell out the circumstances
under which this mechanism could be invoked and would be binding. Under this variant of the
96 Chapter 8
independent commission model, as diagrammed in Figure 8.1, both the judiciary’s and the
ministry’s roles would be advisory in that they would present their positions to an independent
commission whose findings and recommendations would govern court administration.213
The dispute resolution variant of the independent mechanism could take the form of a single
independent official, a Commissioner for Courts if you will. Alternatively, the dispute resolution
mechanism could take the form of an independent commission for court administration,
appointed along the same lines as the provincial judges’ remuneration commissions. As well, as
with these other bodies, the budget for and accountability of such independent commissions
should come directly from the Legislature.
The mandate of such a commission could be restricted to only one area of court administrative
decision-making. An example of this option would again be the judicial remuneration commissions
recently established as the result of the Provincial Judges Reference (1997) with the specific
mandate of making recommendations about judicial salaries. In this model, the commission
decisions might bind the government, as is the practice in Ontario on judicial remuneration
pursuant to statute. As the recent New Brunswick Provincial Judges Association (2005) case
affirms, where such statutory provisions are not in place, governments will have the discretion
to reject commission recommendations as long as those recommendations have been given
meaningful effect and the reasons for rejecting them are legitimate and clearly set out. As the
Court reiterates, the purpose of the independent commission is to preserve judicial
independence and promote the depoliticization of the executive-judicial relationship.
The mandate of such a dispute resolution commission could be extended to areas other than
judicial salaries (for example, setting policies for security of automated court information
systems, or implementing caseflow management and delay reduction initiatives). As a specific
example, an independent commission could be given the authority to resolve disputes
between Court and government on the appropriate staffing levels or judicial complement,
or the need for certain types of expenditures. In keeping with the remuneration commission
analogy, this variation of the model could provide that commission recommendations may 
only be altered by the government or the Legislature on constitutionally justifiable grounds.
Alternatively, recommendations could be binding if the Legislature agreed. Attention would
also have to be paid to ensure that monies provided to execute decisions of the commission
were not simply re-allocated from other critical budget line items.
As noted earlier, the dispute resolution variant of the independent commission model may
provide a useful function in conjunction with any of the other decision-making models
presented in this section which might be chosen to govern other policy and operational aspects
of court administration. This function might be especially important during any transition period
in the introduction of alternative models that prescribe new decision-making roles for both the
Courts and the executive.
Alternative Models: Different Levels of Control over Decisions 97
213 There are a number of sources to which one could turn to further develop the specific policies and practices of such 
a dispute resolution commission. For instance, dispute resolution mechanisms in labor relations often provide for
compulsory arbitration of grievances by a single individual drawn from an agreed-upon list, or a trio of individuals, one
appointed by each side and the third appointed by the first two.These mechanisms are sufficiently well-established that
they may provide an alternative to the executive model within certain designated areas. Similarly, in keeping with the labor
relations analogy, the commission or commissioner’s recommendation could be binding based on the previous agreement
of the parties.
• Restricted Policy and Operational Mandate
The second variation would be an independent entity with a considerably more restricted
mandate, one that for instance is restricted to policy and/or operational control over only one
or a small number of court administration activities shown in Figure 6.2.
Pure examples of such a variation are difficult to find. However, some fairly common institutions
and practices do come close. For example, one would include within this variant instances in
which the provision of specific administration services has been, in effect, outsourced to an
independent private or public entity. The executive and/or Court would, of course, specify 
in precise terms what had to be accomplished by the otherwise independent body, but that
entity would in executing that mandate operate on a day-to-day basis at arms length from the
executive and the judiciary. In the justice area, one could cite the outsourcing of the collection
and analysis of comparative national statistics on court operations to the Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics, a part of Statistics Canada.
Similarly—although it is not normally considered an example of the types of decision-making
“models” considered elsewhere in this document—a more obvious example might be those
Rules Committees that have been established as functionally independent bodies with specific
policy and operational responsibilities.
• Full Administrative Services Commission
Finally, and at the other end of the continuum, the commission would have full policy and
operational control of all, or at least most, stages of all or most court administration activities
shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The commission would in fact be a separate court administration
unit in and of itself.
Here again pure examples of such a variation are rare if they exist at all. However, the variant 
is included here for sake of completeness.
8.2.2 Consultations
In our consultations, very few respondents expressed support for this model as a free-standing
alternative model of court administration. This model was seen to lack clear and accountable lines
of authority and decision-making and to risk a situation in which the judiciary would find itself
with even less of a role in court administration than is now the case and in which a new added
layer of bureaucracy might further impair innovation and initiative in the court administration
sphere. Other respondents believed that, inevitably, tensions surrounding who controls court
administration decision-making would spill over into the process of appointing such commissions
and the setting of their terms of reference.
Respondents tended to view an independent commission more favourably as a mechanism 
for dispute resolution and direction on court administration than as an operational framework 
for court administration decision-making. Most respondents seemed to assume the commission
would have only judicial and executive membership but those who considered a broader base 
of membership, including non-partisan justice sector institutions such as provincial law societies,
law deans or bar associations, or other public bodies to represent more fully the public interest 
in court administration, viewed such possibilities with interest.
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While there was very little support for the independent commission as a stand-alone model,
a number of respondents were attracted to key aspects of the model, such as the importance 
of credible and neutral dispute resolution between the courts and executive and a fully
professionalized court administration unit. These aspects are addressed further below in 
the context of the Limited Autonomy and Commission model.
8.3 The Partnership Model
8.3.1 Description
The third model, the “Partnership Model”, presents an option that retains a significant role for 
the executive in court administration, but also potentially increases the direct influence of the
Court/judiciary. The significance of the increased role for the latter, however, depends on the
composition of the joint control partnership.
Conceptualizing the Court as a partner means that the Court does not exercise direct operational
control over court administration, as in the autonomy models discussed below, but exercises
control jointly, by participating either with the Attorney General alone or with others, on a broader
board or council that nominates or appoints the Court Executive Officer and has the authority 
to make and ensure the implementation of court administration policy. Unlike the Executive/
Guardian Model discussed below, the Court here is more broadly involved in the full range of
management issues. While the judiciary lacks the authority to act on its own, the board on which
its representatives sit does in fact have the authority and responsibility to administer the courts,
and under existing applications of the model, this authority (and responsibility) extends to all areas
of court administration shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, including: financial management, human
resource management, information system development and other core management functions.
As with the other models, it is assumed that court administration has been established as 
a separate entity, one that will be governed by the policies and directions of the partnership.
It is also important to note that, as in any partnership in which groups might have different
interests, effective discussion and decision-making require a clear consensus on the objectives 
and expectations of the partnership. The importance of clearly defined court administration 
goals and objectives is therefore especially important to the partnership model.
In practice, different versions of the partnership model vary widely in the degree of judicial
control, depending upon the composition of the governing board.
• Limited Partnership
The partnership could be more limited and symbolic, with chief justices representing the
judiciary ex officio on a board weighted toward government appointees. The chief justices
could serve along with a wide variety of judicial, executive and other appointees, as in the
model propounded by Professor Martin Friedland that echoed the Governing Council model 
at his home University of Toronto. However, this model may represent little more than an
extension of the consultative approaches currently found in some executive-directed systems,
and if it is perceived that the board has an expanded role in court administration, it may be
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seen as an extension of executive authority in the field. It also in effect introduces a barrier
between the judiciary and government, a barrier that is controlled by government, so that
judicial involvement is diluted still further.
• Equal Partnership
Moving further along the continuum, the chief justice or a judge whom is designated could
serve on a board such as the one that governs the Irish Courts Services Agency; 50% of the
membership of that board is drawn from the judiciary, but only two of its 16 members are
appointed at the discretion of the government.214
• Controlling Partnership
It is interesting to note here that the judiciary’s leadership role in relation to the Irish Courts
Service, and the government’s well-known desire to remove itself from a role in court
administration, have combined to make that model in practice closer to that of a majority
partner variant of the partnership model.215 In a true “Controlling Partnership” variant of this
model, the Court would have a voting majority of the seats at the partnership table.
Typically, these variants of the partnership model are spelled out in legislation, and that legislation,
while providing for the exercise of wide discretion by the board or council in the internal
governance of the court system, maintains the supremacy of the Legislature in the setting of
budget estimates and a variety of administrative policies applicable to the greater public sector as
a whole. Partnerships have been the subject of non-statutory experiments, as when the Attorney
General of Manitoba established a board in the 1980s made up of the province’s three chief
judicial officers and the provincial deputy attorney-general. However, its lack of a statutory base
essentially transformed it into an advisory board, while the “Court as Partner” model requires real
joint control—i.e. participation in a board with direct control over court administration.216
Proponents and critics of this approach vary as widely as the composition of the boards or
councils they envision. Judges who favoured greater judicial control still opposed Friedland’s
proposal because the sharing of control was seen as a de facto extension of executive control to
areas that could impinge on judicial independence. Critics of judicial control have felt that even a
minority of judges on a board or council would leave the body open to domination. (Ironically, if
this is a valid argument, it must also mean that the judiciary has enough expertise and interest in
administration to be able to exert its persuasive powers even when its authority is lacking—a
supposition that undermines another of the critics’ arguments: that judges lack the expertise or
interest to exercise leadership over court administration.)
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214 Others represent the bar, court staff and segments of the national economy (business, labor and consumers).
215 Or even the Limited Autonomy Model discussed below at 8.5.
216 See also the New Brunswick Liaison Committee, composed of judicial, executive and bar representatives, which has been in
existence for several years, but does not meet on a regular basis and does not make budgetary allocations, and the Court
Advisory Board established by the Minister of Justice in Newfoundland in September of 2004 composed of the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General, the three Chief Justices of Newfoundland’s courts, the Deputy Minister of Justice and the
Assistant Deputy Minister.The participation of the Minister on the advisory board in Newfoundland is a novel approach.
The Newfoundland Court Advisory Board is not conceived of as a decision-making body but rather as a forum for
discussion, exchange of information and planning.
An Important Caveat
It is important to recognize an important caveat relevant to the feasibility of effectively imple-
menting any variants of the partnership model. The lukewarm reception given to partnership
models in the past may reflect a conceptual dilemma that has not been given sufficient
recognition. The general concept of partnership requires that two separate and independent
individuals or organizations come together to pursue a common enterprise. In this case, that
common enterprise is court administration. But while the judiciary is independent for the
purposes of adjudication, it has not been granted that the Court has an independent role 
in court administration — and that maintaining that independence is critical to the exercise of the
judicial function.
A true partnership requires not only recognition by the parties of their interdependence, but also
recognition of the distinct and independent perspective each one brings to the partnership. Thus
an offer of partnership from government or a minister or deputy minister must be more than a
concession given to shore up its ultimate authority; it must put into practice a new paradigm,
and think through the application of that paradigm in a wide variety of areas and stages in the
administration of justice. Conversely, the judiciary must participate in a partnership not merely 
to veto administrative initiatives that are seen to disrupt the status quo, but primarily to develop
and support innovations that enhance the ability of the Courts to serve justice and serve the
public. Attempts at the partnership model which are not approached with these principles in
mind would tend to erase the distinction between the judiciary and the government, thus eroding
the important independence of each.
8.3.2 Consultations
In our consultations, the partnership model attracted a small number of respondents—
particularly in specific smaller jurisdictions in which partnership and consultative approaches
characterized decision-making in many other parts of public and private decision-making 
in their community. However, overall this did not constitute significant support.
Many saw this model as a noble aspiration but an unworkable administrative arrangement, or at 
a minimum, an arrangement which would inevitably lead back to greater executive control when
issues of resources or major policy initiatives were at stake. As one judicial respondent emphasized,
“This would be a recipe for gridlock, which in the end would simply revert to an executive model,
since the courts have to function and they pay the bills.” Other respondents noted,“It sounds 
great in theory but could never work. Over time, it would simply become the executive model 
by another name.”
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8.4 Executive / Guardian Model 
8.4.1 Description
The fourth model, the “Executive/ Guardian Model” (herein referred to as the Guardian Model),
leaves primary responsibility for day to day planning and operations of the Court to the
executive.217 However, this model also better recognizes the very special and important role and
responsibilities the Court (i.e. the judiciary) has in ensuring the existence of an effective judicial
system, and therefore the existence of effective court administration activities necessary to
support that judicial system.
The Guardian Model therefore gives the Court not only the authority but also the responsibility for
intervening in court administrative planning and operations when those activities adversely affect
the ability of the judicial system to achieve appropriate levels of effectiveness. This responsibility
and authority would be exercised at the discretion of the Court, and would not be subject to the
prior approval of the either the legislature or the executive.
The Guardian Model encompasses but goes beyond a “quality control” approach to the judicial
role in administration since the Court would have the authority to intervene when it deemed
necessary and appropriate. Thus, under this model, the Court would have both the responsibility
and the authority to order the Chief Court Administrator to perform certain tasks or activities—
or to cease performing certain activities—in order to reach or maintain an acceptable level of
court administrative support to ensure the achievement of broader court goals and objectives.
There would be a concomitant authority and responsibility of the Court Executive Officer to
take or cease specific actions as ordered by the Court, and do so without delay. Obviously, the
Court Executive Officer could (and should) raise questions afterwards with his/her superiors 
in government. However, that reporting could not unnecessarily delay or otherwise affect the
carrying out of the Court’s orders.
There are a number of variations on this model which would have to be considered. For instance,
this “guardian” responsibility might be exercised, not by individual judges, but only by the chief
justice personally. Similarly, although it would not be consistent with the model to require the
chief justice to request either prior or subsequent approval from either the Legislature or the
executive for such orders, it might be appropriate for the Court to provide documentation for such
orders. Similarly, whether or not such documentation included reasons would have to be resolved
beforehand. Finally, special protocols—such as a contingency fund—would have to be developed
for those situations in which resources are not immediately available to allow court administration
to comply with the Court’s order out of the existing regular court budget.
However, the development of a consensus on court administration goals and objectives would be
an essential building block for implementing the Guardian Model. Clearly the model requires for
its success a joint understanding between the Court and the executive (and the Legislature) of
what will constitute appropriate goals and objectives regarding administrative infrastructure and
services to achieve acceptable levels of court performance. This is particularly important from an
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217 This description of the model is written as if the executive controls court administration.The Guardian Model would
however apply equally to situations in which court administration is governed through the Independent Commission
Model (but not through the Partnership Model).
accountability perspective, since the Court is in effect being given responsibility for ordering that
some other party perform or not perform actions necessary to achieve a level of performance for
which that other party has agreed beforehand to be accountable. As well, provision must be made
to ensure that both the judiciary and the executive are provided on an ongoing basis with current,
accurate and relevant information on all key aspects of court administration, especially the extent
to which the administration achieves its goals and objectives. Otherwise, the Court will have 
no mechanism for identifying whether intervention is required, and the executive will have no
mechanism for ensuring provision of an adequate level of resources.
This concept is derived from management theory. However, it was the very approach advocated in
the comprehensive 1973 Report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, but never implemented
by that province’s Ministry of the Attorney General. That report recommended that when a dispute
arose between executive and judiciary on a court administrative issue, the view of the judiciary
should prevail. It can be argued that the present Federal Court of Canada model is a variation on
this theme.
The Guardian Model might also be seen as a reflection of the kind of analysis made by Le Dain J.
on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Valente, the first case to define the concept of
judicial independence under section 11(d) of the Charter, because that case discussed a set of
administrative areas (e.g. assignment of judges to cases) that had to be under judicial control to
pass constitutional muster. But the Guardian Model conceptualized here is broader, since a chief
justice could invoke his/her authority in areas traditionally controlled by the executive.
8.4.2 Consultations
A small group of respondents in our consultations were attracted to this model, based largely on
the similarity of this model to the current Federal Court of Canada administrative structure. The
legislation creating the new Federal Court Administration Service, which came into force in July of
2003, provides that the Chief Justices of the Federal Court can give binding direction in writing to
the Chief Administrator, which in turn could form part of the Chief Administrator’s annual report to
Parliament.218 However, the Federal Court experience shows how considerable variation is possible
within each of the alternative models considered in this report. Although it would normally be
assumed that under a Guardian model the court would be selective with respect to the frequency
of intervening, within the current implementation of the Federal Court structure—even though 
it envisions an autonomous administration unit—the court in fact has been involved in a broad
range of areas and stages of administration decision-making.
One judicial respondent strongly supported the Guardian model precisely because he did not want
the judiciary to be involved in day-to-day court administration matters (e.g. personnel administration,
purchasing), but wanted for example to be able to order an exemption from Treasury Board
requirements that limited the flexibility of court staff addressing emergency situations.
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8.5 The Limited Autonomy Model
8.5.1 Description
This model reflects an emerging trend in countries around the world to confer increasing
authority and responsibility on the judiciary for court administration. This trend is also consistent
with the development of international instruments increasingly accepted by established and
aspiring democracies around the world.
Under the Limited Autonomy Model, court administration authority (including financial and
human resource management) is transferred by statute from the executive to the judiciary, which
will typically, in turn, delegate the day-to-day operational management of courts to a chief registrar
or Court Executive Officer. The registrar/CEO would be appointed by (or on the nomination of ) the
chief justice or a council of judges, and the work assignments and performance appraisals of the
executive officer would be the responsibility of the judiciary. All court staff would be under the
direction of the Court.
The main “limitation” in the Court’s autonomy could come from the Court’s global budget being
approved by the Legislature, although the Court could make representations directly to the
legislature on the Court’s needs. In these circumstances, the Court would operate within that
global budget. However, the Court would have the internal flexibility to reallocate approved funds.
The chief justice (or chair of a council of judges) would report to the Legislature on the administration
of the court, and would advise and receive advice from the attorney general and other officials
(and private groups) as he/she deems necessary and appropriate. Typically this would be done
through the court registrar or the Executive Officer of the courts. And of course the Courts could
be administered within the legal framework established by statutes that define the organization
and jurisdiction of the courts and the social justice priorities of the province.
Judicial autonomy is “limited” under this model in another sense as well. Some areas of court
administration could remain beyond the sphere of judicial control under a Limited Autonomy
model—for example, decisions over whether to construct or close a courthouse could continue 
to be political decisions. While the judiciary may not control such decisions, the logic of the
Limited Autonomy model would militate in favour of significant and meaningful consultation 
and consensus around decisions of this kind.
Clearly defined court administration goals and objectives—and the provision of information
describing how well those goals and objectives have been met—play an especially important role
in this model. Under this model, it is the Court itself that defines those administrative goals and
objectives. It is through the provision of timely, accurate and comprehensive information to the
Legislature and to the public at large that the Courts ensure real transparency and accountability
for their administration decisions and actions.
This model is not new to court administration. In fact, variations of the model have been
recommended and implemented in a number of jurisdictions.
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• The Deschenes Report
In the early 1980s, Quebec Superior Court Chief Justice Jules Deschenes published a blueprint 
for independent judicial administration of the courts in terms of three stages: consultation,
decision-sharing, and independence. His third stage recommended a judicial council in which 
the judiciary was at least a majority and non-judicial representatives would not be appointed 
by the government.
• Australian Court Autonomous Model
The Deschenes Report had a significant influence on a 1991 Australian study on court
administration.219 The main characteristics of that report are partly reflected in the design of
the Federal Court of Australia and the role of its Chief Justice. That model has been labeled the
“Chief Justice Autonomous Model” since it applies to a single Court rather than to all of the
Courts within a particular state or province. For our purposes, the conceptualization of this 
model for the Courts of an entire province may be most closely approximated by the Courts
Administration Authority in the state of South Australia. Under that system, court administration
is responsible to a three-judge council made up of the chief justice of the state Supreme 
Court, the chief judge of the District Court, and the chief magistrate of the Magistrate’s Courts.
While this council has the authority and responsibility for court administration, it reports to 
the state Legislature through the responsible minister, in a process analogous to that of Crown
corporations or independent boards and agencies in Canadian provinces, and its budget must
still be approved by the normal estimates process.
• American Federal Courts
The most frequently cited examples of autonomous court administration operate within the
United States. The earliest and best known American model is the federal court system, in
which the Judicial Conference of the United States, made up of chief justices from every federal
appellate Court and district (trial) judges from each appellate circuit, and chaired by the Chief
Justice of the United States, sets policy for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
the agency with overall responsibility for federal court administration. In turn, judicial councils
in each circuit have authority in a dozen geographically-defined circuits. The Congress and the
President remain the budget authorities, but the Judicial Conference and the Administrative
Office have direct access to Congress and its committees, and chief judges and clerks of court
have broad authority to administer the budgets of major court units.
Those in Canada who claim that the American Federal Court Model is inconsistent with
principles of parliamentary government and ministerial accountability ignore two facts. First,
the separation of powers, especially between the judiciary on one hand, and the executive and
legislature on the other, is an accepted norm in Canadian constitutional law. Surely Canadian
ingenuity can be counted on to develop a model of court administration in light of the theory
and practice of the separation of powers within our parliamentary system. Second, while the
American Federal Court Model is linked to the imperatives of that country’s tripartite system of
government, in fact the executive model was used in the U.S. federal Courts for 150 years, and
was not replaced until 1939, in the wake of President Franklin Roosevelt’s controversial “court-
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packing” proposals two years earlier. Before that time, the Department of Justice administered
the Courts even as U.S. Attorneys from the same department prosecuted criminal cases in those
Courts, and there were numerous complaints from judges about the need to go through Justice
Department officials (i.e. U. S. Marshals) to obtain needed resources.220
• American State Courts
American state court systems have also typically adopted the Limited Autonomy Model.
State Courts vary considerably, because in a number of jurisdictions, many areas of trial court
administration remain a local responsibility, often in the hands of an elected county Clerk of
Court. Court reform has uniformly moved in the direction of unified administration at the state
level under the chief justice of the state Court of last resort. This model, advocated in the
American Bar Association Standards on Court Organization221 and adopted to various degrees
by a solid majority of states, has meant that the most successful and innovative state court
systems (e.g. New York, New Jersey, Colorado) have court budgets, personnel systems, and
management information systems administered by a state court administrative office directly
responsible to the state chief justice.222 At the same time, however, court budgets remain at the
discretion of Legislatures that are often active and vigorous in pursuing budget cutbacks.223
• Singapore
The internationalization of court administration, and our broader knowledge of court manage-
ment practices throughout the world, has revealed numerous other exceptions to an executive
model. Perhaps most intriguing is the Republic of Singapore. In colonial times, there was no
separation of executive and judicial authority; as a result, the chief justice sat in cabinet. Thus
court administration was under the authority of the chief justice in British times, and remained
with the chief justice after independence. Singapore court officials have never known any other
system, taking for granted and taking seriously their responsibility for managing the Courts and
introducing a wide range of innovations in technology and organization.
It is noteworthy that prior to Confederation, the executive model was not the accepted model for
court administration in Canada. The Chief Justice of Upper Canada sat on that province’s Executive
Council before Confederation, just as the Chief Justice of British Columbia sat as one of that future
province’s four governing commissioners. But in neither case did any administrative role for the
judiciary survive from colonial times.
While we have drawn our previous comparative examples exclusively from common law
jurisdictions such as Australia, Ireland and the United States, civil law countries have also moved 
in the direction of more autonomous court administration. In Western Europe, it appears that the
Netherlands has moved furthest in this direction, and in France, 37 regional president judges now
have expanded authority and responsibility for court administration. Sweden and more recently
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220 Until the late 1970s, financial and management audits of the Federal District Courts were conducted by lawyers employed
by the Justice Department’s Office of Judicial Examination. Records examined in that office in 1970 revealed that an audit
of the Arizona Territorial Court in the 1890s was conducted by Wyatt Earp.
221 First formulated in 1938, and then revised in the 1970s and again in the 1990s.
222 In another variant, California’s innovative court system is managed by a state court administrative office responsible to the
State Judicial Council which, while chaired by the Chief Justice, includes non-judicial representation.
223 See the Summer 2004 issue of The Judges’ Journal, a special issue on “The State Court Funding Crisis”; note also that the first
book on state Court budgeting was titled Separate but Subservient (D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1975).
Norway have also moved away from the traditional executive model. Emerging nations in 
post-Communist Eastern Europe have adopted elements of autonomous court administration 
(e.g. Bulgaria and the Republic of Georgia). In Asia, the Supreme Court of the Philippines has 
long held tight control over the administration of the nation’s entire court system.
8.5.2 Consultations
Not only has the Limited Autonomy model has found considerable support and success in a
number of established and emerging democracies around the world, but it also enjoyed the most
widespread support among judicial respondents to our consultations. For many, this model struck
the optimal balance between ministerial accountability and judicial independence, and seemed
best suited to achieving the goals and objectives set out in Figure 5-1.
A number of executive respondents worried that this model could politicize court administration.
As one Deputy Minister observed,
If responsibility for court administration were to be assigned to the Judiciary, I believe
the values which constitutional recognition of judicial independence advances would be
diminished. Responsibility for court administration involves many issues that are, or have
the potential to be, political.
The Deputy cited labor relations, budgetary resources, facilities construction (or closure) and policy
development as examples of matters inextricably bound up in political and government-wide
decision-making. However, it is far from clear that the judiciary would be more politicized under
alternatives to the executive model. Moreover, this view ignores the evident political problems
arising directly from the executive model and its failure to recognize the role that the Courts
legitimately play in the administration of the justice system. The most dramatic examples of
judges entering the political arena have occurred when provincial governments have threatened
substantial cutbacks in funding, personnel and/or facilities. The most recent example was in the
British Columbia Provincial Courts, when a new government elected by a landslide in 2001
threatened major retrenchment, including the closure of 24 (of the 100) provincial courthouses.
Would a more autonomous model of court administration result in the judiciary being seen to be
more “political”? Arguably, by establishing a clearer and stronger role for the judiciary in court
administration—and by clarifying the dividing line between the executive and the judiciary—
there would be less need for overt political intervention by the judiciary.
For the judicial respondents, most cited the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism as the key
limitation of this model. This of course constitutes a flaw of virtually all of the models, certainly
including the executive model. The problem is that where, for example, the autonomy of the
courts is not respected by the executive or where the executive declines to provide reasonable
support services and facilities for the courts, there is no “third party” to whom to turn to resolve
the impasse. For this reason, many believed the Limited Autonomy model would be most effective
if combined with a dispute resolution mechanism as anticipated in the model discussed below.
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8.6 Limited Autonomy & Commission Model
8.6.1 Description
During our analysis of elements and stages of management in Chapter 6, we suggested that when
court administrative decisions are considered in fuller detail and complexity, it might prove useful
to consider different models for different elements or stages. Given this suggestion, it is appropriate
that we present a model that in fact does this, especially given Canada’s experience with models
that include mechanisms similar to the remuneration commissions.
The Limited Autonomy & Commission Model identified here represents a combination of the
Limited Autonomy Model, by which the judiciary takes responsibility for court administration and
defines the standards by which it is accountable to the public for the exercise of that responsibility,
and an Independent Commission Model with a narrowly specified “dispute resolution mandate,”
by which a limited range of issues, principally around budgeting, would be subject to the binding
decision of an authority separate from both judiciary and government.
This combination of models is suggested in light of the realities of the Limited Autonomy Model.
To place authority for court administration within the Court and remove it from government,
effective processes for public accountability must be in place, such as the proposals for defining
and measuring objectives suggested in the preceding section. Furthermore, we have noted the
importance of the Courts articulating expectations for their administration that could enhance
transparency and accountability. Under these circumstances, to maintain full executive and
parliamentary control over court budgets could lead to grim reminders of just how limited the
administrative autonomy of the Courts would be if central agencies of provincial governments 
fall prey to the temptation to place more substantial fiscal constraints on the Courts.
More importantly, it must be recognized that one of the most significant shortcomings of the
executive model is that the judiciary—through the Chief Justice—is involved in continuous
negotiations with the executive branch of government over a wide range of areas. The Limited
Autonomy model addresses this concern by making courts self-governing within a global budget.
To the extent that the breadth, depth and frequency of negotiations around such budgetary
issues is a concern shared by executive and judicial respondents alike, it suggests the need for an
appropriate and effective mechanism to resolve issues relating to the setting of the global budget.
Given the extent to which Courts in the United States, particularly at the state level, have been
compromised by the politics of the budgetary process even when the executive and legislative
branches are separated, the absence of a full separation of executives and Legislatures in Canadian
provinces suggests that much more fundamental problems arise in this country. We have been
fortunate that the level of political conflict has not traditionally been as high in our provinces as 
in the governments in the United States and in many newly-emerging democracies. However,
we should consider appropriate governance structures before we face greater difficulties.
The option proposed here would be to create a setting and mechanism by which conflicts over
levels of funding for the Courts could be referred to an independent official, body or commission
for resolution. This would allow for dispute avoidance as well as dispute resolution and would
achieve the goal of depoliticizing the relationship between the judiciary and the executive over
the most contentious policy and political matters.
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While the analogy to the remuneration commissions was raised earlier, it is not clear that a
similarly structured body would be appropriate to tackle areas of court administration outside of
salaries. The make-up and mandate of such a commission may vary across courts and/or jurisdictions,
but the success of the model depends on a credible commission with the moral and legal authority
to issue decisions which command the respect of executive and judiciary. With this goal in mind, a
broader group, possibly with participation by stakeholders and public organizations (in addition to
commission members able to reflect executive and judicial perspectives) may well be appropriate.
8.6.2 Consultations
This model enjoyed the highest degree of support during our consultations. Many respondents
suggested the Limited Autonomy and Commission models were complementary and in fact
should be integrated. In this fashion, the judiciary would enjoy significant responsibility for and
control over court administration decision-making but could avoid becoming embroiled in
political disputes over resources. The commission would ensure that disputes were resolved based
on principled accommodation and that both political accountability and judicial independence
received appropriate consideration.
As one Chief Justice commented during a Canadian Judicial Council seminar discussion on the
alternative models,“together, the limited autonomy and commission models strike a balance that
can work.”
A number of judicial respondents worried that the limited autonomy model could lead over time
to friction with a government intent on retaining or reestablishing control over court administration.
Ensuring a mechanism for dispute resolution and, just as importantly, dispute avoidance, would
contribute to predictable and constructive relations between the executive and judiciary under
the limited autonomy model and also reflect the depoliticization of court administration consistent
with the constitutional analysis set out in Chapter 4.
Judicial respondents cited a range of reasons for moving toward a limited autonomy and
commission model. These included:
• This model could best support a culture of continuous innovation and improvement of court
administration.
• This model could most effectively guarantee judicial supervision over access to justice, especially
for self-represented and marginal litigants.
• This model most effectively avoids a divisive and adversarial atmosphere over court
administration.
• This model could allow courts to develop and implement strategic planning.
• This model is the only one which combines judicial autonomy with ministerial responsibility.
Overall, the limited autonomy and commission model not only garnered the most supportive
response from the consultations but also attracted the fewest negative responses.
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8.7 The Judicial Model
8.7.1 Description
For the sake of completeness, and because it is the mirror image of the executive model with
which this Chapter began, the last model proposed here is one that is based on complete judicial
control, rather than complete executive control, over court administration. Under this model, the
Court not only controls its own administration, but it has the authority and ability to set its own
rules, hire and fire its own administrative personnel, and set its own budget.
This model of court administration has been manifest in greater and lesser degrees through
history and even today, although an interdependent (and even wired) world makes self sufficiency
appear obsolete. Historically, common law courts often generated their own funds through court
fees, and enforced their own orders through the exercise of the contempt power. To this day,
probate courts exist in the United States in which the court receives a percentage of the estates 
it probates, and uses the proceeds to hire staff and maintain court records and court facilities.224
Furthermore, American state Courts have used a variation of the contempt power to argue that
they have an inherent power to govern many aspects of their internal operations, and even order
the payment of funds deemed “reasonably necessary” for the exercise of their constitutional
functions. This inherent powers doctrine has been used in over 30 states and remains valid law
today, as an extension of the inherent power of common law courts to maintain orderly court
proceedings and enforce judicial orders. Most funding mandates based on inherent powers were
made against local funding authorities, and as state Courts shifted funding authority from local
governments to state Legislatures, the use of the doctrine has declined. In effect, state court
systems traded constitutional authority for managerial autonomy.225
8.7.2 Consultations
The Judicial model did not receive strong support from either judicial or executive respondents,
although some respondents in the consultation indicated that this would be their preference “in
an ideal world”.
Given the political realities and Westminster principles which characterize the administration of
budgets and policies in the justice sector, few believed a fully realized Judicial model would be
either viable or desirable. Both judicial and executive respondents acknowledged the importance
of responsible government and democratic accountability in court administration.
110 Chapter 8
224 Until 1990, Ontario Small Claims Court clerks typically operated in this fashion. One variation of this approach was termed 
a Franchise Model in a U.S. study that dubbed them “Kentucky Fried Courts”; see Carl BAAR and Thomas A. HENDERSON,
“Alternative Models for the Organization of State Court Systems,” in Philip L. DUBOIS, ed., The Analysis of Judicial Reform
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982), ch. 13.
225 For the best general survey of the use of inherent powers by American state Courts, see Felix F. STUMPF, Inherent Powers of
the Courts: Sword and Shield of the Judiciary (Reno, Nevada: National Judicial College, 1994).
8.8 Conclusions
Based on the descriptions, analysis and consultations discussed above, we have reached the
following conclusions with respect to each of the models of court administration:
1. Notwithstanding the significant successes and accomplishments of Canadian court
administration, it is apparent that the executive model is deficient in key aspects. Further,
the success of the executive model has often in the past depended on the level of trust 
and communications that exist among specific persons occupying key decision-making
positions—and their dedication and willingness to make modifications to the pure executive
model. It is a very positive sign that these modifications—most if not all toward greater (but
limited) judicial autonomy — have generated significant improvements and have earned
support from both the court and the executive. However, the independence of the judiciary,
the effectiveness and efficiency of the courts, and public confidence in the justice system
requires an improved and robust model that ensures that jurisdictions take full advantage 
of more of the types of improvements that have already proven to be advantageous.
2. The independent commission model offers some advantages, most notably it provides 
a “level playing field”. However, it does so by reducing the influence of the executive (and
others) to a level similar to that of the judiciary currently. The model therefore fails to resolve
one of the key concerns with the executive model, since it fails to enhance the judicial role 
in court administration decision-making, while reducing the government’s role.
3. The partnership model has some appeal—and it may be appropriate in smaller jurisdictions
where such models are used routinely in decision-making in other areas of government 
and civil society. However, for most jurisdictions it fails to resolve the key concerns with the
executive model on a number of dimensions; for instance, the absence of a clearly defined
decision maker and the dependence on the particular characteristics of the different partners.
In fact, in many circumstances this model could exacerbate many of the undesirable features
of the executive model.
4. The executive guardian model partially resolves the key concerns with the executive model,
by giving the court power to order either that certain court administration activities take
place or that certain activities be stopped. However, this model also has some deficiencies.
In particular, it does not incorporate any ongoing mechanisms to facilitate effective court
involvement in larger strategic decisions that will have fundamental impacts on judicial
independence and the effectiveness and efficiency of court administration.
5. The limited autonomy model resolves many of the key concerns with the executive model.
While consistent with a Westminster system of Parliamentary supremacy, and while main-
taining democratic accountability over resource allocations, this model is based on judicial
control and autonomy over core areas of court administration. Further, although the model of
judicial autonomy would be expected to be applied to the large majority of areas and stages
of administration decision-making, the model also recognizes that judicial autonomy could be
limited—perhaps differently in different jurisdictions. For instance, the model could address
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one of the key concerns raised about models involving judicial control—by leaving the
determination of the overall total court administration budget with the executive or
legislature and outside the “limit” of judicial autonomy. However, this model does not address
dispute resolution between the judiciary and executive over court administration policies.
6. The limited autonomy and commission model incorporates the features of the limited
autonomy model but joins that model with independent commission model in order to
provide a mechanism for resolution and avoidance of disputes.
7. The judicial model —with judicial control over virtually all court administration decisions—
resolves some of the key concerns with the executive model, but gives rise to a different




The Recommended Model: Limited
Autonomy & Commission Model
9.1 Review of the Purpose, Criteria for Assessment 
and Key Findings and Conclusions
The main purpose of the research and consultations conducted as part of this research has been
to determine which of the models described in Chapter 8, alone or in combination, would be 
the most appropriate for either all or specific subgroups of the different types and stages of
administrative decisions (identified in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 above).
The appropriateness of any alternative model relates directly to how well its application improves
(or hinders) the ability to achieve the goals and objectives in the four areas listed in Figure 5.1,
namely:
1. to better preserve judicial independence and the institutional integrity of the judiciary 
as a separate branch of government
2. to better enhance public trust and confidence in the judicial system
3. to better improve the quality and delivery of judicial services, more specifically:
a) By making court dispute resolution more accessible (esp. by reducing costs, introducing
more familiar and effective process, resulting in more timely resolution)
b) By ensuring a more timely pace of litigation (all stages)
c) By enhancing the quality of dispute resolution (equality, fairness and integrity—
process and outcomes)
d) By enhancing court transparency
e) By enhancing the environment for conducting the work of the court (litigants, judiciary,
lawyers, mediators, other participants)
4. to better develop within the Court an enhanced capability and culture of continuous
improvement and reform (through enhanced direction and leadership, organization, strategies
and procedures, resources and/or support systems).
Our investigation developed and examined information from five main sources:
1. a detailed review of related constitutional considerations;
2. two rounds of interviews with Chief Justices and Deputy Ministers and other key participants
in court administration from most jurisdictions in Canada, with the first round of interviews
focusing on the models currently existing in Canada, and the second round of interviews
focusing on a range of alternative models;
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3. two seminars held with the Canadian Judicial Council following each round of interviews 
at which the issues raised during the consultations were discussed;
4. a review of the range of models used in Courts in other jurisdictions internationally; and 
5. a review of the more general body of knowledge on models of administrative decision-
making in Courts and in other organizations.
This investigation has led to the determination that the limited autonomy and commission model
is the optimal model for court administration in Canada. The next section summarizes the analysis
which has led to this conclusion.
9.2 The Recommended Model
Why recommend the limited autonomy and commission model? There are three central justifications
for this recommendation, all of which flow directly from the analysis presented in the body of the
report. The first is the constitutional argument in favour of this model, the second is the argument
based on administrative efficiency and effectiveness and the third is the argument based on the
results of the consultations undertaken as part of this research.
First, the limited autonomy and commission model is most fully consistent with the constitutional
analysis presented in Chapter 4. It protects judicial independence while respecting the role of the
political branches in the budgeting of public funds. Valente illustrated the minimum requirements
of administrative independence for Courts as judicial autonomy over a limited sphere of court
administration activities. The limited autonomy and commission model builds on this same
principle—the link between adjudicative and administrative independence—and strengthens 
it. Importantly, Valente did not enumerate any court administration functions which would not 
be appropriate for judicial autonomy and was never treated as an exhaustive code. More recent
decisions expand the grounds of judicial independence and increase its requirements of
institutional independence by situating it in the broader context of the separation of powers and
the rule of law. These principles and developments all suggest the need for an enhanced judicial
role in court administration and a depoliticization of court relationships with the executive and
the legislative branches. The limited autonomy and commission model depoliticizes these
relationships by clarifying the areas of decision-making in which the judiciary will be autonomous
and the area of decision-making which will be subject to an independent commission. A growing
body of international soft law on judicial independence reinforces this view, as does a clear trend
toward greater judicial autonomy in civil and common law jurisdictions across the globe.
The executive model of court administration in Canada operates in an environment of
constitutional uncertainty. The extent to which the doctrines of judicial independence and the
separation of powers militate for judicial autonomy over a number of the stages and areas of
court administration elaborated in Chapter 6 is unclear. The recommended model ends this
uncertainty and provides a more robust constitutional foundation for the administration of 
the courts, which could in turn enhance public confidence in the administration of justice.
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Second, from the vantage of administrative effectiveness and efficiency, this model addresses the
key shortcomings identified with the executive model. Those shortcomings need not be repeated
again here, but include the lack of a single source of clear leadership and accountability, divided
loyalties of court staff, the absence of stable funding and strategic planning capacity, and the
likelihood that the court’s interests may become subsumed by the policy priorities of the
government of the day. The recommended model addresses these shortcomings directly. Under
this model, court staff would report to a Court Executive Officer responsible for running the day-
to-day operations of the court, who in turn reports to the Chief Justice(s).
Because the courts would have control over how budget is allocated, they will be able to engage
in long-term strategic planning (and in augmenting their capacity for such planning) based on
the continuous improvement cycle of court administration presented in Chapter 6. Courts on 
this model would be able to focus on the public interest in efficiently and effectively run courts,
undistracted by political vicissitudes or partisan campaigns. Self-administered courts will be able
to forge better ties with the other key participants in court administration identified in Chapter 7.
Too often in the past, relationships traditionally mediated by the Attorney General’s office have
proven cumbersome, with the potential for the government’s priorities and the court’s priorities to
be blurred. In the recommended model, courts may develop independent and direct relationships
with other government departments, stakeholder groups in the justice community, and the public
at large, in furtherance of a coherent vision of court administration priorities.
Returning to the criteria for selecting a preferred model as detailed in Chapter 5, it was observed
that innovation in court administration is a function of institutional confidence and administrative
competence. A comparative review of developments in court administration in other jurisdictions
(including Australia, Singapore, Ireland and the United States) suggests that self-administered
courts have a comparative advantage over the executive-led administration of courts both 
in terms of institutional confidence and administrative competence. Further, as noted above,
transparency and accountability are greater when innovation is developed by self-administered
courts. Since innovation does not require direct negotiation with government officials to whom
court administration is subordinate, the appearance of justice is not compromised—but in fact
enhanced—by innovation efforts.
Third, the autonomy and commission model was overwhelmingly the preferred model in the
consultations undertaken in support of this analysis and discussed in Chapter 8. The fact that 
the overwhelming majority of judicial respondents and indeed many executive respondents
highlighted flaws in the executive model speaks to the need for change and the rationale for 
this study. When presented with a number of alternative models, a strong majority of judicial
respondents believed that the combination of the limited autonomy model and the independent
commission model would be the most desirable alternative model. Some were persuaded for
reasons of constitutional principle, some for reasons of administrative practice in light of their 
own experience. Others were persuaded by the success of judicial autonomy initiatives in their
own jurisdiction, or by the success of limited autonomy models in analogous jurisdictions such 
as Australia.
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Executive respondents also emphasized the success of judicial autonomy initiatives within the
executive model. The reasons given for why the executive model was nonetheless preferable to
alternative models, however, do not stand up to careful scrutiny. Some executive respondents, for
example, pointed to the lack of judicial capacity to manage court administration. Courts lack this
capacity, however, precisely because under the executive model the executive branch manages
court administration and controls the courts’ ability to develop this capacity. Other respondents
raised the difficulty of judges making daily decisions on human resources, information technology
and so forth. Under the recommended model, however, the day-to-day operations of the court are
handled by the Court Executive Officer, not judges. What changes under the recommended model
is to whom the Court Executive Officer is accountable and who sets the global direction of court
administration.
The consultations reflect broad judicial support for the view that the recommended model is the
most constitutionally suitable and will result in more efficient and effective court administration.
The recommended model is also consistent with the principles most often cited by executive
respondents, such as ministerial responsibility and public accountability.
The consultations also reinforced the view that Canada is falling behind its peers. The trend
globally, and in other common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia, is
toward greater judicial autonomy and self-governing courts.
In summary, based on a constitutional analysis, an analysis of administrative effectiveness and
efficiency and extensive consultations with both judicial and executive respondents, this report
concludes that the optimal model of court administration in the present circumstances is one
which features limited judicial autonomy, combined with an independent commission for the
prevention and resolution of disputes regarding the global budget for court administration. This
model represents the best alternative for preserving judicial independence and the institutional
integrity of the judiciary, enhancing public trust and confidence in the judicial system, improving
the quality and delivery of judicial services and developing a culture of continuous improvement
in the administration of Canadian courts.
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